• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    The present invention relates to a financial institution processing facility for processing a received financial transaction number simulating a primary account number of a credit or debit card and encrypting therein an account number of a payee which includes an extractor for extracting the account number from the simulated primary account number and a method to process a financial transaction using said financial institution processing facility.
    公开号:CH709883B1
    申请号:CH01346/13
    申请日:2007-11-16
    公开日:2016-01-29
    发明作者:Serge Christian Pierre Belamant
    申请人:Net1 Ueps Technologies Inc；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    This invention relates to electronic financial transactions. In particular, it relates to a financial transaction number generator. A carrier for an algorithm for the generator, a memory module for use together with the generator, a financial institution processing device, a method for carrying out a financial transaction, a method for processing a financial transaction and a method for enabling a financial transaction are disclosed herein.
    For financial transactions considered here, a primary account number (primary account number = PAN) of a normal credit or debit account with a bank or financial institution is generally formed or simulated, which contains the correct account number in encrypted form. The simulated PAN can also contain an amount to be deducted from the account. Accordingly, an account number is encrypted together with an amount and inserted into a sequence of digits that appears as a valid PAN. This embeds the account number and the transaction amount in the simulated PAN. The simulated PAN is then handled by the existing financial transaction infrastructure, whereby the issuing bank knows that this is not a PAN and the corresponding digits must be decrypted so that one can see the embedded account number and the embedded amount. In an application, a payer (transactor) who wants to make a financial transaction generates a simulated PAN and gives it to a supplier of goods or services from whom he would like to purchase these goods or services. The supplier enters the simulated PAN and the transaction amount in a conventional manner. These data are then transmitted to a receiving bank, which forwards them to the issuing bank for verification. The issuing bank then extracts the embedded account number and amount, verifies that the embedded amount and the specified amount are the same (while doing the normal, conventional checks), and if they match, authorizes the transaction.
    Those skilled in the art will appreciate that, in most cases, the payer must provide an expiration date and a card verification value (CVV). One or both of these can also be simulated and used to encrypt information. The person skilled in the art is also aware that a “Bank Identification Number” (BIN) is included in the first part of a PAN, and that does not change with the simulated PAN.
    It will therefore be appreciated that this invention improves the security of transactions, particularly over the Internet or by telephone.
    [0005] A financial transaction number generator for generating a unique transaction number is described first, the transaction number simulating the primary account number of an ordinary credit or debit card and containing an account number of a payer.
    The generator can also incorporate a transaction amount in the transaction number.
    [0007] A method for performing a financial transaction is further described, which consists in creating a simulated PAN which contains an account number and, embedded therein, possibly a transaction amount.
    This includes issuing such a simulated PAN to the supplier of goods or services and receiving such a simulated PAN by a supplier of goods or services.
    [0009] The simulated PAN can be created in a form that can be recognized by humans. In order to be able to continue working with the existing financial structure, it can therefore in particular consist of a sequence of numerical digits. Those skilled in the art will understand that such a sequence could consist of 16 to 23 digits.
    Those skilled in the art will also appreciate that the first 6 digits of the simulated PAN indicate the BIN which, as mentioned above, enables the transaction to be routed to the correct financial institution and the issuing financial institution to recognize that it has received a simulated PAN that contains the embedded transaction number and transaction amount. Similarly, those skilled in the art will also appreciate that the last digit of the simulated PAN can be a check digit.
    The PAN generator can generate a unique sequence of digits containing the encrypted information, each time providing a new sequence. The generator can therefore use a corresponding encryption algorithm in order to deliver a unique encrypted sequence each time.
    As already mentioned above, the encrypted sequence can also contain a transaction amount.
    In addition, as already mentioned, the CVV and / or the expiry date can be simulated and incorporated into the encrypted information.
    The generator can contain an electronic wallet, which is charged with the transaction amount when creating the simulated PAN.
    The simulated PAN can also contain embedded information about the identity of the intended payee in encrypted form. The generator can request a user to enter the name or the account number of the intended payee, which is then also embedded and encrypted in the simulated PAN.
    If the simulated PAN is intended for use by a middleman, it can be created in an encrypted intermediate form, as an alphanumeric sequence that requires a one-time password for decryption and that provides a usable simulated PAN. This intermediate form is then delivered to the middleman in one way and the password in another way. The generator can then have a facility to generate either the simulated PAN or the intermediate form together with a password for one-time use. In addition, the generator can have a device to accept the intermediate form with its password, to decrypt the alphanumeric sequence and to deliver a usable simulated PAN.
    Furthermore, an approved transaction medium can be specified in the simulated PAN. If the simulated PAN should only allow a POS device, an ATM, a telephone transaction or an Internet transaction, or anything, then this can also be embedded in the simulated PAN.
    The generator can include an electronic processing device, a storage unit, an input device for entering an application for a simulated PAN and the transaction amount, and a display for displaying the simulated PAN. It will be appreciated that the relevant account number and encryption algorithm are stored in the storage unit. The generator can be a mobile device, in particular a mobile phone, in which case the memory unit can be a “subscriber identification module (SIM)”. It will be recognized that if a user wishes to incorporate an indication of the payee, and / or requires an intermediate form in an alphanumeric sequence with the appropriate password, and / or wishes to specify a special transaction medium, this with the input device and the Display, which shows corresponding prompts and / or menus, can be made.
    Accordingly, a memory module such as a SIM card, on which a suitable BIN is stored, an account number, an encryption algorithm for encrypting the account number and a transaction amount to be transferred, from which a simulated PAN is created, which the BIN contains, as well as an encrypted sequence of digits in which the account number and the transaction amount are embedded.
    Also described is a carrier that provides the generator with the encryption algorithm which contains the encryption algorithm, preferably together with the account number, therein or on it.
    Also described is a method for enabling a financial transaction, in which an encrypted financial transaction number, which simulates a primary account number of a conventional credit or debit card and built therein an account number of a payer, is generated by the payer, the provision of a memory module to the payer who has the payer's account number and the encryption algorithm.
    Also described is a method for enabling a financial transaction, in which an encrypted financial transaction number, which simulates the primary account number of a conventional credit or debit card and contains the payer's account number, is generated by a payer who is sent to includes the issuer of his account number and the encryption algorithm.
    Also described is a financial institution processing device for processing a financial transaction number which simulates the primary account number of a conventional credit or debit card and which includes an account number of a payer therein which includes an extractor for extracting the account number from the simulated primary account number.
    A device for processing financial transactions is specified, which includes a financial institution processing device as described above, together with a financial transaction number generator as also described above.
    [0025] A method for processing financial transactions is also described, which comprises:
    Obtaining an apparent financial transaction number simulating the primary account number of a conventional credit or debit card and listing an issuer's account number along with a request to authorize payment; andTake the account number from the primary account number.
