• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    Fraudulent tampering detection method in the electrical energy meter terminal block. It allows the possible manipulation of a meter to be determined without the need to remove the terminal cover (2) or break a seal (7) with which the union of said cover (2) and the fixed part (1) of the meter is fixed. The method comprises the steps of determining a reference point P on the outside of the meter; measure the magnetic field at a plurality of n points P1 ... Pn between which point P is, with the counter closed; obtain an indicator (I1, I2) corresponding to a combination of magnetic field values obtained at least two of the points P1 ... Pn ; determine, based on the value of the at least one indicator (I1, I2), the presence or absence of magnetic fields generated by the modification of any of the connections of meter terminals. (Machine-translation by Google Translate, not legally binding)
    公开号:ES2731672A1
    申请号:ES201830470
    申请日:2018-05-16
    公开日:2019-11-18
    发明作者:Romero Pedro Cruz；Expósito Antonio Gómez；Vargas Angel Arcos
    申请人:Universidad de Sevilla；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001]
    [0002] Method of detecting fraudulent manipulation in the terminal of electric energy meters.
    [0003]
    [0004] OBJECT OF THE INVENTION
    [0005]
    [0006] The present invention has as its main object a method that allows the detection of fraud in single-phase or three-phase electric meters, whether conventional (induction disk) or digital.
    [0007]
    [0008] Specifically, the fraud that can be detected with the proposed method is the manipulation in the connections of the conductors coming from the network and charging to the terminal block of the meter. The method can be carried out without removing the terminal cover.
    [0009]
    [0010] The method is based on the measurement of the magnetic flux density or magnetic field in a given area of the front surface of the meter. From this measure, the values of some indicators are calculated that allow to determine if the meter has been manipulated or not.
    [0011]
    [0012] BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
    [0013]
    [0014] The single-phase meters of the state of the art comprise a fixed part and a terminal cover, joined together by screws. The terminal cover is removed so that the ends of the phase and neutral conductors of the network side can be connected to the counter with the respective phase and neutral conductors of the load side. Inside the single-phase meter there are basically an ammeter circuit, a voltmeter circuit and a terminal block for connection to the network and the load.
    [0015]
    [0016] In three-phase counters the scheme is similar, but with two additional phase conductors both on the network side and on the load side, so it has not been considered necessary to represent it graphically.
    [0017]
    [0018] There are several methods to fraudulently reduce the measure of electric power consumption in electric meters. One of them, usually employed, It consists of manipulating the terminal block connections. To do this, the fraudster breaks the seal and, using a screwdriver, loosen the screws of the terminal cover, allowing its removal to access the terminal block.
    [0019]
    [0020] There are two possibilities to manipulate the connections. The first option, from now on type 1 fraud, involves bridging the terminals corresponding to the ammeter circuit. For example, a fraudulent electrical connection can be added between a network connection terminal and a load connection terminal. This allows to establish a parallel path to the original to reduce the current through the ammeter circuit and therefore the energy measured by the meter.
    [0021]
    [0022] In the case of three-phase meters, type 1 fraud admits variants, such as inserting a direct fraudulent connection between the network connections and loading of any one of the three phases, inserting two direct fraudulent connections between two of the three phases or inserting three fraudulent connections , one per phase.
    [0023]
    [0024] The second option, from now on type 2 fraud, is to open the voltmeter circuit. This is achieved by disconnecting the mains conductors and their corresponding equal voltage from the terminal on the load side and connecting them directly to each other.
    [0025]
    [0026] Either of these two types of fraud is detected visually by opening the terminal cover, but it is an invasive method. Currently, with the installation of telemanaged digital meters, the face-to-face inspection is not as usual as with the induction meters since the periodic consumption of energy can be telemed. That is why, currently, remote fraud detection methods are being developed.
    [0027]
    [0028] A first known method of remote fraud detection is the analysis of the evolution of consumption over time. With this method of detection, type 2 fraud is more easily detected. This is because, in type 1 fraud, the counter marks a certain lower than normal consumption. Said consumption recorded by the meter depends on the resistance of the conductor or conductors that make up the connection that has been bridged and, above all, on the contact resistance of the ends of said connection to the terminals on which it has been connected.
