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    • 专利摘要:
    The field of the invention is that of the methods for checking the integrity of the estimation of the position of a mobile carrier, said position being established by a satellite positioning measurement system, said estimation being obtained by the methods called "real-time kinematics". The method according to the invention verifies that the carrier phase measurement is consistent with the pseudo-code distance measurement. The method comprises a step (E3) for calculating the speed of the carrier, at each instant of observation, a step (E4) of verification that at each of said observation instants, the short-term evolution of the phase of carrier of the signals received on each of the satellite view axes is consistent with the calculated speed and a step (E6, E7) of checking that at each of said observation instants, the filtered position obtained from the filtered pseudo-distance measurements long term by the carrier phase is integrity.
    公开号:FR3076354A1
    申请号:FR1701391
    申请日:2017-12-28
    公开日:2019-07-05
    发明作者:Marc Revol
    申请人:Thales SA；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    Method for checking the integrity of the estimation of the position of a mobile carrier in a satellite positioning measurement system
    The general field of the invention relates to the consolidation of the integrity of high-precision positioning methods accessible through constellations of GNSS satellites, acronym for "Global Navigation Satellite System". A privileged field of application of the invention is that of drone navigation. The new regulations governing the use of drones are gradually leading drones to take on autonomous and integrated positioning systems that meet the safety objectives set by the aeronautical authorities. For certain drone operations, positioning must be carried out with great precision to ensure the precise referencing of on-board devices.
    A position integrity defect delivered by a GNSS-type satellite navigation system consists of the existence of a position measurement bias greater than a given threshold without this estimation error being detected by the system. In aeronautics, the estimated GNSS position is always associated with a protection radius, making it possible to evaluate the volume within which it is not possible to guarantee, for a given confidence, the detection of a bias of position. Biases can arise from unreported satellite outages, errors in signal propagation, or faults in the receivers of these signals. The barriers that specifically monitor for satellite failures are known by the general acronym "RAIM", meaning "Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring". There are different types known by the acronyms of "RAIM-FDE", meaning "RAIM- Fault Detection and Exclusion", "RAIM_SBAS", meaning "RAIM_Satellite Based Augmentation System" or "ARAIM", meaning "Advanced RAIM".
    These algorithms, defined for aeronautical operations, are used to verify the integrity of the position calculated on the basis of pseudo-distance measurements developed from estimates of arrival dates accessible through broadband spreading codes. called "BPSK", acronym meaning "Binary Phase Shift Keying". Similar algorithms, based on the signal carrier phase increment measurements, can also be used to check the consistency of the speed estimate calculated on the basis of the integrated doppler measurements. By way of example, mention may be made of US Pat. No. 6,169,957 entitled “Satellite signal receiver with speed computing integrity control”.
    The risk of loss of integrity depends on the probability of non-detection of these error monitoring algorithms, but also on the occurrence of feared events generated at the satellite level such as failures not detected by the satellite system. Thus, only the integrity of the position estimate calculated on the basis of the pseudo-distance measurements can be verified, since the GNSS service providers currently only guarantee the defect rate existing on the pseudoranges and not on the linked measurements. at the carrier phase.
    Despite the diversity of methods capable of providing high-precision GNSS positioning measurements based on techniques known as "PPP", acronym for "Precise Point Positioning" or "RTK", acronym for "Real Time Kinematic" and despite the advent dual frequency constellations which simplify the precise positioning algorithm and make it more robust, it is still not possible to associate them with a risk of loss of integrity, which makes them difficult to use for "SOL" applications, acronym for "Safety Of Life".
    Also, receivers certified for aeronautical operations only use pseudo-distance measurements to calculate the position. The integrity of the position solution is evaluated by the receiver on the basis of the dispersion of the pseudo-distance errors calculated from the residuals of the least square of the pseudo-distance measurements. Doppler measurements, characteristic of the evolution of the carrier phase related to relative displacement, are not used for their part to consolidate the integrity, whereas they provide much more precise details than the code and , potentially, would make it possible to reach much smaller protection radii for the management of relative displacement.