    The simulated PAN may have been received over a conventional financial communications network.
    As shown above, the PAN has incorporated a BIN, and the remaining numbers of the simulated PAN are encrypted. The device can thus have separating means in order to separate the encrypted numbers from the BIN. If the transaction amount has also been encrypted, the transaction amount is also decrypted during decryption.
    If, as already discussed above, the CVV and / or the expiry date have also been simulated and contain encrypted information, these are also decrypted.
    If the simulated PAN has embedded a transaction amount in it, then the embedded amount is decrypted and compared by means of comparison means with the trade amount that was delivered in the usual way. If they are different, the transaction will be refused.
    If the simulated PAN contains information about the intended payee, then this is also extracted and can then be compared with the data about the recipient, which is supplied together with the PAN in a conventional manner; and should the simulated PAN also contain a special transaction medium, this is also extracted and a check is made to determine whether the transaction medium used was correct.
    The device may contain a memory for storing the received, simulated PANs, or at least the encrypted parts thereof, and comparison means for comparing a received simulated PAN (or the encrypted part thereof) with stored PANs (or the stored and encrypted parts thereof ) to ensure that a simulated PAN can only be used once.
    If a transaction is authorized, the requesting bank or the supplier of goods or services is sent an authorization and the corresponding account of the payer is debited with the transaction amount.
    The invention will now be described by way of non-limiting examples which refer to the accompanying drawings: Figure 1 shows a first application of the invention; Fig. 2 shows a second application of the invention; and Fig. 3 shows a third application of the invention.
    In Fig. 1 a first implementation of the invention is shown. A payer who wants to buy goods from a retailer has a generator in the form of a mobile telephone 10. The telephone 10 has a display 14, a keyboard 16 and a SIM card 18. The SIM card 18 contains a program that , as discussed above, is intended to provide a simulated PAN. The SIM card 18 has thus saved the payer's account number, a BIN, an encryption algorithm and a PIN. The payer uses the keyboard 16 to enter an application to activate the program, along with his PIN, and then uses the keyboard 16 to enter the transaction amount when prompted to do so on the display. The program then generates the simulated PAN, a CVV and an expiry date, which are shown on the display 14. It will be appreciated that the phone 10 and SIM card 18 thereby provide a virtual credit or debit card.
    The payer reads the PAN, the CVV and the expiry date from a cashier, who manually enters the relevant digits into a point of sale (POS) device 20 together with the trade amount. The simulated PAN is checked by the POS device 20 to ensure that the check digit is correct. The PAN, CVV, expiration date, and trade amount are transmitted in a conventional manner to the receiving bank of the merchant 22 over a conventional financial network 24.
    The receiving bank 22 identifies the corresponding issuing bank 26 from the BIN and sends the simulated PAN, the CVV, the expiry date and the trade amount to the issuing bank 26. The issuing bank 26 has a communication interface 28, a computer 30 and a storage unit 32. The simulated PAN, the CVV and the expiry date and the transaction amount are fed to the computer 30, which separates the encrypted parts from the simulated PAN, the CVV and the expiry date. This is then compared with a list of all previously obtained numerical sequences which are stored in the storage unit 32. If the sequence is unique and has not been used before, it is added to the saved list. If it has already been used before and has been saved on the list, the transaction is refused and a corresponding message is sent to the receiving bank 22 and to the supplier. If the series has not previously been used, then it is decrypted by the computer 30 using an appropriate decryption algorithm in order to extract the payer's account number and the embedded transaction amount. The issuing bank does not require a PIN or any other identification. The embedded transaction amount is compared with the separately delivered trade amount and, if they differ, the transaction is refused. The computer 30 checks whether the payer has sufficient credit, and if so, the payer's account is debited and a conventional authorization is sent to the receiving bank 22 which credits the amount to the merchant's account and informs the merchant that the Transaction has been made.
    The SIM card 18 can also function like an electronic wallet, in which case the wallet will be debited with the transaction amount after the simulated PAN, CVV and expiration date have been specified.
    Referring to Fig. 2, a second implementation of the invention is shown in which a financial transaction is made over the Internet 40. In this application, generator 42 is a laptop computer on which the program has been installed in order to create a simulated PAN as discussed above. The computer 42 has also stored the payer's account number, the BIN, the encryption algorithm and the PIN.
    When the buyer wants to buy goods or services or wants prior approval from a supplier over the Internet, he generates a simulated PAN, CVV, and expiration date that is delivered to the supplier over the Internet 40 to a server 44 of the supplier will. This is then transmitted to the receiving bank 22 of the supplier, which forwards the data to the issuing bank 26. The process is then carried out as already discussed above with reference to FIG. 1.
    Similarly, a secured transaction can be made over the phone, as shown in FIG. In this implementation, the generator is again a mobile phone 10, as in FIG. 1. The buyer thus delivers the simulated PAN, the CVV and an expiry date as read from the telephone 10, via a telephone network 50 to an employee in a call center 52. From there, it is sent in a conventional manner together with the transaction amount to the receiving bank 22 and the issuing bank 26 forwarded. The issuing bank processes the transaction as shown in Fig. 1 above.
    An example of how the simulated PAN is generated and processed is now shown:
    1. Customer USN = 3 bytes
    1st byte = F1, can be determined by the BINUSN = 9876 5432 (max. 8 digits)
    2. Generate an expiration date
    [0044]Use 5 years as the expiry date of the card - that's 60 months minus 12 months (counts for the current year –1)48 months remainEXPDATE = TRXTYPE [2 BITS] .AID [4 bits]WHEREAID [2 bits] = 00, 01, 10, 11TRX TYPE [4 bits] = 0000, 0001, 0010, 0011, 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111,1000, 1001,1010,1011MONTH = TRX TYPE + 1 (+ 1 so we don't end with a month = 0)MM = Binary_To_ASCII (MONTH)YEAR = (current year +1) + AID (CCYY)YY = Binary_To_ASCII (the last 2 digits of the YEAR)
    NOTE:MM and YY are (ASCII) characters that can be displayed. These 4 numbers are entered on the terminal as the desired expiry dateMONTH [1] = binary equivalent to MM (result is always 1 byte)YEAR [2] = binary comparable with YEAR including century (result is always 2 bytes)AID is the account / exchange that is debited or to which something is credited.
    3. Generating the Expiry Date Mapping Values (EDMV) (Here we have space for more)
    - This here brings a little more randomness into the month and year generated and a method of checking that it was entered correctly on the terminal. EDMV = 1 DES ((YEAR [2] + 00.MONTH [1]) [2]). YEAR [2] .MONTH [1]. (YEAR [2] - 00.MONTH [1]) [2] .FF)
    NOTE:A static key is used to generate the encrypted block (EDMV key).(YEAR [2] + 00.MONTH [1]), the result is always a 2-byte value(YEAR [2] - 00.MONTH [1]), the result is always a 2-byte valueEDMV1 [2] = the last two bytes of the EDMV resultEDMV2 [2] = the second 2 bytes of the EDMV resultIf MM / YY was entered incorrectly on the terminal, EDMV will turn out differently and therefore the encryption block is not set up correctly and the CVV comparison will fail.