    [0029] However, in type 2 fraud the consumption is null during the period of time that the fraud lasts. In both the conventional counter (manual reading) and the telemanagement meter, zero consumption for months is easily detectable by the distribution companies by comparing the same subscriber's consumption in past periods.
    [0030]
    [0031] However, type 2 fraud is generally practiced for short periods of time, precisely to avoid detection by electric companies. Thus, the result in consumption during the charging period may become similar to that generated with type 1 fraud.
    [0032]
    [0033] Whatever the type of fraud, this detection method presents as major associated problems the fact that it is necessary to have, depending on the percentage of energy defrauded, a certain number of months of consumption without fraud in each subscriber. These data are necessary to know the typical consumption of the subscriber and it is also necessary to assume that said subscriber has consumption habits that do not change substantially. Another disadvantage of this method is that it is based on statistical calculations that have a certain percentage of errors associated in the predictions.
    [0034]
    [0035] Other methods for detecting both type 1 and 2 fraud are known in the state of the art. For example, for detecting type 1 fraud a method based on the use of an intensity sensor disposed inside the counter is known, which it measures the current through the ammeter circuit, and another intensity sensor arranged outside, at the point of rush. The measurement of the internal sensor is sent as a communications channel through the connection cable itself to the external sensor and compared, detecting the possible fraud if both measures are different.
    [0036]
    [0037] As for type 2 fraud, an applicable method in induction counters is known, based on the insertion of a Hall effect sensor in the coil of the voltmeter circuit and another in the ammeter circuit. In this way, if the voltmeter circuit is opened, the Hall sensor of the voltmeter coil measures a null field and that of the ammeter does not, thus detecting fraud. With current digital counters, type 2 fraud is very easy to detect since the voltage marked by the meter is zero.
    [0038] Another known solution that tries to avoid fraud in the manipulation of the terminal block is the detection of the removal of the terminal cover by means of a small switch that changes state and generates an alarm signal when this occurs.
    [0039]
    [0040] From the state of the art, a method of detecting the presence of magnetic field sources external to the meter (such as magnets, coils, etc.) that have been placed so as to affect the correct functioning of the meter is also known. To do this, magnetic field sensors are used inside the meter that provide information on external magnetic fields that are interfering with the meter.
    [0041]
    [0042] DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
    [0043]
    [0044] The method of detecting fraudulent manipulation in the terminal block of electric energy meters of the present invention allows detection without having to open the meter, quickly and reliably.
    [0045]
    [0046] In electrical meters, for example single-phase, the network side phase and neutral network side conductors are connected respectively with the phase side load and neutral side conductors by means of a terminal block inside the meter. The electrical current that enters through the connection terminal of the phase-phase conductor to the ampere circuit goes out through the connection terminal of the phase-side conductor. The same current returns from the neutral load side via the neutral conductor. Whatever the counter (induction or digital, magnetically shielded or not), the currents by the four conductors (in the case of a single-phase meter) generate a vector magnetic field at a point outside the meter that is distributed in all directions .
    [0047]
    [0048] The vector magnetic field at any point outside the counter is defined by three Cartesian components. This distribution can be characterized by a magnetic field detector device, arranged outside the counter. The fraudulent insertion between the network phase and load phase connections (type 1 fraud) causes the appearance of a current that does not enter the meter and generates a magnetic field that overlaps the existing field. If you compare the new distribution with the original distribution using one or more indicators such as the variation of one of the fields along a line or a quotient between two of the fields in At a certain point, fraud can be detected if said change is appreciable enough not to be attributed to measurement errors, external interference or any other cause beyond the fraud itself.
    [0049]
    [0050] Thanks to this method, the detection does not require the removal of the terminal cover, thus speeding up the inspection of the meters by the personnel and reducing the cost that currently involves the face-to-face detection of the fraud companies.
