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    • 专利摘要:
    the invention is a method for communication between a server (30) and user equipment (20) through a set of command / response pairs. the user equipment (20) uses an imsi field of a connection request frame as defined by etsi ts 124.008 to transmit a command to the server (30). the server (30) uses an authentication parameter rand field or an authentication parameter autn field from an authentication request frame, as defined by etsi ts 124.008 to transmit a response corresponding to the command received. the server (30) sends the authentication request frame in response to the connection request frame.
    公开号:BR112019016201A2
    申请号:R112019016201
    申请日:2018-02-02
    公开日:2020-04-07
    发明作者:Rhelimi Alain；Anslot Michel
    申请人:Thales Dis France Sa；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    METHOD FOR MANAGING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A SERVER AND USER EQUIPMENT (Field of Invention) [0001] The present invention relates to methods of managing communication between a server and user equipment. It relates, in particular, to the methods of establishing a communication channel between a server and a Telecom user equipment without full Telecom credentials.
    (Background of the invention) [0002] To securely connect a telecommunications communication network, it is necessary to provide user equipment with complete telecommunications credentials, known as the IMSI / Ki pair, where IMSI is a unique identifier for the telecommunications and Ki a secret key allocated exclusively for subscription by a mobile network operator.
    [0003] The IMSI / Ki pair is usually stored in a tamper-resistant element, which can be a SIM card, a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), a built-in secure element (for example, eUICC), a secure software or an integrated secure element (ie 1UICC) within a chip system (SOC).
    [0004] An element resistant to violations is considered safe because it is able to control access to the data it contains and to authorize or not the use of your data by other machines or entities. Violation-resistant elements can also provide computing services
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    2/29 based on cryptographic components (also known as cryptographic processor). In general, tamper-resistant elements have limited computing resources and limited memory resources and must be connected to a host machine that supplies electrical power. Tamper-resistant elements can be removable or attached to a host machine.
    [0005] Due to process of manufacturing, one equipment of user (and your element resistant at violations) can be issued s in an IMSI pair / Ki.[0006] It is necessary establish safely an
    communication session between that user equipment and a server designed to allow the user equipment to obtain an IMSI / Ki pair.
    (Summary of the Invention) [0007] An objective of the invention is to solve the aforementioned technical problem.
    [0008] An objective of the present invention is a method of communication between a server and a user's equipment through a set of command / response pairs. The user's equipment uses an IMSI field in an Attachment Request frame, as defined by ETSI TS 124.008, to transmit a command from one of said pairs to the server. The server uses an authentication parameter RAND field or an Authentication parameter AUTN field of an Authentication Request frame as defined by ETSI TS 124.008 to transmit a response corresponding to the received command.
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    3/29 server sends the Authentication Request frame in response to the Attachment Request frame.
    [0009] Advantageously, the user's equipment can use a part of the IMIN of the IMSI field to send the command.
    [0010] Advantageously, the user's equipment can send an initial command to retrieve a session identifier, the server can send the session identifier in response to the initial command and the user's equipment can include the session identifier in all subsequent commands sent to the server until a logout command.
    [0011] Advantageously, the user's equipment can store a destination identifier allocated exclusively to said user equipment, the server can comprise a range of transaction identifiers, the command can comprise a parameter generated from the destination identifier and the server can find the destination identifier in the range, thanks to that parameter.
    [0012] Advantageously, UH denoting 64 most significant bits of the target identifier, PHLn denoting 64 most significant bits of the lower limit of the range, PHHn denoting 64 most significant bits of the upper limit of the range, H denoting a probe value comprised in the parameter, the user equipment can receive PHHn and PHLn from the server, where H is equal to ((UHPHLn) * 100000) / (PHHn-PHLn). The server can generate a
    Updated PHLn + 1 equal to PHLn + (H * (PHHn-PHLn) /
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    100000) and can generate an updated PHHn + 1 equal to PHLn + (((H + 1) * (PHHn-PHLn) / 100000).
    [0013] Advantageously, the user's equipment can incorporate an element resistant to violations. The user's device can send a command to request an IMSI allocated to the user's device. In response, the server can select the IMSI thanks to the destination identifier and return the IMSI. User equipment can forward the IMSI to the tamper-resistant element.
    [0014] Advantageously, the user's equipment can send a command to request a key allocated to a mobile operator and necessary to generate credentials necessary to securely access a communications network. In response, the server can select the key thanks to the destination identifier and return the key. User equipment can route the key to the tamper-resistant element and the tamper-resistant element can compute said credentials from the key and a pre-stored seed in the tamper-resistant element.
    [0015] Advantageously, the seed can be retrieved from the user's equipment and sent to the mobile operator. The mobile operator can generate a pair of MNO keys comprising a private MNO key and a public MNO key, generate the IMSI and calculate a Ki from the seed. The public MNO key can be the key allocated to the mobile operator. The mobile operator can send the MNO public key, IMSI and the destination identifier to the server.