    4. Generating a checksum for the USN - (diversified key)
    CVV = 3DES (USN [3] .ULSN [2] .ULP [1] .EDMV1 [2])
    NOTE:Use triple DES, triple key, diversified under USNDiversified keys (USN-based) are used to generate the encryption block (host key)CVV is converted into representable (ASCII) numbersCVV_1 = the last 3 digits of the representable (ASCII) resultThis 3-digit value is entered into the terminal as the desired CVV (final CVV)CVV_2 = binary equivalent to CVV_1 (always 2 bytes)
    5. Generate a PIN-encrypted checksum for USN
    [0050]When the user enters a PIN, it becomes part of the encryption key.If the user does not enter a PIN, a default PIN code is used.CVV_PIN = 1DES (CVV [8])
    NOTE:If no PIN is required, a static (PIN KEY) is used to generate the encryption block.If a PIN is required, the user can generate one that can consist of 4–8 digits (inclusive).Each digit represents a hex-like nibble that replaces the PIN_key from the most insignificant nibble to the most significant.Conversion of a CVV_PIN to representable (ASCII) numbers.CVV_PIN1 = the last 3 digits of the representable (ASCII) result. This 3-digit value is entered into the terminal as the desired CVV.The CVV is changed based on the PIN and therefore the HOST generates a wrong CVV and the CVV comparison fails.
    6. Generate an unload signature
    AMT [2] = last 2 bytes of the 4-byte amountCVV_PIN2 [2] = binary equivalent of CVV_PIN1 (result is always 2 bytes)CVV_TEMP = (AMT [2] XOR CVV_PIN2 [2])CHARACTER = 3DES (AMT [4] .CVV_TEMP [2] .EDMV2 [2])CHARACTER = 9999 9999 99
    NOTE:Static keys are used to generate an unload signature.The Unload Signature usually contains an Unload LSN, but this is already included in the CVV + TEMP.
    7. SIGN = first 8 digits
    PAN = USN + SIGN (result is a maximum of 9 digits). Optional - [(USN * YY + YY * MM) + SIGN]PAN = 9876 5432 (USN) + 9999 9999 (SIGN)PAN = 1987 6534 1
    Calculation of the checksum for PANBring PAN into the PAN buffer.At this point the full PAN, the expiry date and the CVV are generated.
    8. ON HOST:
    1. Restoration of the expiry date mapping value (EDMV1 and EDMV2) (step 3)TRXTYPE and AID can be determined from MM and YYTRXTYPE [2 bits] .AID [3 bits] = ((YY- (current year + 1)) * 12) + MM 2. Restoration of the unload signature (SIGN), using the CVV entered on the terminal (step 4, 5). 3. USN = PAN-SIGN 4. Now the host can get the HOST_KEY, ULSN and ULP. 5. Recovery of CVV using the calculated USN. 6. Compare the restored CVV (step 4) with the CVV entered in the terminal.
    Verifications 1. 3-digit CVV match. 2. CVV is not generated if SIGN is wrong. 3. CVV is not restored if USN is incorrect. 4. CVV does not fit properly if the EDMV is wrong.
    Summary on the card 1. Use the USN, ULSN, ULP to generate CVV. 2. Use the CVV to generate the SIGN. 3. Now PAN = USN + SIGN.
    Summary on the host 1. Use the received CVV to generate the SIGN. 2. Use the SIGN to get the USN using PAN (USN = PAN-SIGN). 3. Use USN to get the HOST KEYS, ULSN, ULP for generating CVV. 4. Compare the generated CVV with the CVV of the terminal.
    Those skilled in the art will appreciate that it should be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a fraudulent transaction when the transaction is conducted in accordance with this invention.
    Items revealed
    The present property right discloses in a first form of disclosure a financial transaction number generator for generating a unique transaction number, in which the transaction number simulates a primary account number of a conventional credit or debit card and contains an account number of a payer therein.
    In a second disclosure form, the protective right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1, in which the transaction number also contains a transaction amount.
    In a third disclosure form, the property right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 2, which has an input means that can be operated by the payer, whereby the payer can enter the transaction amount.
    In a fourth disclosure form, the protective right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1 or 2, which generates a sequence of digits whose number corresponds to a conventional protocol, and a predetermined number of which is a bank identification number to identify a specific financial institution who will approve the transaction and who will be responsible for paying the transaction amount.
    In a fifth disclosure form, the property right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 3, in which the last digit of the sequence of digits is a check digit.
    In a sixth disclosure form, the property right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1 or 2, which also generates a simulated expiry date.
    In a seventh form of disclosure, the property right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1 or 2, which also generates a simulated card verification value number.
    In an eighth form of disclosure, the property right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1 or 2, in which the simulated primary account number is encrypted and which contains an encryption mechanism to create an encrypted primary account number according to a predetermined encryption algorithm.
    In a ninth form of disclosure, the protective right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1, which also includes an identification of an agreed payee in the simulated primary account number.
    In a tenth disclosure form, the protective right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1, which also records an identification of a specific transaction medium.
    In an eleventh disclosure form, the property right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 2, which also contains an electronic wallet, the credit amount therein being reduced by the transaction amount when the simulated primary account number is generated.
    In a twelfth disclosure form, the property right discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 8, which contains a memory module in which the payer's account number and the encryption algorithm are stored.
    Disclosure Form 13 discloses a financial transaction number generator according to Disclosure Form 2 which generates an intermediate number and a password that provide the desired primary account number when a predetermined decryption algorithm is used.
    Disclosure form 14 discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 13, which contains the predetermined decryption algorithm.
    Disclosure form 15 discloses a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure form 1, which can be operated by a payer.
    Disclosure 16 discloses a carrier for providing a financial transaction number generator according to disclosure 8 with an encryption algorithm having the encryption algorithm therein or thereon.
    Disclosure 17 discloses a memory module for use with the financial transaction number generator according to disclosure 12 which contains the payer's account number and the encryption algorithm.
    Disclosure 18 discloses a financial institution processor for processing a financial transaction number which simulates a primary account number of a credit or debit card and which has an account number of a payer therein which includes an extractor for extracting the account number from the simulated primary account number.
    Disclosure Form 19 discloses a financial institution processing device according to Disclosure Form 18 in which the transaction number also contains a transaction amount and the financial transaction number is received along with a request to approve payment of a trade amount and in which the extractor is extracted from the simulated primary account number also extracted the transaction amount.
