METHOD PERFORMED BY AN AUTHENTICATION SERVER ON A DOMESTIC NETWORK OF U USER EQUIPMENT, METHOD PERFO

专利摘要:
A method performed by an authentication server (14) on a home network (3) of user equipment (1), UE, to obtain a permanent signature identifier, SUPI. The method comprises: receiving a hidden signature identifier, SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted, and a plain text part comprising a home network identifier and an encryption scheme identifier which identifies an encryption scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI, determine an unblocking server (19) to use to decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI; send the SUCI to the unblocking server (19), and receive the SUPI in response. Methods carried out by a UE and a decoction server are also revealed. In addition, UEs, unblocking servers, authentication servers, computer program (133) and a set of memory circuits (12) are also revealed.
公开号:BR112020001538B1
申请号:R112020001538-5
申请日:2018-07-17
公开日:2020-12-22
发明作者:Vesa Torvinen；Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi；Noamen Ben Henda；David Castellanos Zamora；Monica Wifvesson；Pasi SAARINEN
申请人:Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)；
IPC主号:

专利说明:

TECHNICAL FIELD
[001] The invention relates to methods performed by an authentication server, a decoupling server and a User Equipment (UE), respectively. In addition, UEs, disclosure servers, authentication servers, computer programs and a set of memory circuits are also disclosed. BACKGROUND
[002] It is important to maintain the confidentiality of the user equipment (EU) long-term subscription identifier (for example, an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity)). Previous generation 3GPP systems (for example, 4G / LTE, 3G / UMTS, 2G / GSM) included a partial mechanism for confidentiality of the long-term subscription identifier using one or more short-term subscription identifiers. GUTI (Unique Global Temporary ID) and C-RNTI (Temporary Cell-Radio Network Identifier) are examples of short-term subscription identifiers in 4G / LTE systems. However, the legacy partial mechanism can expose the long-term signature identifier in clear text on the air interface. For example, so-called "IMSI collectors" could simply request the UE's long-term identifier, for example, using identifier request / response messages.
[003] The 3rd Generation Partnership Project currently discusses how security, like privacy, can be improved in communication networks. In relation to 5G, 3GPP TS 33.501 V0.2.0 mentions a Permanent Signature Identifier (SUPI) and in this it is observed that the SUPI can be hidden, for example, in the form of a pseudonym or a SUPI encrypted by public key. SUMMARY
[004] An objective of the invention is to facilitate security in the communication between a UE and a communications network.
[005] A first aspect of the invention concerns a method performed by an authentication server on a home network of a UE to obtain a SUPI. The method comprises: receiving a hidden signature identifier, SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted and a clear text part comprising a home network identifier and an encryption scheme identifier which identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI, determine a decoction server to be used to decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI; send the SUCI to the release server and receive the SUPI in response.
[006] The clear text portion of SUCI may comprise a public key identifier for a public key for the home network.
[007] The unblocking server can be one of a plurality of unblocking servers and the determination of the unblocking server (19) can be based on information received from the UE. In that case, the information can be a public key identifier for a public key on the home network. The public key identifier can be contained in the clear text portion of SUCI.
[008] The information can be the identifier of the encryption scheme and the determined decoupling server, then supports decryption according to the encryption scheme.
[009] The method may, in one embodiment, additionally comprise receiving the SUCI from the UE as part of a registration procedure to register the UE with a wireless communication network.
[010] The method may, in one mode, additionally comprise receiving the SUCI from the UE through an authentication request from a Security Anchoring Function.
[011] The authentication server can be one of the plurality of unblocking servers.
[012] The method may additionally comprise sending the SUCI and a request for an authentication vector to authenticate the UE on the unblocking server determined in the same message.
[013] The method may additionally comprise receiving the authentication vector and the SUPI from the decoupling server determined in the same response.
[014] The SUPI can comprise a Mobile Signature Identification number, MSIN, a Mobile Country Code, MCC and a Mobile Network Code, MNC. The MSIN can, in such modality, be encrypted in the encrypted part of SUCI and the MCC and MNC are the identifier of the home network in the clear text part of SUCI. The SUPI can, in an alternative modality, be a Network Access Identifier.
[015] A second aspect of the invention concerns a method, performed by an unblocking server, to provide a SUPI to an authentication server. The method comprises: receiving, from the authentication server, a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted, and a clear text part comprising a home network identifier and a network identifier. encryption scheme that identifies a cryptography scheme used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI and which is supported by the decryption server; decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI using the encryption scheme indicated by the encryption scheme identifier to obtain the SUPI; and send the SUPI to the authentication server.
[016] The clear text portion of SUCI may also comprise a key identifier used to identify a decryption key used to decrypt the SUPI. The key identifier can also be used to identify the unmasking server.
[017] A key corresponding to the key identifier can be a public key for a UE home network.
[018] In a second aspect, the reception of the SUCI comprises receiving the SUCI and a request for an authentication vector to authenticate the UE in the same message.
[019] The sending of the authentication vector and the SUPI to the authentication server can be done in the same message.
[020] A third aspect concerns a method performed by an UE. The method comprises: generating a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of a SUPI is encrypted, and a text part comprising a home network identifier and an encryption scheme identifier that identifies a security scheme. encryption used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI; transmit the SUCI to an authentication server in order to forward the SUCI to an unblocking server capable of decrypting the SUPI.
[021] SUCI can be transmitted in a request to register with a wireless communication network.
[022] SUCI generation can be done using a secure, tamper-resistant hardware component of the UE to generate SUCI. In such a case, generating the SUCI comprises generating the SUCI based on a privacy key selected from a plurality of privacy keys stored on the tamper-resistant secure hardware component.
[023] In one embodiment, generating the SUCI comprises sending a time to the tamper-resistant secure hardware component for use in generating the SUCI.
[024] Generating the SUCI comprises, in one modality, generating the SUCI from a privacy key comprising the SUPI.
[025] Transmitting the SUCI to the authentication server comprises, in one embodiment, transmitting the SUCI to the authentication server in response to an identifier request message received from an Authentication and Mobility Management Function, AMF, as part of a procedure for registering the UE on a wireless communication network. In such a modality, the method may additionally comprise transmitting a registration request to the AMF, in which the registration request comprises a 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier and receiving the identifier request message in response.
[026] The method according to the third aspect may additionally comprise successful authentication with the authentication server after transmitting the SUCI and receiving a registration acceptance message in response.
[027] In a first, second and third aspect, the encryption scheme may be a null encryption scheme.
[028] In a first, second and third aspect modality, the encryption scheme may, alternatively to the null scheme or any other encryption scheme, be an Integrated Elliptical Curve Encryption Scheme, ECIES, and the plain text part of SUCI can, in such modality, understand an ephemeral public key of the UE for use in ECIES.
[029] A fourth aspect concerns an authentication server on a home network of a UE to obtain a SUPI. The authentication server comprises a set of processing circuits and a set of memory circuits. The memory circuitry contains instructions executable by the processing circuitry, the authentication server being operable to: receive a hidden signature identifier, SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted, and a piece of clear text comprising a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI, determine a decryption server to be used to decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI; send the SUCI to the release server and receive the SUPI in response.
[030] A fifth aspect concerns an authentication server for a home network of a UE to obtain a SUPI. The authentication server is configured to: receive a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted portion in which at least a portion of the SUPI is encrypted, and a plain text portion comprising a home network identifier and an encryption scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI, determine a decoction server to be used to decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI; send the SUCI to the release server and receive the SUPI in response.
[031] A sixth aspect concerns an authentication server on a home network of a UE to obtain a SUPI. The authentication server comprises:
[032] An interface module configured to receive a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted, and a clear text part comprising a home network identifier and an encryption scheme identifier which identifies a cryptography scheme used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI, a determination module configured to determine a decoction server to be used to decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI; and where the interface module is additionally configured to send the SUCI to the unblocking server and receive the SUPI in response.