    The PPP and RTK techniques deployed in the field of geodesy directly use the phase measurements of the satellite carriers, and are known to provide position accuracy of decimetric or even centimeter level, but without the ability to ensure the integrity of the position measurement.
    Several attempts have however been made to monitor the integrity of the RTK point, on the basis of the phase measurements and their ambiguities, but these are limited to carriers with weak dynamics or to analyzes by post-processing. or requiring latency incompatible with real-time monitoring of errors. In addition, the unknown weighing on the occurrence rate of carrier phase faults emitted by the satellite does not a priori guarantee the risk of loss of integrity of such precise measurements.
    The method according to the invention makes it possible to provide real-time monitoring of positioning bias derived from the carrier phase of the GNSS signals, which is not limited to operations with low carrier dynamics. It can be implemented in all satellite positioning systems compatible with the so-called "Real Time Kinematics" technique, also known by the name "RTK" meaning "Real Time Kinematic".
    More specifically, the subject of the invention is a method for checking the integrity of the estimation of the position of a mobile carrier, said position being established by a satellite positioning measurement system, said estimation being obtained by so-called “real time kinematics” methods, said methods being based on carrier phase measurements of so-called “GNSS” signals from satellites, said method verifying that a carrier phase measurement is consistent with a pseudo measurement code distance, characterized in that said method comprises:
    a first step E1 of calculating the initial position and time of the carrier, said first step carried out on the basis of the pseudodistances estimated on the axes in view of the satellites, from measurements of the time received carried by the spreading codes of the signals from satellites;
    a second step E2 verifying the integrity of the initial position and time resolution carried out from the satellite pseudo-distances carried out on the basis of a standard algorithm for monitoring satellite faults of the "RAIM" type;
    a third step E3 of calculating the speed of the carrier, at a plurality of observation instants, said third step being carried out on the basis of the apparent Doppler measurements estimated on the axes with satellite view, from phase measurements carrier of satellite signals;
    - A fourth step E4 of verification that at each of said observation instants, the short-term evolution of the carrier phase of the signals received on each of the axes with satellite view is consistent with the speed calculated in the previous step;
    a sixth step E6 and E7 of verification that at each of said observation instants, the filtered position obtained from pseudo-distance measurements filtered in the long term by the carrier phase is integral.
    Advantageously, the method comprises an eighth step E8 of resolving the entire phase ambiguities in the area of uncertainty associated with the filtered position.
    Advantageously, the method comprises a ninth step of calculating the “real time kinematic” position on the basis of the carrier phase measurements E9 and a tenth step E10 of verifying the final integrity of the position consisting in applying a standard monitoring algorithm “RAIM” type satellite failures on the differential phase residuals ensuring the final integrity of the differential position calculation and associating it with a protection radius.
    The invention will be better understood and other advantages will appear on reading the description which follows given without limitation and thanks to the appended figures among which:
    Figure 1 shows the general principle of the positioning method by "RTK";
    FIG. 2 represents the general block diagram of a GNSS reception channel;
    FIG. 3 represents the block diagram of the determination of the GPS attitude;
    FIG. 4 represents the determination of the speed vector of an antenna;
    Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the number of differential phase difference ambiguities and the direction of incidence of the signal;
    Figure 6 illustrates the definition of whole phase and floating phase ambiguities;
    FIG. 7 is an example of searching for whole phase ambiguities in the uncertainty domain of floating ambiguities;
    FIG. 8 shows the entire RTK type positioning method according to the invention.
    The method according to the invention is implemented in GNSS bi-constellation GPS-Galileo receivers of the "DFMC" type, acronym meaning "Dual Frequency Multi Constellation Receiver". The method according to the invention requires simple adaptations of the basic processing of the position in order to add controls making it possible to ensure the integrity of the positioning measurement. These adaptations are within the reach of those skilled in the art, specialists in satellite positioning systems.
    In the following description, the expression “short term” corresponds to the rate of calculation of the GNSS speed, ie 0.1 seconds. The expression "long term" corresponds to the duration of the carrier-code filtering, conventionally between 60 seconds and 120 seconds.