    Disclosure form 20 discloses a financial institution processing device according to disclosure form 18, which includes a single-use checker for ensuring that a primary account number obtained can only be used once.
    Disclosure form 21 discloses a financial institution processing device according to disclosure form 20, in which the single-use checking device includes a memory in which at least specified parts of the previously obtained simulated primary account numbers are stored and a comparison device for comparing at least the specified parts of a simulated primary obtained Account number with the saved parts.
    Disclosure Form 22 discloses a financial institution processing device according to Disclosure Form 19 which includes a response message generator for generating a message to a transaction recipient to accept or reject the transaction.
    Disclosure Form 23 discloses a financial institution processing device according to Disclosure Form 22 which includes forwarding device for forwarding the response message to the transaction recipient over a conventional financial communication network.
    Disclosure Form 24 discloses a financial institution processing facility of Disclosure Form 18 that includes obtaining means for obtaining the simulated primary account number over a conventional financial communications network.
    Disclosure Form 25 discloses a financial institution processing device according to Disclosure Form 22 which includes a transaction checker for checking whether the payer has an account, whether he has sufficient funds, and whether the extracted transaction amount is the same as the trade amount, and for authorizing the transaction if all of this is correct, the response message generator being responsive to this.
    Disclosure Form 26 discloses a financial institution processing device according to Disclosure Form 25 that includes debiting means for debiting the payer's account with the trade amount when the transaction is authorized.
    Disclosure Form 27 discloses a financial institution processing facility of Disclosure Form 18 that includes a decryption device for decrypting encrypted simulated primary account numbers.
    Disclosure form 28 discloses a financial institution processing device according to disclosure form 18, in which the financial transaction number was generated by the payer.
    Disclosure form 29 discloses an apparatus for processing a financial transaction, which contains a financial transaction number generator according to one of disclosure forms 1 to 15 and a financial institution processing device according to one of embodiments 18 to 28.
    Disclosure 30 discloses a method of conducting a financial transaction that includes generating a unique financial transaction number that simulates the conventional primary account number of a credit or debit card and incorporates the payer's account number.
    Disclosure form 31 discloses a method for performing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 30, in which the financial transaction number includes a transaction amount therein.
    Disclosure form 32 discloses a method for carrying out a financial transaction according to disclosure form 31, in which the financial transaction number is generated by the payer and which includes the payer entering the transaction amount.
    Disclosure 33 discloses a method of performing a financial transaction according to disclosure 30, which includes generating a sequence of digits whose number matches a conventional protocol and a predetermined number thereof is a bank identification number to identify a particular financial institution in which the transaction will be approved and who will be responsible for paying the transaction amount.
    Disclosure form 34 discloses a method for carrying out a financial transaction according to disclosure form 33, in which the last digit of the sequence of digits is a check digit.
    Disclosure form 35 discloses a method for performing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 30, which also includes generating a simulated expiry date.
    Disclosure form 36 discloses a method for executing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 30, which also includes generating a simulated card verification value number.
    Disclosure form 37 discloses a method for performing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 30, which includes causing an encrypted simulated primary account number to be generated in accordance with a predetermined encryption algorithm.
    Disclosure form 38 discloses a method for carrying out a financial transaction according to disclosure form 30, which also includes including an identification of an intended payee in the simulated primary account number.
    Disclosure form 39 discloses a method for carrying out a financial transaction according to disclosure form 30, which also includes recording an identification of a particular transaction medium.
    Disclosure 40 discloses a method of performing a financial transaction according to Disclosure 31, including causing an amount of credit in an electronic wallet to be reduced in accordance with the transaction amount when the simulated primary account number is generated.
    Disclosure Form 41 discloses a method of performing a financial transaction according to Disclosure Form 37 that includes generating an intermediate number and password that provide the desired simulated primary account number when a predetermined decryption algorithm is used.
    Disclosure 42 discloses a method for performing a financial transaction according to Disclosure 41 that includes decrypting an encrypted intermediate number using an appropriate password and decryption algorithm to generate the simulated primary account number.
    Disclosure form 43 discloses a method for performing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 30, in which the financial transaction number is created by the payer.
    Disclosure 44 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction which includes obtaining a purported financial transaction number simulating a primary account number of a conventional credit or debit card and having the payer's account number therein along with a request for authorization to pay the Trade amount, and extracting the account number from the simulated primary account number.
    Disclosure form 45 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 44, in which the received financial transaction number also contains a transaction amount and which also includes the extraction of the transaction amount.
    Disclosure Form 46 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction in accordance with Disclosure Form 44 that includes ensuring that the simulated primary account number obtained can only be used once.
    Disclosure Form 47 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction according to Disclosure Form 46 that includes storing at least certain portions of previously obtained simulated primary account numbers and comparing at least the certain portion of a received simulated primary account number with the stored portions.
    Disclosure form 48 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 44 that includes generating a response message to a transaction recipient to approve or deny the requested transaction.
    Disclosure form 49 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 48, which includes forwarding the response message to the transaction recipient via a conventional financial communication network.
    Disclosure Form 50 discloses a method of processing a financial transaction in accordance with Disclosure Form 44 that includes obtaining the simulated primary account number over a conventional financial communications network.
    Disclosure Form 51 discloses a method of processing a financial transaction according to Disclosure Form 45 that includes checking whether the payer has an account, whether he has sufficient funds and whether the extracted transaction amount is the same as the trade amount, and approving the transaction if all of this is correct, includes.
    Disclosure Form 52 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction according to Disclosure Form 51 that includes debiting the payer's account with the trade amount if the transaction is authorized.
    Disclosure form 53 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction in accordance with disclosure form 44 that includes decrypting encrypted simulated primary account numbers.
    Disclosure form 54 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction according to disclosure form 44, in which the transaction number was generated by the payer.
    Disclosure form 55 discloses a method for enabling a financial transaction with which an encrypted financial transaction number, which simulates a conventional primary account number of a credit or debit card and which contains an account number of the payer therein, is generated by the payer who is providing of the payer with a memory module that has the payer's account number and the encryption algorithm stored therein.
    Disclosure form 56 discloses a method for enabling a financial transaction with which an encrypted financial transaction number that simulates a primary account number of a conventional credit or debit card and that contains the issuer's account number therein is generated by the payer and that is transmitted to includes the payer's account number and an encryption algorithm.
    Disclosure form 57 discloses a financial transaction number generator, substantially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
    [0118] Disclosure form 58 discloses a financial institution processing facility, essentially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
    Disclosure form 59 discloses a method for initiating a financial transaction, essentially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
    Disclosure form 60 discloses a method for processing a financial transaction, essentially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
    权利要求:
    Claims (19)
    [1]
    1. Financial institution processing facility for processing a received financial transaction number, thesimulates a primary account number of a credit or debit card and contains therein an account number of a payee encrypted, characterized in that the financial institution processing means comprises an extractor adapted to extract from the simulated primary account number those parts containing the account number of the payer encrypted and decrypt the account number of the payer.
