• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    The invention relates to a method for securing and verifying the validity of an electronic vote, the method being implemented by computer means and comprising: a step of receiving a temporary ballot, during which a ballot paper the temporary ballot is encrypted using a public vote encryption key, a step of receiving a validation ballot, during which a ballot paper validation is received from said voting entity, the validation ballot being encrypted by means of a public validation encryption key, a decryption step, during which the validation ballot is decrypted by means of a private validation key associated with said validation public encryption key, a validation step, during which a validation request generated from the bulletin of validation The decrypted validation vote is sent to the said voting entity, the previous steps being repeated until validation of the validation request by said voting entity, after which the encrypted temporary ballot is recorded as a definitive ballot waiting for its vote. recount.
    公开号:CH710624B1
    申请号:CH01473/15
    申请日:2015-10-12
    公开日:2016-07-15
    发明作者:Jamin Régis；Dahl Christopher
    申请人:Election-Europe；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    The invention relates to a method of securing and verifiability of an electronic vote.
    [0002] Electronic voting systems may be subject to security problems, in particular concerning the integrity and the sincerity of the voting data.
    It is known electronic voting systems, based on software using an encryption system RSA type encryption by a module or a program inspired by the Java language. However, with such systems, the encryption and the transmission of the ballot are performed only on the computer means used by the voter, for example on the computer of the voter. In addition, with such systems, the same encryption keys are used for each voter. In particular, the encrypted ballot is sent directly to a hosting database, a virtual ballot box, and no control of data integrity and therefore of sincerity of the data is performed. Thus, these systems are potentially vulnerable, including the modification of programs or modules inspired by the Java language and interception and manipulation of a component "html" of the web page of the ballot.
    In addition, an electronic voting system must meet, eg in France, the requirements of the National Commission for Computing and Freedoms (CNIL) which advocates in particular that the ballots are encrypted uninterrupted , which requires the use of embedded software on the internet browser, but also meet the requirements of the National Agency for Security and Information Systems (ANSSI) which recommends to avoid the use of light applications such as as Java applications on internet browsers to handle transaction security. An e-voting system must also comply with the Top Ten 2013 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) security repository.
    Therefore, there is a need for an electronic voting system, to ensure the anonymity of the ballot, and the sincerity, confidentiality, integrity and uniqueness of the electronic vote.
    For this purpose, the invention relates to a method for securing and verifying an electronic vote according to claim 1.
    [0007] Advantageously, the method of securing and verifying the validity of an electronic vote makes it possible to respond to the paradigms of the government's safety recommendations issued by the CNIL and FANSSI, while complying with the FOWASP Top Ten 2013 security reference system.
    In addition, the ballot is subject to double encryption and the encryption of the ballot is carried out uninterrupted.
    [0009] Advantageously, the use of a validation ballot enables the voting entity to check its electronic vote before it is taken into account, and thus to validate it if it corresponds to vote, or to invalidate it if it differs from its choice.
    In addition, the method of security and verifiability of an electronic vote ensures the sincerity, confidentiality, integrity, uniqueness and anonymity of the electronic ballot.
    The embodiments of the method may also comprise one or more of the following characteristics, considered individually or considered in combination according to all the possible combinations, for example by considering the combination of two characteristics or a plurality of characteristics:the method comprises, prior to the steps of receiving a temporary ballot and validation, a sending step during which at least one definition of a ballot, a public vote encryption key and an encryption key of validation are sent to a voting entity; and orthe method comprises, prior to the sending step, a step of selecting at least one public validation encryption key during which at least one public validation encryption key is randomly selected from among a set of public encryption keys of confirmation; and orthe method comprises, prior to the validation step, a verification step by the voting entity, during which the content of the validation ballot is verified; and orduring the validation step as soon as the validation request is generated, the validation ballot is deleted from the memory on which it is stored, for example the RAM of a cryptographic service; and orthe temporary ballot is not decrypted; and orprior to the repetition of the steps the encrypted temporary ballot is deleted.
    In addition, when implementing the method of securing and verifiability of an electronic vote according to the invention, the public encryption key validation is preferably different from the public vote encryption key.