[033] The invention also relates to an authentication server of any of the fourth to sixth aspects and configured to perform any of the modalities of the method according to the first aspect.
[034] A seventh aspect of the invention relates to a decoupling server to provide a SUPI to an authentication server. The decoupling server comprises a set of processing circuits and a set of memory circuits. The set of memory circuits contains instructions executable by the set of processing circuits, the decoupling server being operable to: receive, from the authentication server, a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part the SUPI is encrypted, and a clear text portion comprising a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI and which is supported by the decoupling server; decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI using the encryption scheme indicated by the encryption scheme identifier to obtain the SUPI; and send the SUPI to the authentication server.
[035] An eighth aspect of the invention concerns a decoupling server to provide a SUPI to an authentication server. The unblocking server is configured to: receive, from the authentication server, a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted, and a clear text part which comprises a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI and which is supported by the decryption server; decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI using the encryption scheme indicated by the encryption scheme identifier to obtain the SUPI; and send the SUPI to the authentication server.
[036] A ninth aspect of the invention concerns a decoupling server to provide a SUPI to an authentication server. The unblocking server comprises: a receiving module configured to receive, from the authentication server, a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted, and a clear text part which comprises a home network identifier and an encryption scheme identifier that identifies an encryption scheme used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI and which is supported by the decryption server; a decryption module configured to decrypt at least part of the SUCI using the encryption scheme indicated by the encryption scheme identifier to obtain the SUPI; and a sending module configured to send the SUPI to the authentication server.
[037] The invention also relates to an unveiling server of any one of the sixth, eighth and ninth aspects and configured to perform any of the modalities of the second aspect.
[038] A tenth aspect concerns an UE comprising a set of processing circuits and a set of memory circuits. The memory circuitry contains instructions executable by the processing circuitry, the UE being operable to: generate a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of a SUPI is encrypted, and a part of clear text comprising a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI; and transmitting the SUCI to an authentication server to forward the SUCI to a decoupling server capable of decrypting the SUPI.
[039] An eleventh aspect concerns a UE configured to: generate a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of a SUPI is encrypted, and a clear text part which comprises a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI; and transmitting the SUCI to an authentication server to forward the SUCI to a decoupling server capable of decrypting the SUPI.
[040] A twelfth aspect concerns an UE that comprises: a generation module configured to generate a SUCI, which comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of a SUPI is encrypted, and a part of clear text that comprises a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in the SUCI, and a transmission module configured to transmit the SUCI to an authentication server to forward the SUCI to a unblocking server capable of decrypting the SUPI.
[041] The clear text part of SUCI can, according to a modality of the first, third and twelfth aspects, comprise a public key identifier for a public key of the home network.
[042] SUPI may comprise a Mobile Signature Identification Number.
[043] The SUPI can be a Network Access Identifier.
[044] The invention also relates to user equipment according to any one of the tenth, eleventh and twelfth aspects, configured to perform any of the modalities of the third aspect.
[045] A 13th aspect concerns a computer program comprising instructions that, when executed on at least one set of processing circuits on a server device, cause the at least one set of processing circuits to perform the method according to any of the modalities of the third aspect.
[046] A 14th aspect concerns a set of memory circuits containing the computer program. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES
[047] Fig. 1 illustrates an exemplary wireless communication network.
[048] Fig. 2 illustrates an example in which a UE encrypts its long-term signature identifier as part of a linking procedure.
[049] Fig. 3 illustrates an example of a Hidden Signature Identifier (SUCI).
[050] Fig. 4 illustrates an example of a privacy key.
[051] Fig. 5 illustrates a 3GPP public key privacy scheme.
[052] Fig. 6 illustrates an example of a registration procedure.
[053] Fig. 7 illustrates an example in which a 5G-USIM / UICC of a UE generates the SUCI.
[054] FIG. 8 illustrates an example in which 5G-USIM / UICC does not have a privacy key.
[055] Fig. 9 illustrates an example in which an ME generates the SUCI.
[056] Fig. 10 illustrates an example in which the ME is notified of an updated privacy key.
[057] Fig. 11 illustrates an example in which the ME detects that the 5G-USIM / UICC has been replaced.
[058] Fig. 12 illustrates an example of Privacy Key Verification Data.
[059] Fig. 13 illustrates an example of the UE Registration process in which the UE does not have a valid privacy key.
[060] Fig. 14 illustrates an example of the UE Registration process in which the UE privacy key needs to be updated.
[061] Fig. 15 illustrates an example of how the privacy key and Privacy Key Verification Data relate.
[062] Fig. 16 illustrates a hardware modality for, for example, an authentication server.
[063] Fig. 17 illustrates an authentication server modality.
[064] Fig. 18 illustrates an authentication server modality.
[065] Fig. 19 illustrates a modality for, for example, unveiling server.
[066] Fig. 20 illustrates a modality of an unblocking server.
[067] Fig. 21 illustrates a modality of a UE.
[068] Fig. 22 illustrates a modality of a UE. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[069] Figure 1 illustrates an example of a wireless communication network 30 that includes an UE 1, a server network 2 and a home network 3. The UE and the home network are both communicatively connected and exchange signals through each other of the server network. The UE is configured with a subscription identifier that identifies a subscription supported by the home network and accesses the home network using the server network.
[070] Typical examples of UE 1 include a mobile device (ME), mobile terminal, smartphone, personal computer, laptop computer, desktop computer, workstation, tablet computer, wearable computer and / or smart appliance. According to particular UE modalities, the UE may comprise a general memory storage as part of an ME and a tamper-resistant hardware component that provides secure storage, such as a 5G-USIM (Universal Subscriber Identification Module), a UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card), for example, with a 5G-USIM installed and / or other secure storage device. According to such modalities, any of the capacities assigned to the UE can, in general, be performed using the UE's tamper-resistant secure hardware component.
[071] The server network 2 includes one or more physical devices and / or signaling means capable of exchanging communication signals with the UE 1 and the home network 3. In particular, the server network may include hardware that provides one or more: points access points (for example, a base station, eNodeB, femtocell and / or wireless access point), access networks, authentication servers, Mobility and Access Management Functions (AMFs), Security Anchor Functions (SEAFs) , Authentication Server Functions (AUSFs) and / or any combination thereof (not shown). In particular, an authentication server can provide one or more AMFs, SEAFs AUSFs and / or any combination of these. The details of these network entities will be discussed in more detail below.
[072] The home network 3 includes one or more physical devices and / or signaling means capable of exchanging communication signals with the UE 1 via the server network 2. In particular, the home network can include one or more: unblocking servers, authentication servers (for example, as described above), key provider servers, Signature Identifier Unblocking Functions (SIDFs), Privacy Key Provisioning Functions (PKPFs), Unified Data Management (UDM) and / or any combination of these (not shown). In particular, a decommissioning server can provide one or more SIDFs, PKPFs and / or any combination of these. The particularities of these network entities will be discussed in more detail below.
[073] Examples of home and / or service networks include (but are limited to) one or more: local area networks; wireless networks; cellular networks; Networks based on Internet protocol; Ethernet networks; optical networks; and / or circuit-switched networks. These networks can comprise any number of network devices, such as routers, gateways, switches, hubs, firewalls and the like (not shown), which support the exchange of such communication signals.
[074] Although Figure 1 illustrates separate home and server networks, in some embodiments of the present invention, home network 3 is server network 2, that is, in the case where the UE is not roaming. In addition, although examples of particular functions on both the home network and the server network have been specified above, these specific functions can be on the other among home network or server network according to particular modalities. In addition, although only one UE 1 is illustrated in Figure 1, service and home networks can support a plurality of UEs, according to particular modalities.