    [2]
    The financial institution handler of claim 1, adapted to receive the financial transaction number along with a request to approve payment of a trade amount, and wherein the extractor is further adapted to respond to a transaction amount from the received financial transaction number to extract the received financial transaction number along with the request to approve the payment of the trade amount.
    [3]
    A financial institution processing device according to claim 1, characterized in that it includes a disposable inspection device arranged to ensure that the primary account number can be used only once.
    [4]
    The financial institution processing apparatus according to claim 3, characterized in that said disposable use checking means includes a memory adapted to store at least predetermined portions of previously obtained simulated primary account numbers, said financial institution processing means further comprising a comparing means adapted thereto is to compare the fixed portions of the previously obtained simulated primary account numbers stored in the memory with the corresponding portions of the currently obtained simulated primary account number.
    [5]
    The financial institution handler of claim 2, characterized in that it includes a response message generator adapted to generate a message to a transactional recipient of acceptance or rejection of the transaction.
    [6]
    A financial institution handler according to claim 5, characterized in that it includes a forwarding means adapted to forward the reply message to the transaction recipient via a conventional financial communications network.
    [7]
    A financial institution processing device according to claim 1, characterized in that it includes a obtaining means adapted to receive the simulated primary account number via a conventional financial communications network.
    [8]
    A financial institution processing device according to claim 5, characterized in that it comprises a transaction check means adapted to check whether the extracted transaction amount is the same as the trade amount, whether the payer has an account with that account number which is encrypted in the received financial transaction number, has sufficient funding, and approves the transaction in response to the audit, and wherein the response message generator is adapted to respond in response to the approval approval transaction.
    [9]
    A financial institution processing facility according to claim 8, characterized in that it includes debiting means adapted to debit the account of the payer with the transaction amount when the transaction is approved.
    [10]
    A method of processing a financial transaction using a financial institution handler as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein the received financial transaction number simulating the primary account number of a credit or debit card and encrypting in part thereof the account number of a payee , is received along with the request for approval of the payment of a trade amount, characterized in that the processing comprises the step of feeding the simulated primary account number for extracting the account number of the payer to the extractor and the payer's account number from the simulated primary Account number is decrypted.
    [11]
    A method according to claim 10, wherein the financial transaction processing unit receives the financial transaction number also including a transaction amount therein, and the transaction amount is extracted by the financial institution processing means.
    [12]
    12. The method of claim 10, wherein the financial institution processing facility ensures by comparing that the obtained simulated primary account number can be used only once.
    [13]
    The method of claim 12, wherein at least predetermined portions of previously obtained simulated primary account numbers are stored by the financial institution handler and subsequently compared to the corresponding portions of simulated primary account numbers obtained.
    [14]
    14. The method of claim 10, wherein the financial institution processing means generates a response message to a transaction recipient for approving or denying the requested transaction.
    [15]
    The method of claim 14, wherein the financial institution handler is used to send a response message to the transaction recipient via a conventional financial communications network.
    [16]
    The method of claim 10, wherein said financial institution handler receives said simulated primary account number via a conventional financial communications network.
    [17]
    17. The method of claim 11, comprising checking with the financial institution handler whether the payer has an account, if he has sufficient funds, and if the extracted transaction amount is the same as the trade amount, and if the transaction is all correct, is hereby approved.
    [18]
    18. The method of claim 17, wherein the account of the payer is debited with the financial institution processing facility, when the transaction is approved, with the trading amount.
    [19]
    The method of claim 10, wherein encrypted simulated primary account numbers are decrypted with the financial institution handler.
    类似技术:
    公开号 | 公开日 | 专利标题
    CH709883B1|2016-01-29|Secured financial transactions.
    DE60317169T2|2008-08-07|AUTHENTICATION ARRANGEMENT AND METHOD FOR USE WITH FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
    DE60124893T2|2007-06-21|Security module for an account management system
    US6000832A|1999-12-14|Electronic online commerce card with customer generated transaction proxy number for online transactions
    US20020111919A1|2002-08-15|Online payer authentication service
    DE212010000059U1|2012-02-02|Changeable safety value
    JP2008305392A|2008-12-18|Method for providing card settlement service, system for providing card settlement service, and computer program for causing computer system to execute card settlement service providing process
    CN104732379A|2015-06-24|Secure Payment System
    US20040153410A1|2004-08-05|Anonymous payment system and method
    DE69829635T2|2006-06-22|Protect transaction data
    WO2010089049A1|2010-08-12|Mobile payment method and devices
    JP2003536180A|2003-12-02|Improved method and system for making secure payments over a computer network
    US20190019179A1|2019-01-17|Vpew digital wallet
    DE60122912T2|2007-04-12|METHOD FOR DELIVERING IDENTIFICATION DATA OF A PAYMENT CARD TO A USER
    DE102013016119A1|2015-04-02|Payment process
    EP3035270A1|2016-06-22|Card-based offline token generation
    DE102020112328A1|2021-11-11|PROCEDURE FOR TRIGGERING A PAYMENT PROCESS
    DE202012000071U1|2012-03-19|Ident QR code for authentication in case of personal and event-specific data transfer in healthcare and / or electronic payments
    DE202019106383U1|2020-01-31|Electronic payment device
    WO2003070493A2|2003-08-28|Data processing system and method for electronic payment transfer
    KR20040064018A|2004-07-16|Electronic Check Method and System
    DE10229619A1|2003-01-23|Conducting a payment process by mobile telephone involves checking identification characteristic in transaction center, completing payment process if identification check satisfactory
    DE102013009600A1|2014-12-11|Method for authenticating a transaction