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    5/29 [0016] Advantageously, the mobile operator can verify that the tamper-resistant element is authentic by asking third parties to verify the seed.
    [0017] Advantageously, the user's equipment can incorporate a base band. The baseband can send any command from that set without using the tamper-resistant element to retrieve an IMSI and a key allocated to a mobile operator from the server. The baseband can forward said IMSI and said key to the tamper-resistant element. The tamper-resistant element can calculate derived connection credentials according to the 3GPP key derivation mechanism.
    [0018] Another objective of the invention is a user equipment comprising a processor and capable of communicating with a server through a set of command / response pairs. The user's equipment comprises a communication agent adapted to be executed by the processor to generate and send an Attachment Request frame, as defined by ETSI TS 124.008, to transmit to the server a command from one of the referred pairs to the server, being the command included in an IMSI field of an Attachment Request frame. The communication agent is adapted to be executed by the processor to receive, in response to the Attachment Request frame, a response corresponding to said command transmitted in a RAND field of the Authentication parameter or in an AUTN field of the Authentication parameter of a frame Authentication Request Form, as defined by ETSI TS 124.008.
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    6/29 [0019] Advantageously, the user's equipment can be configured to send the following series of ordered commands to the server: requesting a session identifier, transmitting a destination identifier, requesting an IMSI, requesting an allocated key to a mobile operator and session close.
    [0020] Advantageously, UH denotes 64 most significant bits of the destination identifier (14), PHLn denotes 64 most significant bits of the lower limit of a range stored on the server (30), PHHn denotes 64 most significant bits of the upper limit of the range, the user equipment may incorporate a tamper-resistant element comprising a processor and a software probe agent which is adapted to run by the tamper-resistant element processor to generate a probe value (H) equal to ((UHPHLn) * 100000) / (PHHn-PHLn).
    [0021] Another objective of the invention is a server comprising a processor and capable of communicating with user equipment through a set of command / response pairs. The server comprises a provisioning agent adapted to be executed by the processor to receive an Attachment Request frame, as defined by ETSI TS 124.008, to transmit a command from one of the referred pairs of the user's equipment, the said command being comprised in a IMSI field of an Attachment Request table. The provisioning agent is adapted to be executed by the processor to generate and send, in response to the
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    Attachment Request, a response corresponding to the said command transmitted in an RAND field of the Authentication parameter or in an AUTN field of the Authentication parameter of an Authentication Request frame as defined by ETSI TS 124.008.
    [0022] Advantageously, the user's equipment can be destined to store a destination identifier allocated exclusively for said user equipment. The server can store a variety of transaction identifiers. The command can comprise a parameter generated from the target identifier and the server can be configured to find the target identifier in the range using that parameter.
    [0023] Advantageously, UH denotes 64 most significant bits of the target identifier, PHLn denoting 64 significant bits of the lower limit of the range, PHHn denoting 64 most significant bits of the upper limit of the range, H denoting a probe value included in the parameter, the server can be configured to send to the PHHn and PHLn user equipment, where H is equal to ((UH-PHLn) * 100000) / (PHHn-PHLn). The server can be configured to generate an updated PHLn + 1 equal to PHLn + (H * (PHHn-PHLn) / 100000) and to generate an updated PHHn + 1 equal to PHLn + ((H + 1) * (PHHn-PHLn ) / 100000).
    (Brief Description of the Drawings) [0024] Other features and advantages of the present invention will emerge more clearly from a reading of
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    description The follow from one number in achievements favorite gives invention with reference to attached drawings correspondents in which: [0025] - Figure 1 show one flowchart in management of communication in between one equipment in user and one server wake up with An example gives invention, [0026] - Figure 2 shows < schematically an architecture in an equipment user according to one
    example of the invention, [0027] - Figure 3 schematically represents a server architecture according to an example of the invention, and [0028] - Figure 4 shows a flowchart of the communication management to provision the element resistant to the breaches of a user equipment with telecommunications credentials in accordance with an embodiment of the invention.
    (Detailed Description of Preferred Embodiments) [0029] The invention can apply to any type of user equipment intended to be provisioned with a complete telecommunications credential.
    [0030] This user equipment can be a smartphone, a tablet, a personal computer, a smart watch, a vehicle, a meter, a slot machine, a TV or a computer, for example.
    [0031] The invention takes advantage of the communication protocols normally implemented in telecommunications devices, using them in a totally
    Petition 870190100044, of 10/07/2019, p. 15/39
    New 9/29. The user's equipment and the server communicate via a command / response pair mechanism, in which a command is sent by the user's equipment and a response is returned by the server. The user equipment uses an Attachment Request frame as defined by ETSI TS 124.008 (for example, version 8.6.0 of July 2009) to transmit a command via the IMSI field of that frame. The server uses an Authentication Request frame as defined by ETSI TS 124.008 (for example, Version 8.6.0 of July 2009) to transmit the response corresponding to the command received through one (or both) of the RAND fields of the Authentication parameter or AUTN of the Authentication parameter of that frame. It should be noted that the server does not send the conventional response to the Attachment Request, as specified by TS 124.008.