[075] An exemplary way to maintain the confidentiality of a UE's long-term signature identifier is to protect the long-term signature identifier using a public home network key. The public key of the home network can be provided at UE 1 without a certificate, so that a global public key infrastructure (PKI) or certification authority (CA) is not required (that is, because the technique is used asymmetrically between the UE and a function in the home network 3). In such an example, the UE can be expected to encrypt the long-term signature identifier, which is then transmitted towards the home network using the home network's public key.
[076] Figure 2 illustrates such a particular example in which a UE encrypts its long-term signature identifier as part of a linking procedure. According to the example in Figure 2, UE 1 encrypts its IMSI, leaving its MCC (Mobile Country Code) and MNC (Mobile Network Code) parts in clear text and sends a Link Request to server network 2 with the Encrypted IMSI as your identifier (step 1). The server network identifies the UE 3 home network using MCC / MNC in clear text and requests authentication information from the UE home network using the encrypted IMSI as the UE identifier (step 2). The home network decrypts the IMSI from the encrypted IMSI and fetches the corresponding authentication information. In response to the request for authentication information, the home network sends the authentication information from the UE together with the clear text IMSI to the server network (step 3). The server network performs an authentication procedure with the UE to authenticate the UE (step 4). If the authentication procedure is successful, the server network sends a Link Accepted message to the UE (step 5).
[077] In such an approach, the public key of the home network can be previously provided in the USIM and / or can be provided using an OTA (Over the Air) provision procedure. Although the approach illustrated in Figure 2 protects the long-term subscription identifier in at least some modalities, some of these modalities may include one or more deficiencies. For example, the approach illustrated in Figure 2 may be thwarted by legacy USIMs that cannot be exchanged in a viable way, certain domestic operators that may not support the provision of OTA and / or USIMs that may not be upgradeable (for example, due to technical limitations, lack of storage space or other limitations).
[078] Several embodiments of the present invention provide alternatives for at least some aspects of the particular modality illustrated in Figure 2, which corresponds to Figs. 3 to 8: Interactions between components in the document “Deliverable D3.6 5G-PPP Security enablers open specifications (v2.0)”. Particular modalities allow the public key of home network 3 to be provided (for example, new or updated) and stored in UE 1, so that UE 1 is able to encrypt its signature identifier with that public key. In addition, in particular modalities, the core network (such as a 5GC network (5G core)) triggers the provision of the public key of the home network through existing traffic procedures defined by 3GPP (for example, registration / authentication signaling, for example example, Non-Access Stratum messages between the UE and the AMF / SEAF node in relation to a registration procedure) without the need to rely on additional infrastructure and out-of-band procedures, such as performing an OTA update procedure.
[079] Although various modalities of the present invention describe certain characteristics or actions performed by the UE 1, it should not be assumed that such characteristics or actions are performed by any particular component of the UE, unless otherwise indicated. For example, such functions may or may not be performed by a UICC, USIM, embedded UICC, integrated UICC or other circuitry and / or UE software (for example, ME baseband circuitry), depending on the particular modality .
[080] Particular modalities include a Permanent Signature Identifier (SUPI). A SUPI is a permanent, clear text identifier, globally unique, of 5G and allocated to each subscriber in a 5G system. The SUPI can be based on IMSI or not based on IMSI. Modes that include an IMSI-based SUPI can use IMSI as described in 3GPP TS 23.003 V15.0.0, for example. Modes that include a non-IMSI-based SUPI can be based on a Network Access Identifier (NAI) according to the IETF RFC 4282 NAI-based user identification described in 3GPP TS 23.003 V15.0.0. In some modalities, the SUPI contains the home network address (for example, the MCC and the MNC in the case of an IMSI-based SUPI). Such modalities may allow certain roaming scenarios, for example, by providing the server network 2 with useful information to identify the home network 3 of the UE. If the SUPI is a NAI, it may also contain IMSI, but it may also not be based on IMSI.
[081] Particular modalities include, additionally or alternatively, a Hidden Signature Identifier (SUCI), as illustrated in the example in Figure 3. A SUCI is a protected version of a SUPI. SUCI includes a clear text portion and an encrypted portion.
[082] The clear text portion includes a home network identifier that identifies the home network of UE 1. For example, SUCI can include an MCC and MNC of the home network. The clear text portion may also include a public key identifier, an encryption scheme identifier, and / or scheme-related parameters useful for decrypting the encrypted part of the SUCI according to an encryption scheme, such as an ephemeral public key of the UE or other parameters for use in the Integrated Elliptical Curve Encryption Scheme (ECIES) or other encryption scheme. The term "ephemeral key" is known to the person skilled in the art and is defined as a key whose use is restricted to a short period of time, such as a single telecommunications connection (or session), after which all traces of it are eliminated. . As will be discussed below, the public key identifier is an identifier that can be used on the home network to identify the correct SIDF on a home network that includes a plurality of SIDFs. The ECIES, public key identifier and SIDFs will be described in more detail below. The technician in the subject understands that “clear text part” within the context of SUCI means that the information contained therein is non-hidden / unencrypted information.
[083] When the encrypted part is included in SUCI, SUCI is a protected version of SUPI. The encrypted part includes an encrypted signature identifier, such as an MSIN (Mobile Signature Identification Number) or username. The username can be all or part of the characters before the '@' in a NAI, for example, username @ mnc <MNC> .mcc <MCC> .3gppnetwork.org. In this example, all characters before the "@" are encrypted. In the case of a Decorated NAI, which has the format “homerealm! Username @ otherrealm”, only the username part of the text to the left of the “@” is encrypted, since homerealm can be used as routing information. Thus, you can perform the decryption of the encrypted part of SUCI to learn the corresponding SUPI. ECIES is an example of a public key cryptography scheme that can be used to generate a SUCI from a SUPI and / or a SUPI from a SUCI. As will be discussed below, the encrypted part of SUCI can use a null encryption scheme, for example, if UE 1 is not provided with the public key of the home network.
[084] A SIDF is a function located on the home network responsible for decrypting SUCI. Particularly in the 5G architecture, a SIDF can be colocalized in the UDM (Unified Data Management). Alternatively, the SIDF can be seen as part of the UDM or is provided by the UDM. Additionally or alternatively, a SIDF can be a separate entity from the UDM and / or colocalized with an AUSF (Authentication Server Role).
[085] Figure 4 illustrates an example of a privacy key. This particular example of the privacy key includes a public key from the home network. In some embodiments, the privacy key also includes one or more parameters related to the public key scheme, the long-term signature identifier, a subject field indicating a network, domain or context to which the privacy key belongs (for example , the subject may be a home network identifier, such as MCC / MNC), public key scheme identifier, domain specific values related to the public key scheme (for example, values for the elliptic curve domain in the case of the scheme ECIES), public key identifier, as will be discussed in more detail below, validity times indicating and specifying when the privacy key is valid (for example, it is not valid before and / or after hours), a field for using key indicating one or more ways in which the key can be used (for example, signature identifier privacy, slice selection privacy etc.) and / or a digital signature calculates on all or part of the privacy key.
[086] In particular, the key usage field can be defined to indicate that the key is useful for "signature privacy", according to the modalities of the present invention. Uses of privacy that are beyond the scope of the present invention may indicate, additionally or alternatively, other uses for the privacy key. For example, the private key can be used for "Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) privacy" purposes in addition to or substitution for "signature privacy" purposes. In fact, such other purposes may include methods, devices and similar systems in the UE 1 and / or in the home network for initial provisioning, updating and other resources as described in the present invention. Although a privacy key may, in some modalities, indicate multiple uses, other modalities may include respective privacy keys for respective uses, the key usage field of each privacy key indicating a single key use (for example, one among the privacy keys may indicate “signature privacy” and the other may indicate “NSSAI privacy”). The key usage field can be formatted as an integer, one or more enumerated values, an alphanumeric string, a bit string, a delimited string and / or an arrangement of any of the above formats, among other things.