    DE10148673A1|2003-04-30|Network system for electronic purchasing and payment over a network has secure user identification
    AT4805U1|2001-11-26|TERMINAL FOR SECURED CONFIRMATION OF DATA AND METHOD FOR IT
    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    AT506775A2|2009-11-15|
    NZ577677A|2012-05-25|
    KR20090102752A|2009-09-30|
    US20130297508A1|2013-11-07|
    MA30987B1|2009-12-01|
    RU2009122578A|2010-12-27|
    US20100088227A1|2010-04-08|
    KR20170034920A|2017-03-29|
    CA2669320C|2017-10-31|
    WO2008059465A2|2008-05-22|
    AP3361A|2015-07-31|
    PH12015500674A1|2015-05-11|
    MY153194A|2015-01-29|
    BRPI0718902A2|2013-12-10|
    JP2010510567A|2010-04-02|
    SE0950453L|2009-07-21|
    KR20160011698A|2016-02-01|
    GB2457204A|2009-08-12|
    CH698351B1|2015-06-15|
    MX2009005257A|2009-10-12|
    CN101573723A|2009-11-04|
    AP2009004889A0|2009-06-30|
    RU2479032C2|2013-04-10|
    FI20095662A|2009-06-12|
    ZA200903802B|2010-03-31|
    CA2669320A1|2008-05-22|
    IL198738A|2015-05-31|
    AU2007320785B2|2012-09-27|
    DE112007002744T5|2009-10-08|
    GB0910305D0|2009-07-29|
    EP2095311A2|2009-09-02|
    WO2008059465A3|2008-07-10|
    EG25664A|2012-05-09|
    IL198738D0|2010-02-17|
    AU2007320785A1|2008-05-22|
    引用文献:
    公开号 | 申请日 | 公开日 | 申请人 | 专利标题
    US5613012A|1994-11-28|1997-03-18|Smarttouch, Llc.|Tokenless identification system for authorization of electronic transactions and electronic transmissions|
    WO1999001823A1|1997-07-03|1999-01-14|Citicorp Development Center|System and method for transferring value to a magnetic stripe on a transaction card|
    US6163771A|1997-08-28|2000-12-19|Walker Digital, Llc|Method and device for generating a single-use financial account number|
    US6000832A|1997-09-24|1999-12-14|Microsoft Corporation|Electronic online commerce card with customer generated transaction proxy number for online transactions|
    US6327578B1|1998-12-29|2001-12-04|International Business Machines Corporation|Four-party credit/debit payment protocol|
    EP1028401A3|1999-02-12|2003-06-25|Citibank, N.A.|Method and system for performing a bankcard transaction|
    US20030130955A1|1999-12-17|2003-07-10|Hawthorne William Mcmullan|Secure transaction systems|
    US20010029485A1|2000-02-29|2001-10-11|E-Scoring, Inc.|Systems and methods enabling anonymous credit transactions|
    AU4347301A|2000-03-07|2001-09-17|American Express Travel Relate|System for facilitating a transaction|
    AU2001249276A2|2000-03-24|2001-10-08|Access Business Group International Llc|System and method for detecting fraudulent transactions|
    US20010056409A1|2000-05-15|2001-12-27|Bellovin Steven Michael|Offline one time credit card numbers for secure e-commerce|
    US7181762B2|2001-01-17|2007-02-20|Arcot Systems, Inc.|Apparatus for pre-authentication of users using one-time passwords|
    US6983381B2|2001-01-17|2006-01-03|Arcot Systems, Inc.|Methods for pre-authentication of users using one-time passwords|
    US7580898B2|2004-03-15|2009-08-25|Qsecure, Inc.|Financial transactions with dynamic personal account numbers|
    US10592901B2|2001-06-04|2020-03-17|Orbis Patents, Ltd.|Business-to-business commerce using financial transaction numbers|
    UA64840C2|2001-10-12|2004-03-15|Віталій Євгенович Леонідов-Каневський|Method of fulfilling payments by electronic facilities |
    US6908030B2|2001-10-31|2005-06-21|Arcot Systems, Inc.|One-time credit card number generator and single round-trip authentication|
    US7100821B2|2003-05-15|2006-09-05|Mehran Randall Rasti|Charge card and debit transactions using a variable charge number|
    US20090164380A1|2006-12-20|2009-06-25|Brown Kerry D|Financial transaction network|
    US7472829B2|2004-12-10|2009-01-06|Qsecure, Inc.|Payment card with internally generated virtual account numbers for its magnetic stripe encoder and user display|
    US7347361B2|2005-06-13|2008-03-25|Robert Lovett|System, method and program product for account transaction validation|
    US20080288403A1|2007-05-18|2008-11-20|Clay Von Mueller|Pin encryption device security|US9065643B2|2006-04-05|2015-06-23|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|System and method for account identifier obfuscation|
    US8762263B2|2005-09-06|2014-06-24|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|System and method for secured account numbers in proximity devices|
    US7818264B2|2006-06-19|2010-10-19|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|Track data encryption|
    US8121956B2|2007-06-25|2012-02-21|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|Cardless challenge systems and methods|
    US7739169B2|2007-06-25|2010-06-15|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|Restricting access to compromised account information|
    US7937324B2|2007-09-13|2011-05-03|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|Account permanence|
    US10296874B1|2007-12-17|2019-05-21|American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.|System and method for preventing unauthorized access to financial accounts|
    US8219489B2|2008-07-29|2012-07-10|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|Transaction processing using a global unique identifier|
    US8181861B2|2008-10-13|2012-05-22|Miri Systems, Llc|Electronic transaction security system and method|
    AU2009311303B2|2008-11-06|2015-09-10|Visa International Service Association|Online challenge-response|
    GB2466676A|2009-01-06|2010-07-07|Visa Europe Ltd|A method of processing payment authorisation requests|
    CA2753576A1|2009-02-25|2010-09-02|Miri Systems, Llc|Payment system and method|
    US9715681B2|2009-04-28|2017-07-25|Visa International Service Association|Verification of portable consumer devices|
    US8534564B2|2009-05-15|2013-09-17|Ayman Hammad|Integration of verification tokens with mobile communication devices|
    US9105027B2|2009-05-15|2015-08-11|Visa International Service Association|Verification of portable consumer device for secure services|
    US10846683B2|2009-05-15|2020-11-24|Visa International Service Association|Integration of verification tokens with mobile communication devices|
    US9038886B2|2009-05-15|2015-05-26|Visa International Service Association|Verification of portable consumer devices|
    US8893967B2|2009-05-15|2014-11-25|Visa International Service Association|Secure Communication of payment information to merchants using a verification token|
    US7891560B2|2009-05-15|2011-02-22|Visa International Service Assocation|Verification of portable consumer devices|
    US8602293B2|2009-05-15|2013-12-10|Visa International Service Association|Integration of verification tokens with portable computing devices|
    US10140598B2|2009-05-20|2018-11-27|Visa International Service Association|Device including encrypted data for expiration date and verification value creation|
    US8364591B2|2009-08-10|2013-01-29|Visa International Service Association|Track data mapping system for processing of payment transaction data|
    US10049356B2|2009-12-18|2018-08-14|First Data Corporation|Authentication of card-not-present transactions|
    US10255591B2|2009-12-18|2019-04-09|Visa International Service Association|Payment channel returning limited use proxy dynamic value|
    CN102713922B|2010-01-12|2015-11-25|维萨国际服务协会|For the method whenever confirmed to checking token|