    The principle of this process is based on the development of a control of the integrity of the RTK position estimation, obtained from the carrier phases of the GNSS signals, starting from a less precise position but which we were able to ensure the integrity developed from GNSS code delays.
    This consolidation is based on the assumption that the two positioning methods established on the carrier phases and on the code delays are affected simultaneously by defects in the generation of the satellite signal, and therefore that:
    - any non-integrity detected by the position monitoring algorithm, calculated from code delays, also induces a non-integrity of the position constructed from the carrier phase.
    - as long as the position monitoring algorithm calculated from the pseudo-distances declares the position integral, then the position constructed from the carrier phase is potentially integral, provided that it also checks for its constraints consistency between carrier phase measurements.
    The precise positioning algorithm according to the invention comprises two main steps:
    - An estimation of floating ambiguities, based on pseudo-distance measurements of codes and their uncertainties, resulting from the classical resolution of position by least square;
    - A determination of the whole carrier phase ambiguities around this first position in the area of unambiguous ambiguity, from which results the resolution of the second precise position.
    The integrity of the estimate of the precise position therefore implies that each of these two stages is itself integral, therefore that:
    - The pseudo-distance measurements on the code are integrated
    - The phase measurements on the carrier are integrated
    If we name the following assertions:
    P: "Precise positioning is integral",
    - Q1: "The algorithm for positioning on the code delay is integrated"
    - Q2: "The algorithm for positioning on the carrier phase is integrated"
    It is equivalent to writing, at all times t that:
    P (t) => [Q1 (t) A Q2 (t)] or again, no [Q1 (t) A Q2 (t)] => no [P (t) J no [Q1 (t)] v no [Q2 (t) J => no [P (t)] "no [Q1 (t)]" can be evaluated by standard position integrity algorithms obtained from code pseudo-distances. The “no [Q2 (t)]” control algorithm is the essential object of the present invention.
    This algorithm does not consist of an estimation of the carrier phase measurement residues due to the too great uncertainty based on the resolution of the whole carrier phase ambiguities and because of the large number of combinations evaluated. The resolution of the whole phase ambiguities is effective only if the phase measurements are all integral, i.e. there is no measurement bias greater than the measurement uncertainty. phase. On the other hand, in the presence of one or more phase measurement biases, the significant combinatorics of the whole ambiguities can lead to a convergence of the search algorithm on a non-integral combination, while respecting the constraints of reduced dispersion on the residuals of carrier phase measurement.
    To overcome this difficulty, we propose a two-step approach:
    - guarantee the integrity of the initial resolution, based on the filtering of pseudo-distance measurements of code whose integrity has been previously checked by a standard algorithm (RAIM .....),
    - check that at all times the evolution of the carrier phase remains consistent with the speed estimate carried out in parallel with the position estimate from the apparent Doppler measurements obtained by dividing the phase increments by the interval of time considered.
    The combination of these two verifications makes it possible to ensure that the initial precise position at a time T0 is integral, and that the new phase measurements used to maintain the precise position at a time T greater than T0 remain valid and intact. This reduces the risk that the carrier phase measurement becomes inconsistent with the code pseudodistance measurement, and therefore that the precise position estimate is not integrated while the standard position measurement on the code would have been declared to be intact.
    The method according to the invention describes a possible, but not exclusive, implementation of the approach described above. The general principle of RTK-type positioning is based on the precise estimation of the lever arm between a reference station of known position and the user's antenna, based on differential phase measurements of the carriers of the signals from satellites.
    Since the RTK method is based on differential carrier phase measurements, it is considered that all the common biases between the reference station and the user can be canceled and that the sources of residual integrity loss are linked to defects originating from the propagation. local. For example, these faults are due to tropospheric disturbances or to those of the ionospheric front or to multiple signal paths or to antenna biases. Receiver bias common to all satellites is also eliminated by double difference, to the detriment of a visual axis.