    Advantageously, the private vote encryption key associated with the public vote encryption key is different from the validation private encryption key associated with the validation public encryption key.
    Preferably, the private vote encryption key associated with the public encryption key of the temporary ballot can decrypt the final ballot.
    The invention also relates to a computer program product, such as a computer program product, comprising one or more instruction sequences stored and accessible to a processor, and which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of the method according to the invention.
    A storage medium readable by a computer means is also provided, the storage medium comprising at least one program, and wherein the program causes the computer to perform the steps of the method according to the invention.
    An apparatus comprising a processor configured to store one or more instruction sequences and to perform at least one of the steps of the method according to the invention is also provided.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the terms such as "calculate", "determine", "evaluate" or equivalent, refer to the action of a computer means that manipulates and / or transforms physical data, such as electronic data. or amounts within the registers and / or memories, other physical data, such as quantities within the computer system memories, registers or other storage, transmission or display means.
    In addition, the embodiments of the present invention are not described with reference to a particular programming language. A variety of programming languages can be used to implement the method of the invention.
    Other features and advantages of the present invention will appear on reading the description and the following figures:<tb> fig. 1 <SEP> illustrates an architecture of the environment of the execution of an electronic vote according to one embodiment of the invention, and<tb> figs. 2 and 3 <SEP> represent a flowchart of the steps of the method of securing and verifying the validity of an electronic vote according to one embodiment of the invention.
    It should be noted that these drawings have no other purpose than to illustrate the text of the description and do not constitute in any way a limitation of the scope of the invention.
    In the various figures, similar elements are designated by identical references.
    The invention relates to the field of electronic voting. In particular, an example of an architecture of the execution environment of an electronic vote is illustrated in FIG. 1.
    The environment of an electronic vote may include actors of the electronic voting system 10, network services 20, cryptography services 30, and database servers 40.
    [0025] The actors of the electronic voting system 10 include, for example, the voters 11, the members of the polling stations 12, the central president and the assessors 13, possibly assisted by a bailiff or an expert in the field.
    The network services 20 may include an electronic voting website 21, an interface 22 for the administration of the electronic vote and the monitoring of the poll, and an internet network service 23 for generating the encryption keys.
    The cryptography services 30 may comprise an internet network service 31 used by the electronic voting website 21 and an internet network service 32 used by the interface 22 of the electronic voting administration.
    The database servers 40 include several databases. For example, as shown in FIG. 1, the database servers 40 comprise a database 41 where the encryption keys are stored, a database 42 where the definitions of the ballots for each voter profile are stored, temporary urns 43 where are stored the ballots awaiting validation of the voter, the ballot boxes 44 where the validated encrypted ballot papers corresponding to each election are kept, the result tables 45 completed after the decryption of the ballot papers, and lists of 46 voters.
    The actors of the system interact, for example, with the cryptography services 30 and the databases 40 via the network services 20.
    Advantageously, the exchanges between the different entities of the electronic voting environment are performed by a secure network, including a secure Internet network. For example, exchanges can be made according to the secure hypertext transfer protocol ("https"). The secure connection between the different entities in the electronic voting environment ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the ballot, ensuring that no opportunity is given to an outsider to view the ballot or the ballot. access the contents of the voter's ballot.
    Preferably, the response time of the network services 20, cryptography services 30 and data servers 40 are optimized so as to allow the voter to vote quickly and without constraint.
    In addition, the voter can vote in confidence from any computer means connected to the Internet. Indeed, the voter can connect to the website 21 of electronic voting via a secure connection in "https" mode and identify himself using an identifier and a password associated to perform his electronic vote. No software download is required, as the definition of ballots and public vote and validation encryption keys are sent to the voting entity's web browser.
    More specifically, the voter, when registered in the list of electors, is associated with a unique identifier to ensure the uniqueness of the vote. This identifier is then associated with a password that allows the voter to connect to the electronic voting system. In addition, the civil status data corresponding to an elector are kept in a different database and are associated with him only when necessary, for example for editing the registration list, for sending a acknowledgment of receipt of a nominative vote or for search in an electoral list. Thus, in view of the voting system, an elector is associated with a random number.