    [0051]
    [0052] This method can also be used to detect type 2 fraud. When the grid neutral and load neutral conductors are disconnected from the terminal block and the magnetic structure is changed directly to each other the spatial structure is changed and said change can be detected from it. way out of the counter.
    [0053]
    [0054] Depending on the power consumed by the load, the magnetic field components outside the meter have different magnitudes, so it is necessary for the correct execution of the method to determine sufficiently invariant indicators against the value of the current that the meter has in each moment. To ensure the correct choice of indicators, it is necessary to locate a set of points whose field components vary in the same way. Preferably, points whose components vary predominantly linearly with the current will be chosen.
    [0055]
    [0056] If these points are located above the terminal cover of the meter and at some distance from the magnetic screens that eventually protect the ammeter and voltmeter circuits, the variation of the field with the current is substantially linear. Additionally, thresholds sufficiently safe can be defined to take into account the possible contributions that may affect this ideal behavior (contiguous meter interferences, measurement errors, nonlinear field variation, etc.).
    [0057]
    [0058] For each type of single-phase meter, a preliminary study should be carried out in order to set the measurement points and the measurement quantities at each point.
    [0059]
    [0060] The greatest advantage of the present invention over previously proposed methods is that it avoids making internal modifications to the meter since the detection is carried out by portable external devices arranged sufficiently close to the accountant. This fact greatly facilitates the application of the method and increases its versatility since it can be used in meter models of different manufacturers.
    [0061]
    [0062] The only thing necessary is to bring the measuring device closer to the front surface of the meter to capture a sufficient field value generated by said meter. That is, it is necessary to avoid the unwanted effects of interference caused by other counters or contiguous elements. Thus, it is necessary to disassemble any protective envelope before direct contacts.
    [0063]
    [0064] DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
    [0065]
    [0066] To complement the description that is being made and in order to help a better understanding of the characteristics of the invention, according to a preferred example of practical realization thereof, a set of drawings is accompanied as an integral part of said description. where for illustrative and non-limiting purposes, the following has been represented:
    [0067]
    [0068] Figure 1a.- Shows a front view of a single phase meter.
    [0069]
    [0070] Figure 1b.- Shows a view of the single-phase counter of Figure 1a in which the internal elements have been represented.
    [0071]
    [0072] Figure 2.- Shows a perspective view of a meter that is being manipulated, already with the seal broken.
    [0073]
    [0074] Figure 3a.- Shows a terminal block with a corresponding connection manipulation with a type 1 fraud.
    [0075]
    [0076] Figure 3b.- Shows a terminal block with a corresponding connection manipulation with a type 2 fraud.
    [0077]
    [0078] Figure 4.- Shows a counter without the terminal cover and with the representation of the magnetic field generated when the counter has not been manipulated.
    [0079] Figure 5a.- Shows a counter like the one in Figure 4 that has been manipulated with a type 1 fraud.
    [0080]
    [0081] Figure 5b.- Shows a counter like the one in Figure 4 that has been manipulated with a type 2 fraud.
    [0082]
    [0083] Figure 6.- It shows a front and side view of a single-phase CERM1 counter.
    [0084]
    [0085] Figure 7.- Shows a view of the single-phase counter CERM1 of Figure 6 in which the position of the measuring points for the detection of manipulation according to the method of the present invention is shown.
    [0086]
    [0087] PREFERRED EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION
    [0088]
    [0089] Examples of embodiments of the invention are described below with the aid of Figures 1 to 7.
    [0090]
    [0091] As previously described, fraudulent manipulations carried out in counters, both single-phase and three-phase, can be included in two types. To better understand how such manipulations are performed, a counter has been represented in Figures 1a and 1b, in this case single phase, and its essential elements have been indicated.
    [0092]
    [0093] As can be seen in figure 1a, the exterior of the meter is protected by a fixed part (1) that also allows its anchoring to the wall or to the place where it is to be installed, and by a terminal cover (2) that It is removable and is attached to the fixed part (1) by screws (3). You can also see the connection cables to the network side, more specifically the phase conductor of the network side (LR) and the neutral conductor of the network side (NR), and the connection cables of the load side, more specifically the phase phase conductor load (LC) and the neutral conductor of the load side (NC).