    This method is shown in FIG. 1. The two circled crosses represent the positions of the reference station A r and the antenna of the user Au respectively. The direction or "LOS", meaning "Line Of Position" of one of the satellites of the GNSS constellation is indicated by the white arrow. It is characterized by the vector ü. The dotted lines perpendicular to this direction represent the wave planes Po of the signal transmitted by this satellite. Two consecutive wave planes are separated from the emission wavelength λ of this signal.
    The base line Lb is the line joining the station to the user. It is represented by the vector b. The direction of this baseline makes an angle Θ with the LOS of the satellite. We denote by n the whole number of wave planes separating the wave plane of the reference antenna from the user's antenna, this number is also known as ambiguity. F is the fraction of wavelength remaining between the reference antenna and the user's antenna. In the direction of the satellite, the differential phase or path difference ΛΦβεί defined geometrically by the projection or the scalar product of the length of the baseline on the direction of the satellite considered and is therefore equal to:
    ΔΦ = (n + F) * A = u »b
    To deliver a phase measurement, a receiver receives and processes the GPS signal from the satellite using a tracking loop in code known as "DLL", acronym meaning "Delay-Locked Loop" and a tracking loop in carrier called "PLL", acronym meaning "Phase-Locked Loop" as shown in Figure 2. The different acronyms in this Figure 2 represent the following functions:
    - Formatting: This function covers all the functions making it possible to format the signal received from the satellite into a usable signal. These are essentially the functions of filtering, demodulation, automatic gain correction or AGC and conversion of the analog signal into digital or CAN signal.
    - Clock: This function delivers a reference clock signal.
    - NCO: This acronym corresponds to digital control oscillators.
    - DEM: This acronym means demodulator.
    - C.l and C. Q: These acronyms represent the correlators used to deliver the signal and the signal in quadrature.
    - G.C.L. : This acronym means: "Local Code Generator".
    In the case of two antennas, the signals received demodulated by the code and the carrier are written:
    r t (t) = 5, (0 + ^, (0 = aD (t) .exp j (2rft + <p) + n x (t) r 2 (t) = s 2 (t) + n 2 ( t) = aD (t). exp j (2.Ttft + 2π / θτ + φ) + n 2 (t)
    OR,
    - s1 (t) and s2 (t) are respectively the satellite signals received by each antenna,
    - n1 (t) and n2 (t) are the noises received by each antenna respectively,
    - f is the residual carrier frequency,
    - fO is the carrier frequency received,
    - φ is the initial phase of the signal, undetermined,
    - D (t) is the sign of the data which optionally modulates the carrier a is the amplitude of the processed signal,
    - τ is the delay in propagation of the wave between the two antennas separated by a distance d and incidence Θ as defined above. It is worth, c being the speed of light:
    d.cos (0)
    T = ------ c
    The determination of the lever arm is obtained by calculation from the ambiguous phase measurements, by adding the ambiguity previously initialized and maintained, then by reversing the projection of the baseline on the directions of the different satellites as shown in the diagram of Figure 3. On this block diagram, the term "LA corresponds to" Lifting of Ambiguities ". The satellite LOS are derived from so-called “PVT” data, acronym meaning “Position, Velocity, Time” resolved by GPS positioning and from the so-called “PVS” validation protocol, acronym for “Protocol Validation System” calculated by the receiver from navigation data received which is essentially the ephemeris or the almanac and time resolved.
    The initial "Ambiguity Removal" consists in selecting for each satellite the whole number of wavelengths corresponding to the whole part of the difference in the GPS signal. This selection is taken from a research area that includes all possible ambiguity values at the start. In the absence of prior knowledge, the domain is bounded for each satellite by the whole number of wavelengths contained in the baseline.
    The speed of the carrier in the local geographic benchmark can be estimated on the basis of the GNSS signals from the evolution of the phase of the signal observed in each of the axes in view of the satellites. This evolution of the phase is significant of the variation of the doppler signal, itself linked to the evolution of the satellite-carrier distance. The carrier speed can thus be resolved by the method of least squares, a dozen axes with GPS view being commonly available, this number can even be increased by satellites of other constellations.