[087] A 3GPP public key privacy scheme (3GPK schemes) is a standardized public key scheme that a UE 1 can support for interoperability between the UE and, for example, a mobile operator. In the absence of a standardized scheme, EU sellers would likely need to coordinate with such operators to implement privacy mechanisms. According to particular modalities, the UE must support any permitted and / or standardized schemes, so that the home network can choose a scheme freely and without creating interoperability difficulties. In particular, one such scheme is, for example, ECIES. Particular schemes can be adopted as standard and given an identifier (also known as "registrar") for interoperability. For such a scheme, any specific algorithm that needs to be supported can also be specified. For example, in the case of ECIES, key agreement (KA), key derivation function (KD) (KDF), symmetric integrity and symmetric encryption can be specified. One or more parameters related to such a scheme, as well as (in one or more cases) its potential static values can also be specified. For example, in ECIES, elliptic curve domain parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h) can be specified for a curve over a prime field and / or (m, f (x), a, b, G, n, h) for a curve over a binary field.
[088] Figure 5 illustrates an exemplary 3GPK scheme. Each scheme adopted as a standard can be assigned with a specific identifier. For example, the null scheme can be assigned a 0, ECIES can be assigned a 1, and so on. The identifier can be, for example, a 4-bit identifier. Other modalities may use the schema identifier in other ways, including, but not limited to, one or more integers, numeric strings, alphanumeric strings, bit strings and / or other types of data.
[089] According to the modalities of the present invention, the UE registers on the wireless communication network 30 according to a registration procedure, such as the exemplary registration procedure illustrated in Figure 6. According to the illustrated registration procedure in Figure 6, the UE uses a public key from the home network to hide a long-term signature identifier. Although one or more particular interfaces illustrated in Figure 6, such as those specified by an N followed by a numeric designation (for example, N1, N12, N13), are in accordance with 3GPP TS 23.501, the signaling performed on such interfaces as described in the present invention, as well as the interfaces themselves (for example, Nxx), are not known or described in any known technique.
[090] According to the example in Figure 6, UE 1 includes a temporary identifier (for example, a 5G-GUTI) in a registration request and sends the registration request to an AMF / SEAF 4 (step 1). AMF / SEAF, failing to recognize the 5G-GUTI, transmits an identifier request message to the UE to request the UE identifier (step 2). The UE responds to the identifier request message with an identifier reply message comprising a SUCI (step 3). AMF / SEAF requests authentication from the UE from AUSF 5 on home network 3 and includes SUCI in the authentication request (step 4). AUSF uses the information encoded in SUCI to determine which to use among a plurality of SIDFs in order to decrypt at least part of SUCI (step 5). In particular, AUSF can use the public key identifier ported on SUCI (or, otherwise, present in the authentication request message) to identify the correct SIDF 6. In some embodiments, AUSF may, additionally or alternatively, use the schema identifier to identify the correct SIDF. That is, different SIDFs can handle different encryption schemes (for example, a first SIDF can handle ECIES and a second SIDF can handle RSA) and AUSF can choose an appropriate SIDF based on the scheme identified by SUCI. Still in an alternative modality, the information used to identify the correct SIDF 6 can be a parameter or ID that indicates SIDF 6 and which parameter / ID is stored or provided to the tamper-resistant secure hardware component 8.
[091] The modalities of the present invention can include several SIDFs to prevent any point of failure for networks with many subscribers, for example. Consequently, distributed SIDF implementations can be advantageous for improving fault tolerance, load balancing and / or overall network capacity. Additionally or alternatively, different instances of the SIDF can be implemented to handle different sets of public keys from the home network. Therefore, the public key identifier in SUCI can be used to select the appropriate instance (s) of the SIDF, according to one or more embodiments of the present invention. Alternatively, in particular modalities that have only one SIDF implemented, the public key identifier can be omitted from SUCI.
[092] AUSF 5 sends the SUCI to the selected SIDF 6 (step 6). If the SIDF is colocalized in UDM 7 (so that the Nxx message in step 6 of Fig. 6 is an N13 message, for example), the same message can be used to request an authentication vector or authentication credentials from the UDM. The SIDF decrypts the SUCI to obtain a corresponding SUPI and returns the SUPI to the AUSF (step 7). If the SIDF is colocalized in the UDM, the same message can be used to return the authentication vector / credentials to the AUSF.
[093] AUSF 5 and UE 1 exchange authentication messages using authentication vectors / credentials received from UDM 7 (step 8). If the AUSF has not yet received the required authentication vector / credentials from the UDM (for example, in step 7 discussed above), the AUSF can request the authentication vector / credential from the UDM before starting authentication with the UE (not shown). Alternatively, AUSF may have delegated authentication to SEAF. In such modalities, AUSF can simply refer SUPI to SEAF at this stage and depend on SEAF to perform authentication at the next stage.
[094] Continuing with the example in which AUSF 5 successfully authenticates UE 1, AUSF returns SUPI to AMF / SEAF 4 (step 9). AMF / SEAF accepts registration from the UE and transmits a registration acceptance message to the UE (step 10).
[095] As briefly discussed above, particular features of UE 1 can be performed by a tamper-resistant secure hardware component 8 of UE. Figure 7 illustrates a particular example in which a 5G-USIM / UICC 8a from a UE generates the SUCI. Although this specific example uses the term 5G-USIM / UICC, this term should not be considered as limiting in relation to any version or vendor of USIM or UICC technology; this term should also not be considered as limiting in relation to any generation of mobile network, for example, 2G / 3G / 4G / 5G.
[096] According to the example in Figure 7, an ME 9 requests a SUCI (step 1). In some of these modalities, this SUCI request may include time. In other such modalities, the request may simply be a read operation from 5G-USIM / UICC 8a. According to such modalities in which there are multiple public keys for the home network, the 5G-USIM / UICC chooses the corresponding and correct privacy key (for example, based on time) and generates the SUCI using the selected privacy key (step two). Alternatively, in such modalities with only one privacy key, 5G-USIM / UICC simply uses that privacy key. The 5G-USIM / UICC then returns the SUCI to the ME (step 3).
[097] Figure 8 illustrates an example in which 5G-USIM / UICC does not have a privacy key or does not support the feature.
[098] According to the example in Figure 8, ME 9 requests a SUCI with a request (which may include time, in some modalities) similar to the one described above in relation to Figure 7. In this example, however, the 5G-USIM / UICC 8a does not have a privacy key or does not recognize the command as it supports the feature (step 2). Therefore, the 5G-USIM / UICC returns an error message (or empty data) to the ME (step 3).
[099] Alternatively to the example in Figure 8, ME 9 may know that 5G-USIM / UICC 8a does not have a privacy key or does not support a privacy key by other means, according to particular modalities. For example, ME can obtain 5G-USIM / UICC version and / or vendor information and determine, based on that information, that a privacy key is not supported or present. As another example, the ME may determine that a privacy key is not supported or present in 5G- USIM / UICC based on some other response message from 5G- USIM / UICC.
[0100] Figure 9 illustrates an example in which ME 9 generates SUCI, but the privacy key itself is stored in 5G-USIM / UICC 8a.
[0101] According to the example in Figure 9, ME 9 does not have a privacy key and requests one from 5G-USIM / UICC 8a (step 1). In some embodiments, the request includes time. In other modalities, the request is a direct read operation from the memory of the 5G-USIM / UICC. 5G- USIM / UICC chooses the privacy key (for example, based on time, if provided in the request) (step 2). 5G-USIM / UICC returns the privacy key to the ME (step 3). At this point, the EM can, in some modalities (but not necessarily in all modalities) store the privacy key and / or the SUPI in a non-volatile memory of the ME (step 4). The ME then generates the SUCI based on the SUPI and the privacy key (step 5).
[0102] Figure 10 illustrates an example in which ME 9 is notified if the privacy key is updated in 5G-USIM / UICC 8a. In this scenario, ME agrees with changes to the privacy keys and receives notifications when updates are available. This scenario assumes that the ME stores the privacy key or asks 5G-USIM / UICC for the privacy key as needed to obtain the most recent privacy key.