    As soon as it is connected, the system establishes a transaction, for example via IIS, between the voter's internet browser and the electronic voting website 21. This transaction is associated with a unique random number by the transactional IIS engine which will be stored in a database representing the current electronic voting actions and whose number will be associated with the unique identifier of the voter. Following this transaction, the elector only exists with his random transaction number assigned by IIS. The random transaction number is intended to last only the time of the electronic vote and to fade to the confirmation of the vote by the voter, or if the voter remains inactive for too long on the website 21 of the electronic vote. The voter can therefore exchange voting data with the system in the total anonymity of his IIS transaction and through an SSL / TLS encryption pipe.
    The invention relates to a method for securing and verifying electronic voting, particularly in the execution environment of an electronic vote as described above.
    The method of the invention is implemented by computer means, for example by computers, connected tablets, mobile phones or any computer means having access to an Internet network.
    A preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention is shown in FIG. 2.The method of securing and verifying the validity of an electronic vote includes:A step S10 of receiving a temporary ballot,A step S20 of receiving a validation ballot,A step S30 of decryption, andA step S40 of validation.
    During the step S10 of receiving a temporary ballot, a temporary ballot is received from a voting entity. A voting entity corresponds to an entity that performs the electronic vote, for example an elector, also named a voter. The temporary ballot is intended to be registered as a definitive ballot after validation of the voting entity.
    The temporary ballot is encrypted by means of a public vote encryption key. The public vote encryption key is associated with a private vote encryption key. More specifically, a pair of voting encryption keys is associated with a temporary ballot and then with a final ballot when the temporary ballot is registered as a final ballot.
    Advantageously, the encryption used is an asymmetric encryption, of the RSA encryption type. For example, the public vote encryption key encrypts the temporary ballot and the private vote encryption key decrypts the final ballot.
    The public vote encryption key is stored in a database 40, for example the database 41 for storing the encryption keys. The public vote encryption key is generated by the internet network service 23 for the generation of the encryption keys, then transmitted to the database 41 via the internet network service 32 used by the interface 22 of the administration of the network. electronic voting.
    The private vote encryption key is kept on a backup device, outside the internet network. For example, the encryption key private vote can be written on a backup device, the type of a USB key, intended to be kept by the central president and / or assessors 13 in a safe. Advantageously, the private vote encryption key associated with the public encryption key of the temporary ballot is only accessible to the assessors of the vote and when the vote is over.
    The encrypted temporary ballot sent by the voting entity is received by the network services 20, for example by the website 21 of the electronic vote, and then transmitted to a cryptography service 30, in particular to the Internet network service. 31.
    The encrypted temporary ballot is stored in a database, such as the temporary urn 43.
    During the step S20 of receiving a validation ballot, a validation ballot is received from the voting entity.
    Advantageously, the temporary ballot and the validation ballot are jointly received from the distance entity.
    The validation ballot is encrypted by means of a public validation encryption key, associated with a private validation encryption key. In other words, a pair of validation encryption keys is associated with a validation ballot.
    Advantageously, the validation encryption is an asymmetric encryption, of the RSA encryption type.
    The private validation encryption key and the public validation encryption key are stored in a database, for example the database 41 for storing the encryption keys.
    The validation encryption key pair is generated by the internet network service 23 for the generation of the encryption keys, then transmitted to the database 41 via the internet network service 32.
    Advantageously, the public encryption key validation is different from the public vote encryption key. Likewise, the private vote encryption key associated with the public vote encryption key advantageously differs from the private validation encryption key associated with the public validation encryption key.
    The encrypted validation vote ballot is received by the network services 20, for example by the website 21 of the electronic vote, then transmitted to a cryptography service 30, in particular to an internet network service 31 used by the website 21 of electronic voting.
    During the decryption step S30, the validation ballot is decrypted by means of a validation private encryption key associated with said public validation encryption key.
    The private validation encryption key is previously extracted from the database, in which it is stored in order to decrypt the validation ballot.