    [0032] Preferably, the user's equipment uses the MSIN (Mobile Subscriber Identification Number) part of the IMSI field of the Attachment Request frame to transmit data to the server. For example, the MSIN part can be divided into three areas:
    - 3 digits reserved to encode the session identifier (also called allocated slot),
    - 5 digits reserved for the payload,
    - 1 digit reserved for the command identifier.
    [0033] Preferably, the user's equipment and the server are configured to use the following convention for the new set of commands:
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    10/29 '0' for a new session identifier request, '1' for the transmission of the unique identifier allocated to user equipment '2' for an IMSI request for a key request allocated to the subscription / mobile operator,
    - '4' to '8' for the number in sequence, if a command needs to be split into several subsequent frames, to close the session (ie session ended).
    [0034] Advantageously, the number in sequence can be managed in the form of a loop: when it reaches '8', it continues with '4' (that is, circular succession / module in which there is a renumbering of '4'.) Therefore, no there is no limit to the number of subsequent frames.
    [0035] Figure 1 shows a flowchart of a communication management according to an example of the invention.
    [0036] User equipment 20 is presumed to be pre-provisioned with an ephemeral credential and a unique identifier UUIDue, also called destination identifier 14. In this example, server 30 is a Home Location Register (HLR or D-HLR).
    [0037] In step S01, the user's equipment 20 initiates the exchange with the server 30 by sending a first command requesting a session identifier. Optionally, the payload sent can comprise an MNO code that allows the server 30 to identify the
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    11/29 mobile network operator for which telecommunications credentials must be provisioned on user equipment 20. For example, the MNO code can be calculated as a hash (with a length of 5 digits) of the name of the mobile network operator .
    [0038] In step S02, server 30 selects a session identifier and sends it to the user's equipment through an Authentication Request frame in response to command 30 received in step S01. Preferably, the session identifier is transmitted in the RAND field of the Authentication parameter.
    [0039] In step S03, user equipment 20 initiates the transmission of the unique identifier (UUIDue) allocated to user equipment. Assuming that the length of the UUIDue is greater than the size of the available payload, several Attachment Request frames are required. Other connection request frames can be sent with a command identifier from '4' to '8', where these values are sequence numbers, allowing the server to consider the series of Attachment Request frames together.
    [0040] Server 30 is assumed to be pre-provisioned with a range of transaction identifiers. This interval may contain failures if certain transaction identifiers have already been assigned to the user's equipment.
    [0041] In a preferred embodiment, the UUIDue is 16 bytes long. To decrease the number of
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    Solicitation required Annexes, an improvement can
    be implemented with the following algorithm.
    [0042] Suposing that:
    - N as the number of transaction identifiers available on server 30 that are likely to match UUIDue (that is, destination identifier 14). In other words, N is the number of free transaction identifiers in the range stored on the server.
    - PHLn denotes the 64 most significant bits of the limit bottom of available range. - PHHn denoting the most significant 64 bits of the limit top of available range.
    - UH denotes the 64 most significant bits of UUIDue (destination identifier 14).
    - PLLn indicates the lowest 64 significant bits of the lower limit of the available range.
    - PLHn denoting 64 significant lower bits of the upper limit of the available range.
    - UL denotes the lowest significant 64 bits of the UUIDue (destination identifier 14).
    - H denoting a probe value to be sent by the user equipment to the server.
    [0043] User equipment 20 receives both PHHn and PHLn from server 30. This sending can be done in step S04 in response to the command in step S03.
    [0044] In step S05, the user's equipment computes
    H as being equal to ((UH-PHLn) * 100000) / (PHHn-PHLn) and sends H to the server.
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    13/29 [0045] In step S06, server 30 generates an updated PHLn + 1 equal to PHLn + (H * (PHHn-PHLn) / 100000) and an updated PHHn + 1 equal to PHLn + ((H + 1) * (PHHn-PHLn) / 100000). Server 30 sends the updated PHLn + 1 and the updated PHHn + 1 to the user's equipment.
    [0046] In step S07, the user's equipment computes H as described above and sends it to the server.
    [0047] In this example, the server has successfully identified the 64 most significant bits of the UUIDue. Thus, in step S08, the server sends PLHn and PLLn in response.
    [0048] The same algorithm is executed again for the lowest significant bits in steps S09 - S10. In this example, the server successfully identified the lowest significant 64 bits of the UUIDue in step S10 and sends a response to notify the user's equipment of the end of the UUIDue transmission.
    [0049] Then, in the Sll step, the user's equipment sends a command requesting an IMSI. In response, the server sends the IMSI at step S12 through an Authentication Request frame.