    Figure 4 illustrates this principle. Three satellites S1, S2 and S3 are seen from antenna A which is driven at a speed v. The measurement of the three projections P1, P2 and P3 of the speed vector v on the three directions LOS1, LOS2 and LOS3 make it possible to find the coordinates of the speed vector of the antenna.
    The method for checking the integrity of the precise position according to the invention comprises several steps. The essential step of the process consists, before any calculation of the lever arm in position between the reference station and the user established on the basis of the differential measurements of carrier phases which corresponds to the conventional processing of the RTK process, in verifying that the phases measured on the different satellites are consistent and compatible with RTK processing.
    For phase measurements, we are only interested in the local consistency of the measurements between satellites, without considering the absolute errors linked to the transmission of signals at satellite level, errors linked to synchronization, to orbit since the common biases are eliminated by differentiation.
    The integrity of the reference phases, measured and sent by the reference station being previously checked by the differential reference station, in a conventional manner, on the basis of the carrier phase residues estimated from precise knowledge of the position of the reception antenna, checking the consistency of the local phase measurements of the different satellites ensures that the received signals are correctly synchronized with each other, and therefore that the differential phases can be used for the calculation of the user-reference station leverage , thus demonstrating that there are no inconsistencies between the differential phase measurements linked to the different satellites which would come from uncontrolled local phenomena around the user.
    The difficulty of this approach relates to verifying the integrity of the carrier phases at the level of the user, if neither its position nor its speed are known. To carry out this verification, the pseudo-distance measurements filtered using the carrier phase are used.
    The principle consists in reducing the spatial domain in which the ambiguity survey of the carrier phases necessary for the resolution of the RTK position is carried out. Thus, if it is possible to find a combination of phases with "whole ambiguities" compatible with the position obtained on the basis of the code measurements filtered with the carrier doppler measurements, then the calculated RTK position is declared "integrates" in a protection radius compatible with phase measurement errors, i.e. a few centimeters.
    Figures 5, 6 and 7 provide a better understanding of this principle. FIG. 5 represents an antenna A separated from a user U. The antenna and the user receive signals from a constellation of satellites. In FIG. 5, by way of example, the number of satellites is four. Each satellite is perceived in a direction noted LOS. Each satellite corresponds to a different projection P on the baseline denoted L B in FIG. 5. The concentric dotted circles correspond to positioning uncertainties. Their radii are equal to a whole number of wavelengths λ as shown in Figure 5.
    FIG. 6 represents the decomposition of a projection P originating from a satellite in the line of direction LOS on the base line L B. The measurement of this projection P breaks down into an observed value Φ and an undetermined value equal to an integer N of wavelengths λ also called whole phase ambiguities. For example, in the case of FIG. 6, N is 3. The observed value Φ also includes a second integer of wavelengths N ', also called floating phase ambiguities, and a phase φ equal to one fraction of wavelength. For example, in the case of Figure 6, N 'is 4. We have the relation:
    Ρ = Φ + Ν.λ = Ν'.λ + φ + Ν.λ
    It is therefore necessary to remove the ambiguity on the indeterminate value, that is to say on the number N. To resolve this indeterminacy, we use the fact that the different projections from the direction lines of the different satellites must be consistent between them. Figure 7 illustrates this principle. It represents a measurement point Μ. It is surrounded by a circular zone Z of floating ambiguity uncertainty, calculated from pseudo-distances. The series of parallel dotted lines indicate the position of the planes of the entire ambiguities for each direction of satellite, these directions being perpendicular to these planes. In FIG. 7, four series of planes Pa are represented and denoted Pa1, Pa2, Pa3 and Pa4. Within the uncertainty zone, only a few uncertainty zones Z ′ represented by circles in bold lines correspond to possible positions. These zones Z ′ are calculated from the phase differences and possible whole ambiguities. In the case of FIG. 7, these zones correspond to the joint intersections of four planes P A 1,
    P a 2, P a 3 and P a 4.