    [0094]
    [0095] Figure 1b shows the elements that are housed in the fixed part (1) such as the ammeter circuit (4), the voltmeter circuit (5) and the terminal block (6). In the terminal block (6) the connection terminal of the network side phase conductor (B1), the connection terminal of the load side phase conductor (B2), the connection terminal of the terminal neutral conductor on the mains side (B3) and the connection terminal of the neutral conductor on the load side (B4).
    [0096]
    [0097] In three-phase counters the scheme is similar, but with two additional phase conductors both on the network side (L1R, L2R, L3R) and on the load side (L1C, L2C, L3C), so it is not necessary to represent it graphically.
    [0098]
    [0099] A counter that is being manipulated is shown in Figure 2. As you can see, the meters have a seal (7) that allows to physically detect if there has been a manipulation. In this case you can see how, to unscrew the screw (3) that allows you to remove the terminal cover (2) to access the terminal block (6), you have to break the seal (7).
    [0100]
    [0101] Also in Figures 3a and 3b, types 1 and 2 of fraud have been represented, respectively, which have been previously described. The type 1 fraud, observable in Figure 3a, consists of bridging the terminals of the ampere circuit by adding a fraudulent electrical connection (8) between the conductor connection terminal phase network side (B1) and the conductor connection terminal phase load side ( B2) creating a path parallel to the one established.
    [0102]
    [0103] Type 2 fraud, observable in Figure 3b, is carried out by disconnecting the connection terminal of the neutral conductor on the network side (B3) and the connection terminal of the neutral conductor on the load side (B4), connecting them directly to each other by means of the fraudulent connection (9).
    [0104]
    [0105] Figure 4 shows the magnetic field generated when the connections are arranged correctly. Point P is the point chosen for the magnetic field data collection. As can be seen in said figure, at point P a magnetic field can be measured with an effective value of the specific magnetic field ( BP) and which is defined by the three Cartesian components corresponding to the x-axis, the y- axis and the z- axis ( BPx, BPy, BPz). This distribution is characterized by a magnetic field detector device at point P of interest.
    [0106]
    [0107] If point P is placed on top of the terminal cover (2) and the closest to it, the field detected is mainly due to sections 10-11 (connection of the network side phase conductor to the terminal Bi-connection of the net side neutral conductor to terminal B3) of the LR-NR and 12-13 conductors (connection of the load side phase conductor (LC) to terminal B2- connection of the load side neutral conductor (NC ) to terminal B4) of LC-NC conductors. These sections are separated from each other (removing the multipolar cable cover shown in Figure 7) for connection to terminals B1, B2, B3 and B4.
    [0108]
    [0109] The fraudulent insertion of the connection between the network phase conductor and the load phase conductor (8) in the ammeter circuit (type 1 fraud, figure 2a), causes the appearance of a current Id that does not enter the meter, as It can be seen in figure 5a. This current Id generates a magnetic field that overlaps the existing field, as shown in the figure.
    [0110]
    [0111] In an exemplary embodiment, the B pz field and / or the Bpy / Bpz ratio at a given point can be taken as indicators of the magnetic field in P. The variation of these indicators allows to determine if there has been a fraudulent manipulation.
    [0112]
    [0113] In Figure 5b the variations that originate in point P of a fraudulent type 2 manipulation have been represented. In this case, when the neutral network conductor and the neutral load conductor are connected together, a magnetic field change is caused which also affects the magnetic field in P.
    [0114]
    [0115] The preferred embodiment of the invention is aimed at detecting the manipulation of CERM1 type meters as shown in Figure 6. It is simply a particular embodiment, especially interesting in countries such as Spain because the CERM1 type meters are the most used , so it should not be understood as a limiting example of application of the invention. The method of the invention can be used with other types of single-phase meters used commercially, for three-phase meters or even for CERM1 counters with design variants.