    [0050] In step S13, the user's equipment sends a command requesting a key allocated to the subscription / mobile operator. Preferably, this key is an ephemeral key that is used by the user's equipment to generate the final Ki. Due to the usual size of an ephemeral key, two changes are required to transfer the entire key (parts PK1 and PK2) in the example in Figure 1. (Steps S13-16).
    [0051] At this point, the user's equipment can generate Ki using the ephemeral key received and a
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    14/29 seed preset 10 on user equipment. Preferably, the user's equipment incorporates a tamper-resistant element that stores the seed and performs the Ki generation.
    [0052] In step S17, the user's equipment sends a command to close the session. At that point, the session identifier can be released and relocated to other user equipment by the server. A response is returned by the server at step S18 to notify the user's equipment of the end of the session. The server can resume the allocated slot and transfer it to another device.
    [0053] Note that the session identifier allows the server to identify the relevant user's equipment among a plurality of messages received.
    [0054] In other words, the following algorithm can be used to minimize the number of Attachment Request frames needed before the server knows the UUIDue value.
    [0055] This algorithm uses the principle of dichotomy on the scale of 100 000 instead of 2.
    [0056] The server will maintain a dynamic lower limit and a dynamic upper limit of its interval. Progressively, the server will restrict the search value range, thanks to the probe value (ie, H) transmitted by the user's equipment. Thus, the dynamic lower limit and the dynamic upper limit will converge to a single value corresponding to what is sought. The improved dichotomy principle is performed twice:
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    15/29 one for the most significant bits and the other for the lowest significant bits.
    // 64 part MSB (most significant bits)
    For X = 0 to 5 user equipment computes:
    H = (((UH-PHLn) * 100000) / (PHHn-PHLn) and sends H to the server.
    On the server: IF (PHHn - PHLn) = 0 THEN QUIT LOOP
    END IF
    The server generates an updated PHLn + 1 equal to PHLn + (H * (PHHn-PHLn) / 100000) and an updated PHHn + 1 equal to PHLn + ((H +11) * (PHHn-PHLn) / 100000) and sends both PHLn + 1 and PHHn + 1 updated for the user's equipment.
    NEXT X
    IF X <6 // 64 part LSB (lowest significant bits)
    For X = 0 to 5
    User equipment computes:
    H = ((UH-PLLn) * 100000) / (PLHn-PLLn) and sends H to the server.
    On the server: IF (PLHn - PLLn) = 0 THEN QUIT LOOP
    END IF
    The server generates an updated PLLn + 1 equal to PLLn + (H * (PLHn-PLLn) / 100000) and an updated PLHn + 1 equal to PLLn + ((H + 1) * (PLHn-PLLn) / 100000) and sends both PLLn + 1 and PLHn + 1 updated for the user's equipment.
    NEXT X
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    END IF
    IF X <6 // 0 UUIDUE was successfully transferred
    END IF [0057] It should be noted that if none of the loops converge after 5 steps, then the UUIDue does not belong to the server's range.
    [0058] The maximum number of loops (as far as exchanges) is 2 x Log (N) / Log (100000). For example, if N = 1,000,000 transaction identifiers available in the server range, the number of exchanges is less than or equal to 4.
    [0059] If, in the server interval, there are no transaction identifiers corresponding (that is, whose value is equal) to the destination UUIDue, the server can obtain a temporary IMSI in a set of pre-negotiated signatures related to the mobile operator (the code MNO of the command sent in step S01 can be used to identify the mobile operator). In this case, the server performs a dynamic assignment and notifies the mobile operator that the temporary IMSI is assigned to the user's equipment.
    [0060] By reference to step S02, the server can send PHHn and PHLn with advantage in the RAND and AUTN fields of the Authentication Request so that the user equipment can compute the value of probe H before sending the first frame of Request for Authentication. Annex for the transmission of UUIDue in step S03. Using RAND and AUTN, operations are performed using 128-bit limits instead of 64-bit, so steps S07 and S08 can be removed.
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    17/29 [0061] Before step S01, some previous steps can be performed to populate server 30.
    [0062] For example, the seed can be retrieved from user 20 equipment by an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) and sent to a mobile operator. The mobile operator can then generate a pair of asymmetric MNO keys, comprising a private MNO key and a public MNO key. The mobile operator can generate an IMSI and compute a Ki from the seed. Then, the mobile operator sends the trio to the server 30: public MNO key + IMSI + the transaction identifier. Server 30 can add this trio to the range of transaction identifiers it stores. In this way, the server can be filled with a large number of trios, corresponding to as many user equipments (or as many elements resistant to violations).
    [0063] Figure 4 shows a flow of a communications management flowchart for provisioning the tamper-resistant element (TRE) of a user equipment with telecommunications credentials in accordance with an embodiment of the invention.