[0103] According to the example in Figure 10, ME 9 sends a request to 5G-USIM / UICC 8a requesting the signature for updates to the privacy key (step 1). The request may, in some modalities, include a SUPI. The 5G-USIM / UICC accepts the signature and transmits a confirmation to the ME in response (step 2). When the home network updates the privacy key (s) or distributes one or more new ones to 5G-USIM / UICC (step 3), 5G-USIM / UICC notifies the ME that one or more new privacy keys are available (step 4). Although Figure 10 represents the notification message including the privacy key (s), according to other modalities, the ME may alternatively read the 5G-USIM / UICC key based on the notification. The ME acknowledges the notification (step 5). The ME then stores the new privacy keys in the ME's non-volatile memory (step 6). The ME can replace existing privacy key data if the MCC / MNC / MSID in the previously stored privacy key data is identical.
[0104] Figure 11 illustrates an example in which the UE is connected and the ME 9 detects that the 5G-USIM / UICC 8a has been replaced (for example, with a different 5G-USIM / UICC or simply removed and reinserted, according with various modalities). Although particular modalities may deal with replacement by a different 5G-USIM / UICC equal to removal and reinsertion (for example, for security reasons), other modalities may respond differently based on which of these two scenarios is detected.
[0105] According to the example in Figure 10, UE 1 is connected (step 1). ME 9 sends a message to 5G-USIM / UICC 8a (step 2) and 5G-USIM / UICC responds in an inconsistent way when the UE is previously connected (step 3). For example, the reply message may include a SUPI different from that seen previously by the ME.
[0106] ME 9 determines that 5G-USIM / UICC 8a has been replaced (step 4). For example, the 5G-USIM / UICC may be, in some aspect, different from the previous time when the UE 1 was connected, indicating that the 5G-USIM / UICC was replaced by a different one. Alternatively, the ME can detect that the 5G- USIM / UICC has been replaced using non-volatile memory updated by a mechanical, electrical or software mechanism, such as an optical sensor, switch, weight sensor, pressure sensor and / or circuitry electrical devices triggered when the 5G-USIM / UICC is removed and / or inserted, for example, regardless of whether the same 5G-USIM / UICC has been removed and reinserted.
[0107] ME 9 removes the privacy key it had previously stored from non-volatile memory (if any). Additionally or alternatively, if the ME has stored the SUPI of the old 5G-USIM / UICC with the privacy key in its memory, the ME may decide to remove the privacy key from the non-volatile memory based on a comparison of the returned SUPI by the new 5G-USIM / UICC 8a with the SUPI stored with the old privacy key.
[0108] The particular modalities described above describe ways in which devices within a wireless communication system can securely exchange a signature identifier, including the generation and use of private data structures and encryption / decryption schemes corresponding. In particular, the modalities described above allow this secure exchange to be performed as part of registering the UE 1 with the wireless communication network 30. Many such modalities assume that the UE is provided with a valid privacy key.
[0109] To ensure that UE 1 does, in fact, have a valid privacy key, additional modalities of the present invention describe ways to provide the UE. Particular modalities related to the supply may include Privacy Key Verification Data (MAC-P). As illustrated in the example in Figure 12, a MAC-P includes a message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is calculated based on the privacy key and a supply key (which will be explained in more detail below). For example, the MAC can be calculated on the various privacy key fields, including, but not limited to, the home network public key and its related parameters as described above, in combination with the supply key.
[0110] MAC-P may, according to some modalities, also include a supply key identifier (for example, a RAND) and / or an integrity protection algorithm identifier. According to some modalities in which the MAC-P does not include the identifier of the integrity protection algorithm, the integrity protection algorithm to be used can be identified separately from the MAC-P or a Key Derivative Function ( KDF), such as, for example, HMAC-SHA-256. MAC-P can, additionally or alternatively, include a counter field, which can be used to identify MAC-P from a plurality of MAC-Ps ( for example, in cases where more than one MAC-P is calculated using the same supply key). The relationship between the privacy key (for example, as shown in Figure 4) and MAC-P (for example, as shown in Figure 12) is explained in more detail below in relation to Figure 15.
[0111] The supply key is a secret shared between the UE 1 and a PKPF 10 (see Fig. 13), which is described in more detail below. The supply key is specific to the UE, that is, it is a key, which in the home network 3, is associated with the UE and / or the 5G USIM, UICC 8a or any other hardware in the UE / ME in which a SIM can be stored / USIM. In some embodiments, the supply key can be derived from the master key of the home network, for example, KAUSF in a 5G or future network as created, for example, in 5G AKA, EAP-AKA 'and EAP-TLS (Protocol Extensible Authentication - Transport Layer Security), which is created when UE 1 authenticates itself on the network. In some of these modalities, AUSF may have the home network master key. In addition, a new master key for the home network can be created when the UE re-authenticates.
[0112] According to an example, the supply key can be created from a CK (Encryption Key), IK (Integrity Key) (for example, applying a KDF like HMAC-SHA-256 or another hash function unidirectional and secure, such as SHA-256, or a concatenation of CK and IK). The supply key can, as an alternative to direct generation from the master key or CK / IK, be generated from CK 'and IK', as generated from CK and IK in the EAP-AKA 'method. In another alternative, the supply key can be generated from the EMSK (Extended Master Session Key) in the case of EAP-TLS, as specified in RFC5216. Since the same home network master key can be used to derive multiple keys, the embodiments of the present invention use at least one additional standard parameter in combination with the home network master key as an input to derive the supply key. For example, when using standard KDF, FC (Function Code) can be used as an input (for example, as specified in TS 33.220, such as TS33.220 V15.0.0) to produce a supply key distinguishable from others keys produced using the home network master key.
[0113] According to another example, the supply key can be an equal or derived key from an ephemeral shared key that is shared between SIDF 6 and UE 1, particularly when the encryption scheme used is a hybrid public key, such as ECIES. For example, ECIES uses a public key mechanism (for example, Diffie-Hellman) for the key agreement that results in a shared key, which is ephemeral, between the SIDF and the UE. This ephemeral shared key, for security purposes, is generally further processed through a key derivation function (for example, SHA-256) to further derive other shared keys derived between the SIDF and the UE (for example , encryption key and MAC key in ECIES). One of these other derived shared keys is generally used for encryption and is referred to as the ephemeral encryption key. As applied to the modalities of the present invention, one of these other derived shared keys can be used, for example, to generate a SUCI from a SUPI. In addition, in some modalities, another of the derived shared keys (for example, MAC key in ECIES), a new one additionally derived from one of the derived shared keys, or yet another key derived from the ephemeral shared key, can be used as the supply key. In some modalities in which SIDF has, or is able to obtain / derive the supply key, SIDF can also calculate the MAC or MAC-P.
[0114] PKPF 10 is a function located on home network 3 that is responsible for providing the privacy key. According to particular modalities, PKPF can be colocalized with AUSF 5 and particularly in at least some modalities in which the supply key is derived from the master key of the home network created based on the primary authentication between the UE and the network . In other modalities, the PKPF can be colocalized with other 5GC entities, such as UDM 7. Still according to other modalities, the PKPF is its separate entity. In some modalities, SIDF 6 and PKPF are implemented together as a single function and there is no need to transfer the supply key. In some other modalities, the PKPF can obtain the supply key from the SIDF. PKPF can also obtain MAC / MAC-P from SIDF.
[0115] Figure 13 illustrates an example of the UE Registration process in which UE 1 does not have a valid privacy key. For example, the end user may have entered a new USIM / UICC in the UE and that new USIM / UICC does not contain a privacy key.