    The integrity and the radius of protection of the filtered position calculated from the filtered pseudo-distance measurements, by carrier-code filtering is ensured on the basis:
    - control of the integrity of the initial position, established from unfiltered pseudo-distances from certified monitoring algorithms of the RAIM, ARAIM, SBAS type, ...
    - checking the integrity of the integrated doppler measurements which are used to filter carrier code of pseudo-distances,
    - checking the integrity and protection radius of the filtered position, calculated from the pseudo-distances filtered via a simple RAIM.
    The principle consists in checking the RTK implementation conditions, that is to say that the RTK algorithm can be used, taking into account the quality of the measurements. For this, a control is carried out on the basis of the pseudo-distance measurements filtered using the carrier phase according to the following steps:
    a) verification that the search space for phase "whole ambiguities", the first step necessary to reduce the range of exploration of combinations between inter-satellite measurements is effectively reduced to the range of uncertainty in position, calculated on the basis pseudo-distance. This compactness is ensured via the position integrity check based on pseudo-distance measurements. Indeed, the use of non-honest arrival time measurements would lead to retaining entire erroneous phases in the area of uncertainty in position
    b) verification that the integrated pseudo-distance measurements are not affected by error linked to possible biases on the integrated doppler derived from the carrier phase, which can be carried out on the basis of the integrity check of the filtered position, RAIM applied to the filtered pseudorange measurements. It is thus verified that the evolution of the carrier phase or relative doppler is consistent on all the satellite axes. If integrated pseudo-distance measurements are not consistent, then we deduce that the corresponding integrated Doppler measurements and therefore the elementary phases also undergo local deformations such as multipath or interference effects, front effects ionospheric, cycle jumps, which in fact prohibit their use for the calculation of the differential phase of the RTK
    c) if the two preceding stages are effectively crossed, one can apply the equivalent of a RAIM on the residuals of differential phase which makes it possible to ensure the final integrity of the differential position calculation and to associate a radius of protection to it, in a completely similar way to classic RAIM in pseudo-distance. This last check makes it possible to take into account the errors which do not affect the first two tests, and which would relate to possible dispersions of the differential phase measurements resulting for example from the dispersion of the phase responses of the RF stages of the receiver, which may differ depending on the satellites and which correspond to antenna responses, Doppler effects on RF transfer function, ...
    The method according to the invention consists in setting up the various processing means making it possible to ensure that the evolution of the phase of the carrier is consistent with the evolution of the phase of the code, with a view to transposing by equivalence the certified integrity on the position in code phase, towards position integrity in carrier phase.
    The sequence of the different stages of the process is shown in Figure 8:
    Step E1: From the data coming from the satellites, so-called “SIS” data, acronym meaning “Signal In Space”, calculation of the standard position on the basis of pseudo-code distances.
    Step E2: Performing a first integrity check based on the previous code pseudo-distance measurements. This step ensures that all the participating satellites in the PVT are intact, within a calculated protection radius.
    Steps E3 and E4: Verification that the associated integrated doppler measurements are also intact, through a GNSS speed integrity check as defined above. This test detects the short-term appearance of inconsistencies in the carrier phase increment measurements. Such an inconsistency in the evolution implies a short-term integrity defect on the absolute phase measurement of the carrier.
    Steps E6 and E7: Verification of the consistency of the code phase and carrier phase changes, by a second integrity check carried out on the filtered pseudo-distance measurements. This test makes it possible to detect the long-term appearance of bias from slow drift, on the carrier phase increment measurements and to verify that it is possible to resolve the entire phase ambiguities in the area of uncertainty or radius. protection calculated on the filtered position
    Step E5: Performing a final check on the basis of the carrier phase measurements resulting from the resolution of the precise point corresponding to the phase difference residues of the lever arm between the user antenna and the reference antenna.