    [0064] The following notations are used below: CERT.X.ECDSA: ECDSA X static certificate ECDSA SK.X.ECDSA: X private key for ECDSA signature PK.X.ECDSA: X public key for ECDHE SK signature .X.ECDHE: ECDHE X private key (ephemeral) ECDHE ATK.X.ECDHE: ECDHE authentication token (X dynamic certificate for key contract)
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    CERT.X.ECKA: Certificate static ECKA from X to key contractSK.X.ECKA: Wrench toilet X ECKA for contract in keyPK.X.ECKA: Key public X ECKA for contract in
    key
    PK.X. ECDHE: Public key ECDHE of X (ephemeral)
    VERIFY (Y) [X]: Check X with the Y key
    SIGN (Y) [X, ...]: Sign X with the Y key
    DERIVE (X) [Y]: Compute a shared session key from a private key X and a certificate / authentication token Y {SK, PK} = ECDHE (): Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair.
    {M, 1} = ENCRYPT (Y) [X]: Encrypt X with the key
    Y. Obtain Mea cryptogram and integrity check I
    X = DECRYPT (Y, I) [M]: Decrypt M with the Y key and check the integrity using I. Obtain clear text X [0065] The following references are used:
    [a] AES128: Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) - FIPS PUB 197 [b] BSI Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptical Curve Cryptography - Version 2.0 [c] SHA-256: Specifications for Secure Hash Standard - FIPS PUB 180-3, 2008 [0066] The following operations can be performed:
    signature
    CERT.X.ECDSA = SIGN (SK.Y.ECDSA) [PK. X.ECDSA, X0, XI, X2, X3 ...]
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    ATK.X.ECDHE = SIGN (SK. W. ECDSA) [PK. X ECDHE, XO, XI, X2, X3 ...] where XO, XI, X2, X3, ... are optional values to sign
    Verification
    VERIFY (CERT.Y.ECDSA) [CERT .X.ECDSA] return a boolean (TRUE WHEN successful) using PK.Y.ECDSA in CERT.Y.ECDSA
    Derivation
    KS XY N = DERIV (SK.X. A) [BYC] where KS XY N is the shared secret key (s)
    KS YX N = DERIV (SK.YC) [BXA] where KS YX N is the shared secret key (s)
    Where:
    A is ECKA or ECDHE
    B is CERT or ATK
    C is ECKA or ECDHE
    KS XY N = KS YX N
    KS XY N or KSYX N is an array of N keys: KSXY [1], KS XY [2], ..., KS XY [N],
    Key Derivation Function [0067] The DERIVE (X) [Y] function allows the computation of an array of N shared secret key Ks N from the private key X and a public key Y within a certificate or authentication token in [ B]. The procedure begins with the calculation of a shared secret ECKA-EG or ECKA-DH, as defined in [b], and a key derivation function:
    [0068] The KDF-128 is an X9.63 key derivation function in [a] using an SHA-256 in [c] and generating a set
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    20/29 of keys derived from N x 128 bits K [1] to Κ [N] as elements of the matrix.
    Ki N = KDF-128 (ShS, I, SI)
    Where
    ShS: the 256-bit shared secret of the ECKA-EG Key Contract Algorithm (using a static key and an ephemeral key) or ECKA-DH (using two ephemeral keys), as defined in [b]
    I: a 32-bit counter value between 1 and N
    SI: information shared as SI = N | |
    KEY_TYPE | | 128
    KEY_TYPE: '10' for KS1
    KEY_TYPE: '20' for KS2
    The KDF function is an SHA256 in [8].
    Encryption / Decryption Function [0069] Data encryption and decryption is a symmetric function based on the eGCM-128 algorithm.
    M DST , H check = eGCM-AES128 (Κ, IV, EIV) [M SRC ]
    Where:
    K: 128-bit encryption / decryption and integrity key
    IV: 128-bit Initial Value Integrity check
    M SRC : message flow to encrypt / decrypt. The message length must be a multiple of a 128-bit block filled with 'FF'.
    EIV: 128-bit Initial Value Encryption Key
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    M DST : encrypted / decrypted message flow The length of the encrypted message is the same as that of the M SRC message
    H src : 128-bit Integrity check result for clear text (source) [0070] All keys and initial values are derived from the key derivation function as follows:
    K = K [1] on the KDF-128
    IV = K [2] in KDF-128
    EIV = K [3] in KDF-128 [0071] Consequently, the generic notation as
    M dst / H src - ENCRYPT (KS 3 ) [M SRC ] aiming
    M DST / H src = eGCM-128 (K, IV, EIV) [M SRC ] is
    M dst , H src = eGCM-128 (KS [1], KS [2], KS [3]) [M SRC ] [0072] Other encryption and integrity checking algorithms can be used efficiently.
    [0073] We are proposing that eGCM-128 has an encryption method, but CBC-AES-128 on FIPS-PUB-81 and HMACSHA256 on FIPS PUB 198-1 can replace it to facilitate the acceptance of protocols.