[0116] According to the example shown in Figure 13, UE 1 sends a registration request to an AMF / SEAF 4 including a SUCI in the request (step 1). Since the UE initially does not have a privacy key in this scenario, the UE uses a null scheme or null encryption method to create the SUCI. The null scheme is implemented to return the same output as the entry and applies to both encryption in the UE and decryption by SIDF 6. Furthermore, since the UE does not have a privacy key that indicates the null scheme or the method of null encryption (which the home network can choose freely, according to the modalities), an explicit or implicit indicator that the real privacy key is missing from the UE, according to particular modalities, can be used. For example, as discussed above, SUCI can use a null encryption scheme for the encrypted part, which can implicitly signal that the privacy key is missing. Alternatively, a "missing privacy key" indicator can be, for example, a standardized or widely known public key identifying value, a flag and / or a message type indicator (for example, a registration request of type " privacy provision "or" pre-initial registration ").
[0117] AMF / SEAF 4, after receiving the registration request, requests UE authentication from AUSF 5 / PKPF 10 (step 2). AUSF sends the SUCI (and the "missing privacy key" indicator, if one is included in the authentication request) to an SIDF 6 (step 3). According to the modalities in which the SIDF is colocalized in UDM 7 (for example, the Nxx message is an N13 message, for example), then the same message can be used to request an authentication vector / credentials from the UDM.
[0118] SIDF 6 sees that SUCI is in clear text and that UE 1 is without a privacy key. According to this example, SIDF has a local policy in which all SUCIs must be protected using ECIES. Therefore, the SIDF returns a SUPI to the AUSF, together with a request to provide the ECIES privacy key to the UE (step 4). In some embodiments, the response includes multiple privacy keys to be provided to the UE. According to the modalities in which the SIDF is colocalized in UDM 7, then the same message can be used to return the authentication vector / credentials to AUSF 5.
[0119] According to modalities in which AUSF 5 has not yet received the authentication vector / credentials from UDM 7, AUSF 5 may request the said authentication vector / credentials from UDM before starting authentication with the EU (not shown). Alternatively, according to modalities in which AUSF has already received the authentication vector / credential from the UDM, AUSF and UE exchange authentication messages using the said authentication vectors / credentials (step 5). Alternatively, AUSF may have delegated authentication to AMF / SEAF 4.
[0120] According to this example, PKPF 10 is colocalized with AUSF 5. Consequently, after successful authentication, AUSF / PKPF creates a supply key that can be used to protect the privacy key supply message. in UE 1, that is, without the need to exchange signaling to transfer the supply key. According to other modalities in which AUSF and PKPF are not colocalized, AUSF can request that the supply key be generated by PKPF and PKPF can transfer the supply key to AUSF in response (not shown).
[0121] AUSF 5 / PKPF 10 protects the privacy key (s) (received from SIDF 6 in step 4) with the supply key by calculating a MAC (for example, as described above with relation to Figure 12) and building the MAC-P (step 6). In some ways, the privacy key can also be encrypted. In some modalities, AUSF / PKPF may receive the MAC and / or MAC-P from the SIDF, as described above, particularly in at least some modalities in which the supply key is based on the ephemeral shared key of, for example, an ECIES scheme. In particular, as discussed above, the SIDF may have generated the MAC and / or MAC-P.
[0122] AUSF 5 then returns the SUPI, the privacy key (s) and the MAC-P to AMF / SEAF 4 (step 7). In some modalities, the SUPI, the privacy key (s) and / or the MAC-P are transmitted to the AMF / SEAF in the same message flow related to the registration to register the UE 1 on the wireless communication network 30 In some modalities, the SUPI, the privacy key (s) and / or the MAC-P are transmitted to the AMF / SEAF in a separate message flow (not shown).
[0123] According to modalities in which AUSF 5 has delegated authentication of UE 1 to AMF / SEAF 4, AMF / SEAF can authenticate the UE at this point (not shown). In such modalities, the AMF / SEAF may have received the SUPI, the privacy key (s) and the MAC-P previously, for example, directly from SIDF 6 in step 4.
[0124] AMF / SEAF 4 accepts registration from UE 1 and forwards the privacy key (s) and MAC-P to the UE, for example, in a registration acceptance message (step 8). The UE then verifies the MAC and, if successful, stores the privacy key (s). To verify the MAC, the UE creates the supply key in the same way that AUSF 5 / PKPF 10 did previously. That is, when the UE generates an expected MAC and then compares it with the received MAC, the MAC is checked if the expected MAC is considered equal to the received MAC.
[0125] In some modalities, UE 1 disconnects from the network (step 9), for example, to start a new registration procedure using a privacy key provided to hide your subscriber identity, according to one of the described modalities above. For example, detaching and re-registering in this way can prevent an attacker from linking the SUPI to a temporary UE identifier.
[0126] UE 1 may need, in some modalities, to be provided with a privacy key due to the expiration or invalidation of a privacy key that was provided previously to the UE. Figure 14 illustrates an exemplary UE Registration process in which the UE privacy key needs to be updated, for example, for some security or operational reason. Some reasons why the privacy key provided previously may need to be updated, according to various modalities, may be that the privacy provided previously may have reached (or is reaching) its expiration date, security in the wireless communication network 30 has been compromised in any way and / or the privacy key is subject to regular updates.
[0127] According to the example in Figure 14, a UE 1 sends a registration request to AMF / SEAF-4 (step 1). The registration request includes a SUCI. In this example, since the UE has a privacy key, the UE uses an encryption scheme or method (for example, ECIES) to create the SUCI, for example, according to one of the modalities described above.
[0128] AMF / SEAF 4 requests authentication of the UE from an AUSF 5 / PKPF 10 (step 2). AUSF sends the SUCI to a selected SIDF 6 (step 6). As in the previous example, according to some modalities in which the SIDF is colocalized with UDM 7, then the same message can be used to request an authentication vector / credentials from the UDM.
[0129] SIDF 6 sees that SUCI is encrypted with a privacy key that needs to be updated. For example, SIDF may detect that the privacy key has expired or is about to expire or that the privacy key is invalid for any other reason, as discussed earlier. The SIDF returns a SUPI to AUSF 5 together with a request to provide the updated ECIES privacy key to the UE (step 4). According to some modalities, the answer may include several privacy keys. In addition, as previously discussed, according to the modalities in which the SIDF is colocalized in the UDM, the same message can be used to return the authentication vector / credentials to the AUSF.
[0130] AUSF 5 and UE 1 exchange authentication messages using authentication vectors / credentials received from UDM 7 (step 5). As discussed in the previous examples, AUSF may have received the required authentication vector / credentials from the UDM in step 4 (for example, in some modalities in which SIDF 6 is colocalized in the UDM) or AUSF may request that vector / authentication credentials from the UDM before starting authentication with the UE.
[0131] According to modalities in which PKPF 10 is colocalized with AUSF 5, AUSF / PKPF can create a supply key used to protect the privacy key supply message to UE 1 as a result of successful authentication . For example, the authentication procedure may include producing a home network master key that can be used to derive the supply key. Alternatively, in modalities in which PKPF and AUSF are not colocalized, AUSF and PKPF can exchange the supply key via appropriate messages (not shown).
[0132] AUSF 5 / PKPF 10 protects the privacy key (s) (received from SIDF 6 in step 4) with the supply key by calculating a MAC and building the MAC-P, for example, from according to the example illustrated in Figure 14 (step 6) As discussed above, in some modalities, the AUSF / PKPF can receive the MAC and / or MAC-P from the SIDF, as described above, particularly in at least some modalities in which the supply key is based on the ephemeral shared key of, for example, an ECIES scheme. In particular, as discussed above, the SIDF may have generated the MAC and / or MAC-P.
[0133] After successful authentication, AUSF 5 sends the SUPI, privacy key (s) and MAC-P to AMF / SEAF 4 (step 7), for example, in the same message flow related to the registry. Other modalities may use separate message flows for one or more among SUPI, privacy key (s) or MAC-P. In addition, as discussed earlier, AUSF may have delegated UE authentication to SEAF; in this case, the SUPI, the privacy key (s) and the MAC-P may have already been returned to SEAF in step 4 and the AUSF performs authentication as previously described.