    [0116]
    [0117] The magnetic field measurements are made, according to the method of the present invention, in the same way at each point Py ... Pn aligned with each other, located as close as possible to the plane nt shown in Figure 7. The plane nt is a plane that passes through the centers of all the terminals (B1-B4) of the meter, and that is perpendicular to a plane n0 that contains the back surface (14) of the meter. The exact points Py ... Pn at which the measurements are made will depend on the skill of the operator and on the greater or lesser difficulty of placing the measuring device (17) of magnetic fields according to their own characteristics (weight, geometry, size, etc.).
    [0118]
    [0119] In addition, the points ... Pn are arranged as close as possible to the front surface (21) of the terminal cover (2) according to the restrictions imposed by the magnetic field measuring device (17). More specifically, these limitations are related to the position of a sensor element (18) housed in the measuring device (17) at a certain distance from the surface of the meter (20). Said surface of the meter (20) is placed, in order to carry out the measurements, in contact with the front surface (21) of the terminal cover (2) of the meter as observed in the aforementioned figure 7. The measurement of the magnetic field depends also of a measuring axis (19) of the magnetic field of the sensor element (18) which is also shown in the figure and whose position depends on the geometries of the cover (2) (on which the measuring device (17) rests )) and the measuring device itself (17).
    [0120]
    [0121] Other elements shown in Figure 7 are a first hole (16) disposed in the terminal cover (2) intended to receive the screw (3) and a second hole (15) arranged in the fixed part (1) in the The screw end is housed.
    [0122]
    [0123] As can be seen in figure 7, in the CERM1 counter, the screw (3) is housed in the second hole (15) that is aligned with the four terminals (B1-B4) and extends perpendicularly to the first hole (16 ). Thus, said first hole (16) can be chosen, as in Figure 7, as a measuring point P. It is a point easily identifiable by any operator and which is in a centered position with respect to the terminal block (6).
    [0124]
    [0125] The method of the present invention comprises a step of choosing, preferably, said second hole (16) as point P ^ n + î , choosing odd n . By
    [0126] on the other hand the point Px is chosen at a distance from the point P ^ n + i ^ somewhat greater than the distance
    [0127] between terminal B1 and the second hole (15). In an exemplary embodiment in which the total width of the counter is 125 mm, the distance between Px and P ^ n + i ^ is about 5 mm
    [0128] more than the distance between B1 and the hole (15).
    [0129] Similarly, the opposite point Pn must be at a distance from the point P ^ n + i ^ something
    [0130] higher than the one between terminal B4 and the second hole (15). In a 125 mm counter like the one previously used, this distance would also be for example about 5 mm more than the distance between Pn and the hole (15). The remaining points are equidistant and separated a certain distance from each other. In an exemplary embodiment such as the one proposing said distance would be, for example, about 7 mm.
    [0131]
    [0132] Preferably, the separation between points Pt and Pn is greater than the separation between the terminals of the meter farthest from each other.
    [0133]
    [0134] In the exemplary embodiment presented, a sample is taken at 11 points, that is, «= 11. The magnetic field that needs to be measured is directed substantially in the direction perpendicular to the plane n0, and may vary slightly to facilitate the measurement process, as seen in Figure 7, where the measuring axis (19) is perpendicular to the surface front (20) of the terminal cover (2). To avoid the effect of the earth's magnetic field, the magnetic field measuring device (17) used for the method must measure only fields generated by alternating current and have a signal processing internally to obtain the effective value B pi Bpn in each point P1.P n.
    [0135]
    [0136] The following preferred indicators are established below to detect fraud in the handling of connections:
    [0137] - Indicator
    [0138]
    [0139] - Indicator
    [0140]
    [0141] According to the method of the present invention, it can be ensured with a 100% probability that a fraud exists (type 1 or type 2) if either of these two criteria is met:
    [0142]
    [0143] 1) If it is met that It < 0.5
    [0144] 2) If they meet simultaneously that 0.5 <I 1 < 6.5 / / 2 and I2 < 6 there is fraud with a probability of 100%.