    MDST = CBC-AES-128 (KE, IV) [MSRC]
    HSRC = HMAC-SHA256 (KH) [MSRC]
    Where
    KE: 128-bit encryption / decryption key and integrity: K [1] on KDF-128
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    IV: integrity check of the 128-bit initial value: K [2] in KDF-128
    MSRC: message flow to encrypt / decrypt. The message length must be a multiple of a 128-bit block filled with FF.
    KH: 128-bit initial key: K [3] on the KDF-128
    MDST: flow of encrypted / decrypted messages. The length of the encrypted message is the same as the MSRC HSRC message: 128-bit integrity check result of clear text (source)
    Long-term keys [0074] The user's equipment is supposed to incorporate a Tamper Resistant Element (TRE - Violation Resistant Element) capable of hosting secrets and securely performing cryptographic computations.
    [0075] The long-term keys to the TRE are as follows:
    CERT.PN.ECDSA: = SIGN (SK.Cl.ECDSA) [PK.PN.ECDSA]. TRE part number certificate signed by Cl
    CERT .TRE.ECDSA: = SIGN (SK.PN.ECDSA) [PK.TRE.ECDSA]. TRE certificate signed by PN SK.PN.ECDSA private key
    SK.TRE.ECDSA: = TRE static private key
    CERT.Cl.ECDSA: = Root of the certificate issuer
    The long-term keys to IDS are as follows:
    CERT. IDS .ECKA: = SIGN (SK.Cl.ECDSA) [PK. IDS.ECKA]
    SK.IDS.ECKA: = static IDS private key for the HSM1 hosted key contract
    CERT.Cl.ECDSA: = root of the certificate issuer
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    Generation of TRE credentials
    VERIFY (CERT.C1.ECDSA) [CERT. IDS .ECKA]
    KS1 3 = DERIVE (SK.TRE.ECDHE) [CERT. IDS .ECKA]
    Ml, Hl = CRYPTOGRAPHY (KS13) [CERT .TRE.ECDSA] {SK.TRE.ECDHE, PK.TRE.ECDHE} = ECDHE ()
    ATK.TRE.ECDHE = SIGN (SK.TRE.ECDSA) [PK.TRE.ECDHE,
    ISSN, UUID eu ]
    CERT .PN.ECDSA, ATK.TRE.ECDHE, Ml, Hl are the credentials of the TRE and ISSN is a Boolean value
    Verifying TER Credentials
    KS13 = DERIVE (SK. IDS .ECKA) [ATK.PBL.ECDHE]
    CERT.PBL.ECDSA = DECRYPT (KS13) [Ml]
    VERIFY (CERT.Cl.ECDSA) [CERT .PN.ECDSA]
    VERIFY (CERT .PN.ECDSA) [CERT .TRE.ECDSA]
    VERIFY (CERT .TRE.ECDSA) [ATK.TRE.ECDHE]
    Computation of Ki by MNO
    SK.MNO.ECDHE, PK. MNO.ECDHE] = ECDHE ()
    Ki = DERIVE (SK. MNO. ECDHE) [ATK.TRE.ECDHE]
    Computing Ki by TRE
    Ki = DERIVE (SK.TRE.ECDHE) [PK.MNO.ECDHE] [0076] In step G of Figure 4, a service provider or OEM equipment manufacturer (SP / OEM) generates a UUID ue or obtains a UUID u and user equipment.
    [0077] Advantageously, the UE may be UUID generated by the user equipment, according to a specific formula that provides some mathematical properties. For example, the following formula can be used:
    UUIDue = AES128 [KTRESI] (Rand | CATV | SN) where:
    Petition 870190100044, of 10/07/2019, p. 30/39
    24/29
    Rand: it's a 62-bit random value,
    CATV: is a 16-bit secret constant standard for verifying successful SN decoding,
    SN: the serial number of the tamper-resistant element
    K TRE SI: A secret key managed by the tamper-resistant element.
    [0078] Advantageously, the SP / OEM can obtain a certificate from a certification authority / issuer (Cl) as CERT. IDS.ECDSA and inject both CERT into the tamper-resistant element. IDS. ECKA and UUIDue. The SP / CEM can obtain the TRE credentials from the user's equipment. Preferably, according to a commercial contract with a mobile operator (MNO), the SP / CEM transfers the credentials.
    [0079] In phase V of Figure 4, the mobile operator can transfer the credentials of the TRE for verification to the IDS. The IDS counter signs ATK.TRE.ECDHE and returns it to the MNO. The MNO obtains the evidence that the TRE is authentic and recovers:
    - PK.TRE.ECDHE
    - UUID eu
    - ISSN = TRUE if SN '= SN with Rand' | CATV | SN '= AES128 - 1 [KTRE SI] (UUIDue) [0080] When checking the ISSN, the MNO believes that the UUID u is connected to the TRE to avoid the rush attack, where a fraudulent actor can get the UUID u spying on exchange data and use it with another TRE in another UE.