[0134] AMF / SEAF 4 accepts registration from UE 1 and forwards the privacy key (s) and MAC-P to the UE, for example, in a registration acceptance message (step 8). The UE creates the same supply key from primary authentication as did AUSF 5 / PKPF 10 and checks the MAC in the message. If the verification is successful, the UE stores the privacy key (s). The old privacy key can also be removed.
[0135] Still according to an example, AUSF 5 generates the MAC and MAC-P and sends the privacy key (s) and MAC-P to UE 1 through UDM 7 which forwards the ) privacy key (s) and the MAC-P to the AMF, which then forwards the privacy key (s) and the MAC-P to the UE 1. In this example, the AUSF can be an AUSF of the Domestic Terrestrial Public Mobile Network and the AMF may, in this case, be an AMF of the Visited Terrestrial Public Mobile Network (VPLMN). In that case, authentication may have been delegated by AUSF to VPLMN AMF.
[0136] As discussed earlier, the MAC can be calculated based on a privacy key (for example, as shown in Figure 4) and a supply key to generate a MAC-P (for example, as shown in Figure 12 ). In some modalities in which multiple privacy keys are being provided to UE 1, the same MAC can be calculated on all privacy keys sent in the same message.
[0137] Figure 15 illustrates an example of how the privacy key and MAC-P relate and what parameters are used as input for calculating the MAC (or expected MAC (XMAC), as appropriate). As shown in Figure 15, the supply key and the privacy key are both used to generate a MAC, which can then be used in combination with another privacy key to update the MAC, and so on until all privacy keys are processed. Once all the privacy keys are processed, the privacy key (s) and the MAC can be sent to the UE.
[0138] In view of all of the above, one or more of the devices or functions described above can be implemented using the exemplary hardware illustrated in Figure 16. The exemplary hardware includes the processing circuitry 11 and the circuitry assembly communication 12. The set of processing circuits is coupled in a communicative way to the set of communication circuits, for example, through one or more buses. The set of processing circuits may comprise one or more microprocessors, microcontrollers, hardware circuits, discrete logic circuits, hardware recorders, digital signal processors (DSPs), field programmable ports (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuit (ASICs) or a combination of these. For example, the processing circuitry may be programmable hardware capable of executing stored software instructions, for example, as a machine-readable computer program 133 in a memory circuitry 13. The memory circuitry of the various embodiments may comprise any non-transitory, machine readable medium known in the art or that can be developed, whether volatile or non-volatile, including, but not limited to, solid state media (eg, SRAM, DRAM, DDRAM, ROM, PROM , EPROM, flash memory, solid state drive, etc.), removable storage devices (e.g. Secure Digital (SD) card, miniSD card, microSD card, memory stick, thumb-drive, USB flash drive, ROM cartridge, Universal Media Disc), fixed drive (for example, magnetic hard drive) or similar, in its entirety or in any combination. According to particular modalities in which the hardware is used to implement the UE 1, the memory circuitry may comprise a tamper-resistant secure hardware component 8 that provides secure storage, such as a 5G-USIM and / or UICC 8a .
[0139] The communication circuitry 12 can be a controller hub configured to control the input and output data paths (I / O) of the hardware. Such I / O data paths may include data paths for exchanging signals over a wireless communication network 30. For example, the communication circuitry may comprise a transceiver configured to send and receive communication signals within and / or between the UE 1, the server network 2 and / or the home network 3, for example, through an aerial, electrical and / or optical medium.
[0140] The communication circuitry 12 can be implemented as a physical unitary component or as a plurality of physical components arranged in a contiguous or separate way, any of which can be communicatively coupled to any other or can communicate with any other through the processing circuitry 11. For example, the communication circuitry may comprise a transmitting circuitry configured to send communication signals and a receiving circuitry configured to receive communication signals (not shown).
[0141] According to particular modalities, the hardware illustrated in Figure 16 can be configured with a plurality of components. These components can include a plurality of communicatively coupled hardware units and / or software modules. One or more of the hardware units can be, for example, part of the processing circuit set 11. One or more of the software units can be, for example, stored in the memory circuit set 13 and executed by the set of processing circuits. For example, hardware as shown in Figure 16 can be used to implement an authentication server 14 (for example, an AMF, SEAF 4, AUSF 5) on a home network 3 of a UE 1 and configured with the exemplary components illustrated in Figure 17 for obtaining a signature identifier, such as a SUPI, from a UE. The components of Figure 17 include a determination unit or module 15 and an interface unit or module 16. The determination module or unit is configured to determine an unchecked server 19 to be used to decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI and based on the information received from the UE, which of a plurality of unchecked servers to use to decrypt at least part of a hidden signature identifier (SUCI) in which the signature identifier is encrypted. The module or interface unit is configured to send the SUCI to the determined unblocking server and receive the signature identifier, for example SUPI, in response. In other words, the interface module is configured to also receive the SUCI generated by the UE, where the SUCI comprises an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted and a clear text part that comprises a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI.
[0142] Such authentication server 14 may additionally or alternatively be configured with the exemplary components illustrated in Figure 18 to provide a UE 1. The components of Figure 18 include a retrieval unit or module 17 and a transmission unit or module 18. The retrieval module or unit is configured to obtain a message authentication code (MAC) based on a specific supply key for the UE 1 and a privacy key for a home network 3 of the UE. The transmission module or unit is configured to transmit the privacy key and the MAC to the UE.
[0143] Such authentication server 14 may additionally be configured to perform, additionally or alternatively, any of the methods described in the present invention in relation to an authentication server, for example, using any of the hardware or software components authentication server described above.
[0144] Other hardware, consistent with the example illustrated in Figure 16, can be used to implement a decoupling server 19 (for example, SIDF 6) to provide a signature identifier of a UE 1 to an authentication server 14 and can be configured with the exemplary components illustrated in Figure 19. The components in Figure 19 include a receiving unit or module 20, a decryption unit or module 21 and a sending unit or module 22. The receiving module or unit is configured to receive , from the authentication server, a SUCI comprising an encrypted part in which at least a part of the SUPI is encrypted and a clear text part comprising a home network identifier and an encryption scheme identifier that identifies an encryption scheme used by a UE to encrypt the SUPI in the SUCI and which is supported by the decoupling server. The decryption module or unit is configured to decrypt at least part of the SUCI using the encryption scheme indicated by the encryption scheme identifier to obtain the SUPI. The sending module or unit is configured to send the SUPI to the authentication server.
[0145] Such unblocking server 19 can, additionally or alternatively, be configured with the exemplary components illustrated in Figure 20 to provide a UE 1. The components of Figure 20 include a generation unit or module 23 and a transmission unit or module 24. The module or generation unit is configured to generate a Permanent Signature Identifier (SUPI) and a privacy key for the responsive UE to receive, from an authentication server 14, a Hidden Signature Identifier (SUCI) from the UE indicating that the UE does not have a valid privacy key. The transmission module or unit is configured to transmit the SUPI and the privacy key to the authentication server. Thus, the term “unblocking server” can also be referred to as SUCI unblocking server.
[0146] Such unblocking server 19 can additionally be configured to perform, additionally or alternatively, any of the methods described in the present invention in relation to a unblocking server, for example, using any of the hardware or software components of the release server described above.
[0147] Yet other hardware, consistent with the example illustrated in Figure 16, can be used to implement an UE 1 to securely notify a wireless communication network 30 of a signature identifier and can be configured with the exemplary components illustrated in Figure 21. The components of Figure 21 include a generation unit or module 25 and a transmission unit or module 26. The generation module or unit is configured to generate a SUCI comprising an encrypted part in which at least a part of a SUPI is encrypted and a clear text portion comprising a home network identifier and a cryptography scheme identifier that identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the SUPI in SUCI. The transmission module or unit is configured to transmit the SUCI to an authentication server 14 to forward the SUCI to a decoupling server 19 capable of decrypting the SUPI.