    US10255601B2|2010-02-25|2019-04-09|Visa International Service Association|Multifactor authentication using a directory server|
    US9245267B2|2010-03-03|2016-01-26|Visa International Service Association|Portable account number for consumer payment account|
    JP6006907B2|2010-04-05|2016-10-12|カーディナルコマース コーポレーション|Processing method and system for debit transaction with PIN|
    US8473414B2|2010-04-09|2013-06-25|Visa International Service Association|System and method including chip-based device processing for transaction|
    US9342832B2|2010-08-12|2016-05-17|Visa International Service Association|Securing external systems with account token substitution|
    AU2012220669A1|2011-02-22|2013-05-02|Visa International Service Association|Universal electronic payment apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US10223730B2|2011-09-23|2019-03-05|Visa International Service Association|E-wallet store injection search apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US10586227B2|2011-02-16|2020-03-10|Visa International Service Association|Snap mobile payment apparatuses, methods and systems|
    AU2013214801B2|2012-02-02|2018-06-21|Visa International Service Association|Multi-source, multi-dimensional, cross-entity, multimedia database platform apparatuses, methods and systems|
    CN107967602A|2011-03-04|2018-04-27|维萨国际服务协会|Ability to pay is bound to the safety element of computer|
    US9280765B2|2011-04-11|2016-03-08|Visa International Service Association|Multiple tokenization for authentication|
    KR101944504B1|2011-06-08|2019-02-14|주식회사 비즈모델라인|Method for Registering Application for Account Transaction Using Dynamic Account Number|
    US10121129B2|2011-07-05|2018-11-06|Visa International Service Association|Electronic wallet checkout platform apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US9582598B2|2011-07-05|2017-02-28|Visa International Service Association|Hybrid applications utilizing distributed models and views apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US9704155B2|2011-07-29|2017-07-11|Visa International Service Association|Passing payment tokens through an hop/sop|
    US9355393B2|2011-08-18|2016-05-31|Visa International Service Association|Multi-directional wallet connector apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US10242358B2|2011-08-18|2019-03-26|Visa International Service Association|Remote decoupled application persistent state apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US9710807B2|2011-08-18|2017-07-18|Visa International Service Association|Third-party value added wallet features and interfaces apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US10825001B2|2011-08-18|2020-11-03|Visa International Service Association|Multi-directional wallet connector apparatuses, methods and systems|
    WO2013029014A2|2011-08-24|2013-02-28|Visa International Service Association|Method for using barcodes and mobile devices to conduct payment transactions|
    EP2602980B1|2011-12-09|2017-02-15|BlackBerry Limited|Transaction provisioning for mobile wireless communications devices and related methods|
    US8918855B2|2011-12-09|2014-12-23|Blackberry Limited|Transaction provisioning for mobile wireless communications devices and related methods|
    EP2801061B1|2012-01-05|2020-08-26|Visa International Service Association|Data protection with translation|
    US9830595B2|2012-01-26|2017-11-28|Visa International Service Association|System and method of providing tokenization as a service|
    US10282724B2|2012-03-06|2019-05-07|Visa International Service Association|Security system incorporating mobile device|
    US20130297501A1|2012-05-04|2013-11-07|Justin Monk|System and method for local data conversion|
    US9524501B2|2012-06-06|2016-12-20|Visa International Service Association|Method and system for correlating diverse transaction data|
    US9547769B2|2012-07-03|2017-01-17|Visa International Service Association|Data protection hub|
    US9846861B2|2012-07-25|2017-12-19|Visa International Service Association|Upstream and downstream data conversion|
    US9256871B2|2012-07-26|2016-02-09|Visa U.S.A. Inc.|Configurable payment tokens|
    US9665722B2|2012-08-10|2017-05-30|Visa International Service Association|Privacy firewall|
    AU2013315510B2|2012-09-11|2019-08-22|Visa International Service Association|Cloud-based Virtual Wallet NFC Apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US10176478B2|2012-10-23|2019-01-08|Visa International Service Association|Transaction initiation determination system utilizing transaction data elements|
    KR101316466B1|2012-11-20|2013-10-08|신한카드 주식회사|Mobile transaction system using dynamic track 2 data and method using the same|
    US9911118B2|2012-11-21|2018-03-06|Visa International Service Association|Device pairing via trusted intermediary|
    KR101316489B1|2012-11-23|2013-10-10|신한카드 주식회사|Method for processing transaction using variable pan|
    WO2014087381A1|2012-12-07|2014-06-12|Visa International Service Association|A token generating component|
    KR101330943B1|2012-12-10|2013-11-26|신한카드 주식회사|Transaction method using one time card information|
    US9741051B2|2013-01-02|2017-08-22|Visa International Service Association|Tokenization and third-party interaction|
    US10740731B2|2013-01-02|2020-08-11|Visa International Service Association|Third party settlement|
    US10223710B2|2013-01-04|2019-03-05|Visa International Service Association|Wearable intelligent vision device apparatuses, methods and systems|
    US11055710B2|2013-05-02|2021-07-06|Visa International Service Association|Systems and methods for verifying and processing transactions using virtual currency|
    EP2997532A4|2013-05-15|2016-05-11|Visa Int Service Ass|Mobile tokenization hub|
    US10878422B2|2013-06-17|2020-12-29|Visa International Service Association|System and method using merchant token|
    AU2014285769A1|2013-07-02|2016-01-07|Visa International Service Association|Payment card including user interface for use with payment card acceptance terminal|
    AU2014290143C1|2013-07-15|2019-01-03|Visa International Service Association|Secure remote payment transaction processing|
    SG10201800629WA|2013-07-24|2018-02-27|Visa Int Service Ass|Systems and methods for communicating risk using token assurance data|
    AP2016009010A0|2013-07-26|2016-01-31|Visa Int Service Ass|Provisioning payment credentials to a consumer|
    WO2015021420A1|2013-08-08|2015-02-12|Visa International Service Association|Methods and systems for provisioning mobile devices with payment credentials|
    US10496986B2|2013-08-08|2019-12-03|Visa International Service Association|Multi-network tokenization processing|
    KR102222230B1|2013-08-15|2021-03-05|비자 인터네셔널 서비스 어소시에이션|Secure remote payment transaction processing using a secure element|
    AU2014321178A1|2013-09-20|2016-04-14|Visa International Service Association|Secure remote payment transaction processing including consumer authentication|
    US9978094B2|2013-10-11|2018-05-22|Visa International Service Association|Tokenization revocation list|
    RU2019114941A|2013-10-11|2019-06-13|Виза Интернэшнл Сервис Ассосиэйшн|NETWORK TOKEN SYSTEM|
    US10515358B2|2013-10-18|2019-12-24|Visa International Service Association|Contextual transaction token methods and systems|
    US10489779B2|2013-10-21|2019-11-26|Visa International Service Association|Multi-network token bin routing with defined verification parameters|