    [0145]
    [0146] If none of the criteria is met, it can be ensured that there is no fraud with a high probability, between 50% and 100%.
    权利要求:
    Claims (11)
    [1]
    1. - Method of detecting fraudulent manipulation in the terminal block of electric energy meters comprising a fixed part (1), with a rear surface (14), and a terminal cover (2), with a front surface (21 ), said terminal cover is removably attached to the fixed part (1) by means of screws (3) and a plurality of terminals (B1, B2, B3, B4) intended to receive network phase (LR), network neutral connections (NR), load phase (LC) and neutral load (NC), and which is characterized in that it comprises the following stages:
    - determine a reference point P outside the meter;
    - measure the magnetic field at a plurality of n points P1 ... Pn among which is the point P , with the counter closed;
    - obtain at least one indicator ( I1, I 2) corresponding to a combination of magnetic field values obtained at at least two of the points P ± ... P n;
    - determine, depending on the value of at least one indicator (/ x, / 2), the presence or absence of magnetic fields generated by the modification of any of the terminal connections (B1, B2, B3, B4) of the meter.
    [2]
    2. - Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the point P is chosen in a position as close as possible to the front surface (21) of the terminal cover (2) of the meter.
    [3]
    3. - Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the step of measuring the magnetic field is performed uniaxially in a direction perpendicular to the front surface (21) of the terminal cover (2) of the meter.
    [4]
    4. - Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the plurality of n points P1 ... Pn are selected aligned with each other as close as possible to the intersection between the front surface (21) of the terminal cover (2) and a plane n1 that passes through the centers of the terminals (B1-B4) of the meter and that is perpendicular to a plane n0 that contains a rear surface (14) of the fixed part (1) of the meter.
    [5]
    5. - Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the separation between points P1 and Pn is greater than the separation between the terminals of the meter farthest from each other.
    [6]
    6. Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the magnetic field measurement at points P 1 ... Pn is the effective value BPl B Pn.
    [7]
    7. Method according to claim 6 characterized in that the at least one indicator ( I1) is obtained according to the following equation:
    Bpx
    h
    b P p P n T
    [8]
    8. Method according to claim 7 characterized in that the step of determining the presence or absence of magnetic fields generated by the modification of any of the terminal connections (B1, B2, B3, B4) of the meter is carried out taking into account the value of the indicator (/ x) such that if it is satisfied that I1 <0.5 it is determined that there is presence of said magnetic fields.
    [9]
    9. Method according to claim 6 characterized in that the at least one indicator (/ 2) is obtained according to the following equation:
    ma x [Bpv ..., 5 p J
    1 2 m in [fip1,. , fipn]
    [10]
    10. Method according to claims 7 and 9 characterized in that the step of determining the presence or absence of magnetic fields generated by the modification of any of the terminal connections (B1, B2, B3, B4) of the meter is carried out taking into account the value of the indicators (1) and (2) such that if it is fulfilled simultaneously that 0.5 < I 1 <6.5 / 12 and that I2 < 6 determines that there is presence of said magnetic fields.
    [11]
    11. Method according to claims 7 and 9 characterized in that the step of determining the presence or absence of magnetic fields generated by the modification of any of the terminal connections (B1, B2, B3, B4) of the meter is carried out taking into account the value of the indicators (/ 1) and (/ 2) such that if I1> 0.5 and it is not fulfilled simultaneously that 0.5 < I1 <6.5 / / 2 and that I2 <6 determines that there is no presence of said magnetic fields, said probability of absence being less than 100% but greater than 50%.
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    ES2731672B2|2020-07-15|
    引用文献:
    公开号 | 申请日 | 公开日 | 申请人 | 专利标题
    US20040021568A1|2002-07-31|2004-02-05|Schlumbergersema Inc.|Magnetic field sensing for tamper identification|
    US20130088353A1|2011-10-05|2013-04-11|General Electric Company|Systems and Methods for Detecting Tampering Associated with a Utility Meter|
    WO2016143043A1|2015-03-09|2016-09-15|オムロン株式会社|Detection device and power meter|
    法律状态:
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