[0148] Such UE 1 can, additionally or alternatively, be configured with the exemplary components illustrated in Figure 22 to obtain a privacy key. The components in Figure 22 include a receiving unit or module 27 and a scanning unit or module 28. The receiving module or unit is configured to receive the privacy key and a message authentication code (MAC) from a authentication server 14. The verification module or unit is configured to verify the integrity of the privacy key by generating a supply key and using the supply key and privacy key to reproduce the MAC received from the authentication server, the supply key being a secret shared between the UE and the authentication server.
[0149] Such UE 1 may additionally be configured to perform, additionally or alternatively, any of the methods described in the present invention in relation to a UE, for example, using any of the hardware or software components of the UE described above .
[0150] The various methods and processes described in the present invention can be implemented in ways that vary in certain details from the general descriptions given above. For example, although the steps of various processes or methods described in the present invention can be shown and described as in a sequence or temporal order, the steps of any of those processes or methods are not limited to being performed in any specific sequence or order, in no indication to the contrary. In fact, steps in such processes or methods can generally be carried out in several different sequences and orders while still falling within the scope of the present invention. The modalities described in the present invention should be considered in all aspects as illustrative and not as restrictive. In particular, all changes that fall within the range of meanings and equivalences of the modalities listed and attached below are intended to be adopted in it.

权利要求:
Claims (17)
[0001]
1. Method performed by an authentication server on a home network of user equipment (UE) to obtain a permanent signature identifier (SUPI), characterized by the fact that SUPI is a globally unique identifier allocated to a subscriber and the SUPI comprises a home network identifier identifying a subscriber's home network and a subscription identifier identifying a signature within the home network, the method comprising: the authentication server receiving a hidden signature identifier (SUCI) generated by the UE, in which the SUCI comprises an encrypted part and a clear text part, and in which a) the encrypted part of the SUCI generated by the UE comprises the signature identifier identifying the signature within the home network, but the encrypted part of the SUCI generated by the UE does not include the home network identifier and b) the clear text portion of the SUCI generated by the UE comprises i) the home network identifier, ii) an identi encryption scheme recorder that identifies a cryptography scheme used by the UE to encrypt the signature identifier in the SUCI, and iii) a public key identifier for a public key of the home network, but the clear text portion of the SUCI generated by the UE does not understand the signature identifier; the authentication server determines a decoction server to use to decrypt the encrypted part of SUCI; the authentication server sends the SUCI to the unblocking server; and after the authentication server sends the SUCI to the decoupling server, the authentication server receives the SUPI in response.
[0002]
2. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the unblocking server is one of a plurality of unblocking servers, and the determination of the unblocking server is based on information received from the UE.
[0003]
3. Method according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that it additionally comprises receiving the SUCI from the UE as part of a registration procedure to register the UE with a wireless communication network.
[0004]
4. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that it additionally comprises receiving the SUCI from the UE via an authentication request from a Security Anchoring Function.
[0005]
5. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that it additionally comprises sending the SUCI and a request for an authentication vector to authenticate the UE to the unblocking server determined in the same message.
[0006]
6. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that: the home network identifier consists of a Mobile Country Code from a Mobile Network Code, and the signature identifier is a Mobile Signature Identification Number.
[0007]
7. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the SUPI is a Network Access Identifier.
[0008]
8. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the cryptography scheme is an Integrated Elliptical Curve Cryptography Scheme (ECIES).
[0009]
9. Method, performed by a decoction server, to provide a permanent signature identifier (SUPI) for an authentication server, characterized by the fact that the SUPI is a globally unique identifier allocated to a subscriber and the SUPI comprises an identifier of home network identifying a subscriber's home network and a signature identifier identifying a signature within the home network, the method comprising: the decoupling server receiving, from the authentication server, a hidden signature identifier (SUCI) generated by the UE, where the SUCI comprises an encrypted part and a clear text part, and where a) the encrypted part of the SUCI generated by the UE comprises the signature identifier identifying the signature within the home network, but the encrypted part of the SUCI generated by the UE does not include the home network identifier and b) the clear text portion of the SUCI generated by the UE comprises i) the home network identifier ethics, ii) an encryption scheme identifier that identifies an encryption scheme used by the UE to encrypt the signature identifier in SUCI, and iii) a public key identifier for a public key of the home network, but the plain text portion the SUCI generated by the UE does not understand the signature identifier; the decryption server decrypts the encrypted part of the SUCI, using the encryption scheme indicated by the encryption scheme identifier to obtain the SUPI; and the unblocking server sends the SUPI to the authentication server.
[0010]
10. Method performed by a user equipment (UE) to hide a permanent subscription identifier (SUPI), characterized by the fact that the SUPI is a globally unique identifier allocated to a subscriber and the SUPI comprises a home network identifier to identify a the subscriber's home network and a signature identifier to identify a signature within the home network, the method comprising: the UE generating a hidden signature identifier (SUCI) comprising an encrypted part and a plain text part, where a) the part encrypted SUCI generated by the UE comprises the signature identifier identifying the signature within a home network, but the encrypted part of the SUCI generated by the UE does not include the home network identifier and b) the clear text part of the SUCI generated by the UE comprises i ) the home network identifier, ii) an encryption scheme identifier that identifies an encryption scheme used by the UE to create iptograph the signature identifier in the SUCI, and iii) a public key identifier for a public key for the home network, but the clear text portion of the SUCI generated by the UE does not comprise the signature identifier; and the UE transmitting the SUCI to an authentication server to forward the SUCI to a decoupling server capable of decrypting the encrypted part.
[0011]
11. Method, according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that the SUCI is transmitted in a request to register with a wireless communication network (30).
[0012]
12. Method according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that generating the SUCI comprises using a tamper-resistant secure hardware component of the UE to generate the SUCI.
[0013]
13. Method according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that transmitting the SUCI to the authentication server comprises transmitting the SUCI to the authentication server in response to an identifier request message received from an Authentication management Function and Mobility, AMF, as part of a procedure to register the UE with a wireless communication network.
[0014]
14. Method, according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that the encryption scheme is an Integrated Elliptical Curve Cryptography Scheme.
[0015]
15. User equipment (UE) to hide a permanent subscription identifier (SUPI), characterized by the fact that the SUPI is a globally unique identifier allocated to a subscriber and the SUPI comprises a home network identifier to identify a home network of the subscriber and a signature identifier identifying a signature within the home network, the UE comprising: processing circuitry and memory circuitry, the memory circuitry containing instructions executable by the processing circuitry, wherein the UE is operable to: generate a hidden signature identifier (SUCI) comprising an encrypted part and a clear text part, where a) the encrypted part of the SUCI generated by the UE comprises the signature identifier identifying the signature within a home network, but the encrypted part of the SUCI generated by the UE does not include the home network identifier and b) the clear text part the SUCI generated by the UE comprises i) the home network identifier, ii) an encryption scheme identifier that identifies an encryption scheme used by the UE to encrypt the signature identifier in SUCI, and iii) a public key identifier for a public key for the home network, but the clear text portion of the SUCI generated by the UE does not comprise the signature identifier; and transmitting the SUCI to an authentication server to forward the SUCI to a decoupling server capable of decrypting the SUPI.
[0016]
16. UE, according to claim 15, characterized by the fact that the SUPI comprises a Mobile Signature Identification Number.
[0017]
17. UE, according to claim 15, characterized by the fact that the SUPI is a Network Access Identifier.

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法律状态:
2020-12-08| B09A| Decision: intention to grant [chapter 9.1 patent gazette]|

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2020-12-22| B16A| Patent or certificate of addition of invention granted [chapter 16.1 patent gazette]|Free format text: PRAZO DE VALIDADE: 20 (VINTE) ANOS CONTADOS A PARTIR DE 17/07/2018, OBSERVADAS AS CONDICOES LEGAIS. |

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