    [0081] The MNO generates a key pair like {SK.MNO.ECDHE, PK. MNO.ECDHE] = ECDHE ()
    Petition 870190100044, of 10/07/2019, p. 31/39
    25/29
    Ο ΜΝΟ generates an IMSI and computes Ki
    Ki = DERIVE (SK.MNO.ECDHE) [ATK.TRE.ECDHE]
    The MNO is transferred to the D-HLR:
    - PK.MNO.ECDHE
    - IMSI
    - UUID ue [0082] The MNO transfers IMSI and Ki to its HLR / HSS (also known as the Home Location Register / Home Subscriber Server).
    [0083] In stage A of Figure 4, the TRE u communicates its UUID to the server (D-HLR) as described in Figure 1, for example. The TRE then obtains the IMSI and the PK.MNO.ECDHE. TRE computes Ki and performs usual 3GPP authentication for the MNO's HLR / HSS.
    [0084] It should be noted that the mobile operator can verify the genuineness of a tamper resistant element by checking the seed of the tamper resistant element. For example, the seed may be a public key belonging to an asymmetric pair previously assigned to the tamper-resistant element. TRE authentication can also be done indirectly, if the UE can connect to the 3GPP network using MNO credentials that can only be decrypted by a genuine TRE.
    [0085] Figure 2 shows schematically an architecture of a user equipment 20 according to an example of the invention.
    [0086] User equipment 20 comprises a processor 70 and a non-volatile memory 72. It is configured to communicate 20 with a distant server
    Petition 870190100044, of 10/07/2019, p. 32/39
    26/29 through command / response pairs.
    [0087] User equipment 20 comprises a software communication agent 71 which is adapted to be executed by processor 70 to generate and send an Attachment Request frame as defined by ETSI TS 124.008 to transmit a command 25 to the server. The software communication agent 71 is adapted to include the command in the IMSI field of the Attachment Request frame. The software communication agent 71 is also adapted to be executed by processor 70 to receive, in response to the Attachment Request frame, a response corresponding to the said command transmitted in the RAND field of the Authentication parameter or in the AUTN field of the Authentication parameter of an Authentication Request framework, as defined by ETSI TS 124.008.
    [0088] In the example of Figure 2, the user equipment includes a resilient element 10 to violations comprising its own processor 17, a volatile memory 18 is a nonvolatile memory 16. The nonvolatile memory 16 stores a UUID u 14:01 seed 24 needed to compute Ki in the long run. Non-volatile memory 16 comprises a software probe agent 34 which is adapted to be executed by processor 17 to generate the value of probe H equal to ((UH-PHLn) * 100000) 1 / (PHHn-PHLn) for the MSB and ((UH-PLLn) * 100000) / (PLHn-PLLn) for LSB.
    [0089] In addition, the UE can run from the baseband without using the TRE, sending the UUID eu and obtaining the MNO credentials (IMSI and PK.MNO.ECDHE).
    Petition 870190100044, of 10/07/2019, p. 33/39
    27/29
    Consequently, the UE baseband can obtain the IMSI and ο PK.MNO.ECDHE from the D-HLR and forward it to the TRE, which will compute the derived connection credentials according to the derivation of the 3GPP key.
    [0090] Figure 3 schematically shows an architecture of a server 30 according to an example of the invention [0091] The server 30 comprises a processor 80, a non-volatile memory 82 and a DB storage area. Non-volatile memory 82 stores a software provisioning agent 81, which is configured to run by processor 80 to receive an Attachment Request frame, as defined by ETSI TS 124.008 to transmit a command from user equipment 20 and extract a command of the IMSI field of the Receipt Request frame received. The provisioning agent 81 is adapted to be executed by processor 80 to generate and send, in response to the Attachment Request frame, a response corresponding to the received command transmitted in the RAND field of the Authentication parameter or in the AUTN field of the Authentication parameter of an Authentication Request framework, as defined by ETSI TS 124.008.
    [0092] The DB storage area contains a series of trios including a transaction identifier 24, an IMSI 26 and a key 28. Non-volatile memory 82 stores a software selection agent 83 that is configured to run by processor 80 to find a destination identifier 14 that matches a
    Petition 870190100044, of 10/07/2019, p. 34/39
    28/29 transaction identifier 10 in the range. Preferably, the storage area database can be implemented as a database.
    [0093] Non-volatile memory 82 stores a software selection agent 84 that is configured to run by processor 80 to send 20 PHHn and PHLn to the user's equipment (as defined in Figure 1) and generate an updated PHLn + 1 to PHLn + (H * (PHHnPHLn) / 100000) and generate an updated PHHn + 1 equal to PHLn + ((H + 1) * (PHHn-PHLn) / 100000).