    The following two verifications, carried out jointly, make it possible to verify the consistency of the phase and code evolutions:
    - Verification of the coherence of the short-term evolution, based on the residuals of phase increments or integrated doppler obtained after resolution of the speed on the basis of the carrier phase, to verify the coherence of the evolution in the short term ;
    - Verification of the coherence of the evolution in the medium term, based on the residuals of increments of filtered pseudo-distances obtained after resolution of the filtered position on the basis of the pseudodistance measurements filtered by the carrier, to verify the long-term consistency term.
    In itself, the test of the distribution of the speed residues, carried out on the integrated doppler, does not make it possible to quantify an overall risk of integrity on the speed, since the occurrence of the dreaded events on the carrier phase is not known. , but nevertheless allows us to verify with a given confidence that, in the short term, the calculated speed is consistent with the integrated doppler measurements on all the satellites.
    This test on the speed residues therefore makes it possible to ensure that the integrated doppler measurements are not affected by error, and therefore that, as long as the test on the position residues is itself positive, there is no reason to suspect an inconsistency between changes in carrier phase and change in code phase, which makes carrier phase measurements usable for achieving precise and honest positioning, with the same risk of non-integrity as that associated with the position.
    This test identifies the rapid appearance of an error since the residuals are calculated in the short term called "snapshot" measurements. On the other hand, this test does not always make it possible to detect slow drift of the carrier phase, which would gently drive the speed towards an erroneous value.
    To overcome this limitation, it is therefore necessary to set up a consistency test of code phase and long-term carrier changes, over one or more compatible time depths of changes not detectable by the short-term test. For example, if we consider that changes of less than 5cm / s would not be detectable in the short term with the risk constraints of standard non-detection, then a minimum observation depth of 100s is required to be able to detect a drift in the carrier phase greater than 5m, corresponding to 5 σ of the standard deviation of pseudo-distance.
    This test makes it possible to ensure that, even in the event of a slow pernicious drift, unlikely in the event of a fault on a single satellite, and therefore implying an intention, the error on the final position resulting from the carrier phase remains from order of that tolerated, that is to say in the protection radius on the position on the code phase.
    Of course, the algorithm used for precise position estimation will also be susceptible to non-integrity.
    The second check on the carrier phase residues of the precise position resolution may not be necessary, considering that the previous tests ensure the integrity of the phase measurements used by the precise position calculation algorithm. However, the carrier phase is subject to propagation imperfections such as scintillation and ionospheric divergence, differential tropospheric drifts, multipaths which introduce additional noise likely to disturb the resolution of whole ambiguities applied for positioning algorithms on carrier phase.
    It is no longer a question of detecting a satellite fault, but of verifying the relevance of the precise solution, by checking the consistency of the differences in double carrier phase difference resulting from the algorithm for resolving the precise position by the method. least squares.
    The principle of resolved RTK position monitoring uses a statistical test based on the redundancy of phase measurements. This test is of the same nature as the test used for a classic PVT called the Khi- test.
    2. It is applied to each occurrence of attitude measurement, on all of the available visual axes, in order to identify possible degradations in the accuracy of attitude measurement performed by an attitude RAIM.
    It is in fact completed by a projection of the residue detection threshold, on the axis of the lever arm measurements, making it possible to associate with the imprecision on the residuals of differential phase, an imprecision on the relative position of the carrier.
    The introduction of a "relative position protection radius" or "RPP" as indicated in FIG. 8 is then possible and makes it possible to control the availability of the attitude RAIM, with respect to the probabilities of false alarm. and non-detection chosen.
    We can then go to step E8, which consists of resolving the ambiguities of entire phases as described above. The fact of successfully successfully resolving the entire ambiguities in the uncertainty space of the filtered position, obtained after filtering the pseudo-distances by carrier phase evolutions, the integrity of which has been verified according to steps E3 and E4, ensures that this "real time kinematic" solution remains intact.
    Step E9 consists in calculating the precise position on the basis of the carrier phase measurements and, finally, step E10 consists in checking the consistency of the precise position measurements on the basis of the carrier phase measurements. This last step makes it possible to take into account the errors which do not affect the first two tests, and which relate to possible dispersions of the differential phase measurements used for the precise position calculation.