    US10366387B2|2013-10-29|2019-07-30|Visa International Service Association|Digital wallet system and method|
    US8886570B1|2013-10-29|2014-11-11|Quisk, Inc.|Hacker-resistant balance monitoring|
    US9516487B2|2013-11-19|2016-12-06|Visa International Service Association|Automated account provisioning|
    US9922322B2|2013-12-19|2018-03-20|Visa International Service Association|Cloud-based transactions with magnetic secure transmission|
    SG11201604906QA|2013-12-19|2016-07-28|Visa Int Service Ass|Cloud-based transactions methods and systems|
    US10433128B2|2014-01-07|2019-10-01|Visa International Service Association|Methods and systems for provisioning multiple devices|
    US9846878B2|2014-01-14|2017-12-19|Visa International Service Association|Payment account identifier system|
    US10026087B2|2014-04-08|2018-07-17|Visa International Service Association|Data passed in an interaction|
    US9942043B2|2014-04-23|2018-04-10|Visa International Service Association|Token security on a communication device|
    CN106233664B|2014-05-01|2020-03-13|维萨国际服务协会|Data authentication using an access device|
    SG10201803024SA|2014-05-05|2018-06-28|Visa Int Service Ass|System and method for token domain control|
    WO2015179637A1|2014-05-21|2015-11-26|Visa International Service Association|Offline authentication|
    CN105429928A|2014-05-30|2016-03-23|阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司|Data communication method, data communication system, client and server|
    US11023890B2|2014-06-05|2021-06-01|Visa International Service Association|Identification and verification for provisioning mobile application|
    US10373153B2|2014-07-03|2019-08-06|Mastercard International Incorporated|Method and system for maintaining privacy and compliance in the use of account reissuance data|
    US9780953B2|2014-07-23|2017-10-03|Visa International Service Association|Systems and methods for secure detokenization|
    US10484345B2|2014-07-31|2019-11-19|Visa International Service Association|System and method for identity verification across mobile applications|
    US9775029B2|2014-08-22|2017-09-26|Visa International Service Association|Embedding cloud-based functionalities in a communication device|
    US10140615B2|2014-09-22|2018-11-27|Visa International Service Association|Secure mobile device credential provisioning using risk decision non-overrides|
    EP3198907B1|2014-09-26|2019-04-10|Visa International Service Association|Remote server encrypted data provisioning system and methods|
    US11257074B2|2014-09-29|2022-02-22|Visa International Service Association|Transaction risk based token|
    US10015147B2|2014-10-22|2018-07-03|Visa International Service Association|Token enrollment system and method|
    GB201419016D0|2014-10-24|2014-12-10|Visa Europe Ltd|Transaction Messaging|
    US10325261B2|2014-11-25|2019-06-18|Visa International Service Association|Systems communications with non-sensitive identifiers|
    US10257185B2|2014-12-12|2019-04-09|Visa International Service Association|Automated access data provisioning|
    US10187363B2|2014-12-31|2019-01-22|Visa International Service Association|Hybrid integration of software development kit with secure execution environment|
    US10096009B2|2015-01-20|2018-10-09|Visa International Service Association|Secure payment processing using authorization request|
    US11250391B2|2015-01-30|2022-02-15|Visa International Service Association|Token check offline|
    US11176554B2|2015-02-03|2021-11-16|Visa International Service Association|Validation identity tokens for transactions|
    US10977657B2|2015-02-09|2021-04-13|Visa International Service Association|Token processing utilizing multiple authorizations|
    US10164996B2|2015-03-12|2018-12-25|Visa International Service Association|Methods and systems for providing a low value token buffer|
    EP3281164B1|2015-04-10|2019-06-05|Visa International Service Association|Browser integration with cryptogram|
    US9998978B2|2015-04-16|2018-06-12|Visa International Service Association|Systems and methods for processing dormant virtual access devices|
    US10552834B2|2015-04-30|2020-02-04|Visa International Service Association|Tokenization capable authentication framework|
    US20170024734A1|2015-07-21|2017-01-26|Mastercard International Incorporated|Systems and Methods for Processing Transactions to Payment Accounts|
    US9825946B2|2015-08-27|2017-11-21|Mastercard International Incorporated|Method and system for enhanced validation of cryptograms in cloud-based systems|
    RU2018117661A3|2015-10-15|2020-04-16|
    CN108370319B|2015-12-04|2021-08-17|维萨国际服务协会|Method and computer for token verification|
    WO2017120605A1|2016-01-07|2017-07-13|Visa International Service Association|Systems and methods for device push provisioning|
    AU2017214412A1|2016-02-01|2018-06-28|Visa International Service Association|Systems and methods for code display and use|
    US10313321B2|2016-04-07|2019-06-04|Visa International Service Association|Tokenization of co-network accounts|
    US11250424B2|2016-05-19|2022-02-15|Visa International Service Association|Systems and methods for creating subtokens using primary tokens|
    AU2016409079B2|2016-06-03|2021-07-22|Visa International Service Association|Subtoken management system for connected devices|
    US11068899B2|2016-06-17|2021-07-20|Visa International Service Association|Token aggregation for multi-party transactions|
    SG11201808737YA|2016-06-24|2018-11-29|Visa Int Service Ass|Unique token authentication cryptogram|
    US10990967B2|2016-07-19|2021-04-27|Visa International Service Association|Method of distributing tokens and managing token relationships|
    US10509779B2|2016-09-14|2019-12-17|Visa International Service Association|Self-cleaning token vault|
    US10915899B2|2017-03-17|2021-02-09|Visa International Service Association|Replacing token on a multi-token user device|
    US10902418B2|2017-05-02|2021-01-26|Visa International Service Association|System and method using interaction token|
    US10491389B2|2017-07-14|2019-11-26|Visa International Service Association|Token provisioning utilizing a secure authentication system|
    WO2019031644A1|2017-08-09|2019-02-14|주식회사 센스톤|Virtual card number-based financial transaction provision system, virtual card number generation device and virtual card number verification device, virtual card number-based financial transaction provision method and virtual card number-based financial transaction provision program|
    KR101950913B1|2017-08-09|2019-02-21|주식회사 센스톤|System, method and program for providing virtual code, vritual code generator and vritual code verification device|
    KR101954446B1|2018-01-26|2019-03-05|주식회사 비즈모델라인|Method for Transacting by Account Using Dynamic Account Number|
    US11256789B2|2018-06-18|2022-02-22|Visa International Service Association|Recurring token transactions|
    EP3767569A1|2019-07-18|2021-01-20|Mastercard International Incorporated|An electronic transaction method and device using a flexible transaction identifier|
    法律状态:
    2016-07-15| PFA| Name/firm changed|Owner name: NET1 UEPS TECHNOLOGIES INC, ZA Free format text: FORMER OWNER: NET1 UEPS TECHNOLOGIES INC, ZA |
    2021-06-30| PL| Patent ceased|
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    ZA200609533|2006-11-16|
    [返回顶部]