    In the validation step S40, a validation request generated from the decrypted validation ballot is sent to the voting entity.
    Advantageously, the definition of the ballot is also extracted from the database, in which it is stored, for example from the database 42. The definition of a ballot corresponds to the profile of an elector and the resulting data, such as the names of lists or candidates running for election. The decrypted validation ballot can be compared with the definition of the ballot before the validation request is sent to the voting entity.
    While waiting for validation of the validation request, the validation ballot is not stored in a database, but is stored in a memory of the cryptography service 30 giving an ephemeral character to the bulletin validation vote.
    Following receipt of the validation request, the voting entity can validate or invalidate the validation request. In other words, the voting entity can validate its vote if it is consistent with its choice, or invalidate it if it does not correspond to his choice.
    Steps S10 to S40 are repeated until validation of the validation request by the voting entity.
    When the validation request is validated by the voting entity, the encrypted temporary ballot paper is registered as a final ballot awaiting its counting, and the validation ballot is removed from the memory of the voting service. cryptography 30.
    Advantageously, prior to the repetition of the steps, the encrypted temporary ballot is removed.
    The temporary ballot is not decrypted.
    Following the validation of the validation request, the temporary ballot is transferred from the temporary database, in which it was stored to a new database. For example, the temporary ballot may be moved from the temporary ballot box 43 to the ballot box 44 where the validated encrypted ballots are kept.
    In other words, after validation of the validation request, the validation of the transaction IIS, otherwise known as the English word "commit", is carried out and the temporary ballot is transferred from the database of newsletters. vote pending confirmation of the final ballot database.
    When the final ballot is recorded, an indication that said voting entity has voted is recorded. In other words, when the encrypted temporary ballot is registered as the final ballot, the election registration list is automatically completed and the voting entity receives a vote confirmation.
    The validation of the transaction triggers the voter registration in the list of voters because the IIS transaction is completed.
    Preferably, no link exists between the database of the ballots and the database of the registration list, thus the anonymity of the data exchanged in the IIS voting transaction is guaranteed, the link between the name of the voter and the content of his ballot being broken upon the connection established by the voter, that is to say from his identification on the website 21 electronic voting.
    The unique random number of the transaction IIS associated with the identifier of the voter makes it possible to do the correspondence with the elector. Immediate automatic registration prevents any attempt at double voting and guarantees the uniqueness of the electronic vote.
    Preferably, during the validation step S40, as soon as the validation request is generated, the validation ballot is deleted. More precisely, the validation validation ballot, encrypted or decrypted, is not kept in a database or on a hard disk. The validation ballot is intended to be stored in a RAM of the cryptography service 30, before being deleted. The decrypted validation ballot may exist only on the browser of the voting entity and in the memory of a cryptographic service, such as the internet network service 31 used by the electronic voting website 21.
    Steps S10 to S40 make it possible to guarantee the uninterrupted encryption of the ballot as soon as it is broadcast on the voter's computer means. In addition, the generation of an encrypted temporary ballot and an encrypted validation ballot ensures double encryption of the data.
    In addition, the validation request received by the voting entity allows the voter to verify the integrity of his vote.
    [0072] Advantageously, a plurality of validation validation ballots with different validation public encryption keys can be generated for each temporary ballot. Specifically, the validation request may be generated from a validation ballot selected randomly from the plurality of validation ballots. The random selection of a validation ballot from among the plurality of validation ballots associated with the temporary ballot increases the security of the electronic vote.
    As illustrated in FIG. 3, the method may also comprise, prior to the validation step S40, a verification step S31 by the voting entity. During the verification step S31 by the voting entity, the content of the validation ballot is verified.
    The verification step makes it possible to limit the risks of hacking electronic voting. Indeed, the voting entity can reliably control that its vote has been taken into account by the system without having been modified and that it has therefore not been manipulated, for example, by a malicious program present in the system. computer used. In particular, the voting entity can ensure that the validation ballot transmitted is the one it has issued.