    [0094] The invention is suitable for managing the supply of a variety of user equipment.
    [0095] The invention is suitable for provisioning user equipment (or a TRE) with telecommunications credentials (IMSI / Ki). In particular, the invention applies to the system comprising a Primary Boot Loader, as described in application W02016 / 165900 Al, which is included in this description by reference.
    [0096] The invention is not limited to the described embodiments or examples. In particular, command identifiers can have different values, for example.
    [0097] An advantage of the invention is to safely allow the provisioning of essential credentials using a 3GPP network to perform a legacy connection to the same 3GPP network. The invention allows to break the infinite loop, where we need 3GPP credentials to access a data channel to provision 3GPP credentials and there are no initial 3GPP credentials to initialize the data channel
    Petition 870190100044, of 10/07/2019, p. 35/39
    29/29 mentioned above.
    [0098] An advantage of the invention is to allow the selection of a local 3GPP-compatible operator that is unknown in the manufacture of the device and even after the device is distributed in the field.
    权利要求:
    Claims (14)
    [1]
    1. Method for detecting characteristics of access points, using machine learning techniques characterized by the fact that it comprises:
    collect, through a wireless message sniffer module, access point messages to be used for recognition or classification purposes;
    filter, through a message filter module, a set of message types of the desired access point to be used for recognition or classification purposes;
    extract features, by a feature extraction module, from the access point message to be used for recognition or classification purposes;
    recognize access point characteristics, through an access point characteristics recognition module, to be used for external solutions;
    classify the characteristics of the access point, through a module for classifying the characteristics of the access point, to be used for external solutions.
    [2]
    2. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that it collects access point messages to be used for recognition or classification purposes, comprising:
    collect, through the wireless message sniffer module, messages exchanged on the wireless communication link.
    [3]
    3. Method according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the filtering of a set of message types of the desired access point to be used for recognition or classification purposes comprises:
    Petition 870190121618, of 11/22/2019, p. 9/13
    2/5 identify, through a message filter module, a set of message types that are used for recognition or classification purposes;
    filter, through a message filter module, messages collected by the wireless message sniffer module.
    [4]
    4. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the extraction characteristics of the access point message to be used for recognition or classification purposes include:
    determine, by the feature extraction module, the set of features to be extracted according to the machine learning model used;
    extract, by the characteristics extraction module, the corresponding set of characteristics according to the machine learning model used;
    pre-process, through the feature extraction module, the set of features extracted according to the machine learning model used.
    [5]
    5. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that recognizing access point characteristics to be used for external solutions comprises:
    apply, by means of an access point characteristics recognition module, a machine learning model for recognition of access point characteristics;
    determine, by an access point characteristics recognition module, the point characteristic
    Petition 870190121618, of 11/22/2019, p. 10/13
    3/5 access according to the machine learning model applied;
    assemble, through on one module of recognition in characteristics in Score access, the set in characteristics certain of points access. 6. Method , in according to claim 1, featured fur fact that to rank at characteristics of points access to be used for
    external solutions comprises:
    apply, through an access point characteristics classification module, a machine learning model for the classification of access point characteristics;
    determine, by an access point characteristics classification module, the access point characteristic according to the machine learning model applied;
    assemble, through an access point characteristics classification module, the set of determined access point characteristics.
    [6]
    7. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the access point characteristic is determined by applying a machine learning model for recognition purposes, with the machine learning model being given a set of characteristics access point and generated an access point characteristic, the machine learning model used for recognition determines the type of access point.
    Petition 870190121618, of 11/22/2019, p. 11/13
    4/5
    [7]
    8. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the access point characteristic is determined by applying a machine learning model for classification purposes, with a set of characteristics being given as input to the machine learning model. of access points and an access point characteristic is generated as output, the machine learning model used for classification determines the class of the access point.
    [8]
    9. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the set of characteristics of the access point is determined by applying a process of extracting characteristics.
    [9]
    10. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the process of extracting characteristics is given as input of an access point message and generates a set of access point characteristics, with the set of characteristics being calculated by building a set of characteristics by copying the values from the message field, or by further processing to establish the value of the characteristics.
    [10]
    11. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the messages to be used for the feature extraction process are determined by a message filtering process.
    [11]
    12. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the message filtering process is given as input of all messages collected in a wireless communication link and generates a set of
    Petition 870190121618, of 11/22/2019, p. 12/13
    5/5 messages to be used for classification and recognition process.
    [12]
    13. Method according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the characteristics of the access point are passively determined.
    [13]
    14. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the messages used to
    the recognition process and / or classification are collected passively without the user intervention at the wireless communication link. 15. Method, according with the claim 1,
    characterized by the fact that the user can determine various characteristics of the access point.
    [14]
    16. Method, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the process of detecting characteristics of the access point applies a set of machine learning models for recognition and / or classification process.
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