    权利要求:
    Claims (4)
    [1]
    1. Method for checking the integrity of the estimate of the position of a mobile carrier, said position being established by a satellite positioning measurement system, said estimate being obtained by the methods known as “real time kinematics” , said methods being based on carrier phase measurements of so-called "GNSS" signals from satellites, said method verifying that a carrier phase measurement is consistent with a measurement of code pseudo-distance, characterized in that said method comprises:
    a first step (E1) of calculating the initial position and time of the carrier, said first step carried out on the basis of the pseudodistances estimated on the axes in view of the satellites, on the basis of the measurements of time received carried by the codes of spreading of signals transmitted by satellites;
    - a second step (E2) verifying the integrity of the initial position and time resolution carried out from the satellite pseudo-distances calculated on the basis of a standard algorithm for monitoring satellite faults of the "RAIM" type;
    a third step (E3) of calculating the speed of the carrier, at a plurality of observation instants, said third step being carried out on the basis of the apparent doppler measurements estimated on the axes with satellite view, from the measurements carrier phase of the satellite signals;
    a fourth step (E4) of verification that at each of said observation instants, the short-term evolution of the carrier phase of the signals received on each of the axes with satellite view is consistent with the speed calculated in step previous ;
    - a sixth step (E6, E7) of verification that at each of said observation instants, the filtered position obtained from pseudo-distance measurements filtered in the long term by the carrier phase is integral.
    [2]
    2. Method for checking the integrity of the position of a mobile carrier according to claim 1, characterized in that the method comprises an eighth step (E8) of resolution of the whole phase ambiguities in the area of uncertainty associated with the filtered position.
    [3]
    3. Method for checking the integrity of a wearer's position
    [4]
    5 mobile according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the method comprises a ninth step of calculating the "real time kinematic" position on the basis of the carrier phase measurements (E9) and a tenth step (E10) of verification of the final integrity of the position consisting in applying a standard algorithm for monitoring faults of 10 “RAIM” type satellites on the differential phase residuals making it possible to ensure the final integrity of the differential position calculation and to associate a radius therewith protection.
    类似技术:
    公开号 | 公开日 | 专利标题
    FR3076354B1|2019-11-22|METHOD FOR VERIFYING THE ENTIRE POSITION ESTIMATION OF A MOBILE CARRIER IN A SATELLITE POSITIONING MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    CN109975837A|2019-07-05|
    EP3505968B1|2020-09-16|
    US11022694B2|2021-06-01|
    EP3505968A1|2019-07-03|
    CA3028302A1|2019-06-28|
    FR3076354B1|2019-11-22|
    US20190204450A1|2019-07-04|
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    法律状态:
    2018-11-27| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2019-07-05| PLSC| Search report ready|Effective date: 20190705 |
    2019-11-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2020-11-25| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1701391|2017-12-28|
    FR1701391A|FR3076354B1|2017-12-28|2017-12-28|METHOD FOR VERIFYING THE ENTIRE POSITION ESTIMATION OF A MOBILE CARRIER IN A SATELLITE POSITIONING MEASUREMENT SYSTEM|FR1701391A| FR3076354B1|2017-12-28|2017-12-28|METHOD FOR VERIFYING THE ENTIRE POSITION ESTIMATION OF A MOBILE CARRIER IN A SATELLITE POSITIONING MEASUREMENT SYSTEM|
    CA3028302A| CA3028302A1|2017-12-28|2018-12-20|Method of checking the integrity of the estimation of the position of a mobile carrier in a satellite-based positioning measurement system|
    EP18214691.0A| EP3505968B1|2017-12-28|2018-12-20|Method for monitoring the integrity of the estimate of the position of a mobile carrier in a satellite positioning measurement system|
    CN201811620556.5A| CN109975837A|2017-12-28|2018-12-28|The method of the estimation integrality of mobile carrier position is checked in star base positioning measurment system|
    US16/235,519| US11022694B2|2017-12-28|2018-12-28|Method of checking the integrity of the estimation of the position of a mobile carrier in a satellite-based positioning measurement system|
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