    The method may also comprise a step S01 of selecting at least one public validation encryption key. During the selection step S01, at least one public validation encryption key is randomly selected from a set of public validation encryption keys.
    Advantageously, following the selection step S01, the method comprises a sending step S02. During the sending step S02, at least one ballot definition, a public vote encryption key and a public validation encryption key are sent to a voting entity.
    Following a step of connection and identification of the voting entity, the definition of the ballot and public vote encryption keys and validation can be sent to the Internet browser of the voting entity.
    The method may also comprise a stripping step S50. During the counting step S50, a private vote encryption key associated with the public vote encryption key is received and the final voting ballots are decrypted by means of said private encryption key.
    The private vote encryption keys held solely by the President and his assessors are loaded after the close of the vote in the database where they will be stored to allow the counting after the closing of the poll, for example the database. 41 where the encryption keys are stored. Private vote encryption keys are used to decrypt the final voting ballots of voters. The results of the vote are transmitted to a database, for example to result tables 45.
    [0080] Following the filling of the databases with the results of the votes, official reports containing information on the result of the election and the content of the registration lists are sent, for example to the members of the polling stations.
    The invention has been described in the case where a validation ballot is received from the voting entity. Of course, the method according to the invention is not limited to the embodiment described and illustrated, which has been given by way of example. On the contrary, the method according to the invention could comprise a plurality of validation ballots associated with the temporary ballot, so as to increase the security of the electronic vote.
    权利要求:
    Claims (11)
    [1]
    1. Method of security and verifiability of an electronic vote, the steps of the method being implemented by computer means and comprising:A step (S 10) for receiving a temporary ballot, during which a temporary ballot is received from a voting entity, the temporary ballot being encrypted by means of a public encryption key of vote,A step (S20) for receiving a validation ballot, during which a validation ballot is received from said voting entity, the validation ballot being encrypted by means of an encryption key public validation,A decryption step (S30), during which the validation ballot is decrypted by means of a validation private encryption key associated with said validation public encryption key,A validation step (S40), during which a validation request generated from the decrypted validation vote ballot is sent to said voting entity for validation,the preceding steps being repeated until said validation request validation by said voting entity, andfollowing said validation of said validation request, the method includes a step of recording the temporary ballot, encrypted as a definitive ballot paper pending its counting.
    [2]
    2. Method according to claim 1, comprising before the steps (S 10, S20) for receiving a temporary ballot and validation, a sending step (S02) during which at least one bulletin definition of vote, a public vote encryption key and a public validation encryption key are sent to said voting entity.
    [3]
    3. Method according to the preceding claim, comprising prior to the step (S02) of sending, a step (S01) of selecting at least one validation public encryption key during which at least one public encryption key Validation is randomly selected from a set of public validation encryption keys.
    [4]
    4. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the validation public encryption key is different from the public vote encryption key.
    [5]
    5. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein a vote private encryption key associated with the public vote encryption key is different from the validation private encryption key associated with the public encryption key validation.
    [6]
    6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, comprising prior to the step (S40) of validation, a step (S31) verification during which the content of the validation ballot is communicated to the voting entity for verification.
    [7]
    7. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein during the step (S40) validation as soon as the validation request is generated the validation ballot is deleted.
    [8]
    8. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the temporary ballot remains encrypted throughout the course of said method.
    [9]
    9. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein prior to the repetition of steps, the encrypted temporary ballot is deleted.
    [10]
    10. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the private vote encryption key associated with the public encryption key of the temporary ballot can decrypt the final ballot.
    [11]
    A computer program product comprising one or more instruction sequences stored and accessible to a processor, and which, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to perform the steps of the method according to one of claims 1 to to 10.
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    法律状态:
    2018-07-31| NV| New agent|Representative=s name: LUMI IP GMBH, CH |
    2019-05-15| PCAR| Change of the address of the representative|Free format text: NEW ADDRESS: RODTMATTSTRASSE 45, 3014 BERN (CH) |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1558047A|FR3040519B1|2015-08-28|2015-08-28|METHOD OF SECURING AND VERIFIABILITY OF AN ELECTRONIC VOTE|
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