method on an anchor base station for security key generation, anchor base station, method on a wirel

专利摘要:
1 / 1 abstract “hand on an anchor base station for security key generation, anchor base station, hand all in one wireless terminal, and, wireless terminal†techniques for securely generating a set of encryption keys to be used for communication between a wireless terminal and an auxiliary base station in a dual connectivity scenario. an example method includes generating (810) an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based on an anchor base station key. the generated auxiliary security key is sent (820) to the auxiliary base station, for use by the auxiliary base station in encoding data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or in generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encrypt data traffic sent to the wireless terminal while the wireless terminal is dual connected to the anchor base station and the base station auxiliary base. the anchor base station key, or a key derived from the anchor base station key, is used (830) to encrypt data sent to the wireless terminal by the base station. tion of anchor base.
公开号:BR112015017515A2
申请号:R112015017515
申请日:2014-01-30
公开日:2020-02-04
发明作者:Norrman Karl；Johansson Niklas；Teyeb Oumer；Wager Stefan；Virkki Vesa
申请人:Ericsson Telefon Ab L M；
IPC主号:

专利说明:

“METHOD IN AN ANCHOR BASE STATION FOR SECURITY KEY GENERATION, ANCHOR BASE STATION, METHOD IN A WIRELESS TERMINAL, AND, WIRELESS TERMINAL”
TECHNICAL FIELD [001] The technology described here generally relates to wireless telecommunications networks, and more particularly relates to techniques for operating security switches in dual connectivity scenarios, that is, scenarios in which a mobile terminal is connected to multiple base stations simultaneously.
FUNDAMENTALS [002] In a typical cellular radio system, mobile terminals (also called user equipment, UEs, wireless terminals, and / or mobile stations) communicate over a radio access network (RAN) with one or more networks core, which provide access to data networks, such as the Internet, and / or the public switched telecommunications network (PSTN). A RAN covers a geographical area that is divided into cell areas, with each cell area being served by a radio base station (also called a base station, a RAN node, a NodeB, and / or an enhanced NodeB or eNodeB). A cell area is a geographical area through which radio coverage is provided by the base station equipment at a base station location. Base stations communicate over radio communication channels with wireless terminals within range of base stations.
[003] Cellular communication system operators have started offering mobile broadband data services based on, for example, WCDMA (Broadband Code Division Multiple Access), HSPA (High Speed Packet Access), and wireless technologies. Long Term Evolution (LTE). Powered by the introduction of new devices
2/39 designed for data applications, and end-user performance requirements continue to increase. The increased adoption of mobile broadband has resulted in significant growth in traffic operated over high-speed wireless data networks. Therefore, techniques that allow cellular operators to manage networks more efficiently are desired. [004] Techniques to improve lower link performance may include Multi-Input - Multiple Output (MIMO) multi-antenna transmission techniques, multi-stream communication, multi-carrier deployment, etc. Since spectral efficiencies per link may be reaching theoretical limits, the next steps may include improving spectral efficiencies per unit area. Furthermore efficiencies for wireless networks can be achieved, for example, by changing a topology of traditional networks to provide increased uniformity of user experiences across a cell. One approach is to implement so-called heterogeneous networks.
[005] A homogeneous network is a network of base stations (also called NodeBs, enhanced NodeBs, or eNBs) in a planned layout, providing communications services for a collection of user terminals (also called user equipment nodes, UEs , and / or wireless terminals), where all base stations typically have similar transmit power levels, antenna patterns, receiver noise backgrounds, and / or return connectivity to the data network. In addition, all base stations on a homogeneous network can generally offer unrestricted access to user terminals on the network, and each base station can serve approximately the same number of user terminals. Current cellular wireless communication systems in this category may include, for example, GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication), WCDMA, HSDPA (High Speed Bottom Packet Access), LTE (Long Term Evolution), WiMAX (Interoperability)
3/39
World for Microwave Access), etc.
[006] In a heterogeneous network, low power base stations (also called low power nodes (LPNs), micro-nodes, pico-nodes, femto-nodes, relay nodes, remote radio unit nodes, RRU, small cells, RRUs, etc.) can be deployed together with or as an overlay to planned and / or regularly placed macro-base stations. A base station (MBS) can thus provide service over a relatively large macro cell area, and each LPN can provide service for a respective relatively small LPN cell area within the relatively large macro cell area.
[007] Power transmitted by an LPN can be relatively small, for example, 2 Watts, compared to the power transmitted by a macro base station, which can be 40 Watts for a typical macro base station. An LPN can be deployed, for example, to reduce / eliminate a coverage hole in the coverage provided by macro base stations, and / or to offload traffic from macro base stations, as well as to increase capacity at a high traffic or called hot spot. Due to its lower transmission power and smaller physical size, an LPN can offer greater flexibility for site acquisition.
[008] Thus, a heterogeneous network characterizes a multi-layered deployment of high power nodes (HPNs), such as macro-base stations, and low power nodes (LPNs), such as called peak-base stations or peak-knots. LPNs and HPNs in a given region of a heterogeneous network can operate at the same frequency, in which case the deployment can be called a heterogeneous co-channel deployment, or at different frequencies, in which case the deployment can be called a heterogeneous deployment inter-frequency or multi-carrier or multi-frequency.
[009] The Third Generation Society Project (3GPP) is
4/39 continuing to develop specifications for advanced and improved features in the context of the fourth generation wireless telecommunications system known as LTE (Long Term Evolution). In Release 12 of the LTE specifications and beyond, additional enhancements related to low power nodes and heterogeneous deployments will be considered under the protection of small cell enhancement activities. Some of these activities will focus on achieving an even higher degree of network interconnectivity between the macro and low power layers, including through the use of a set of techniques and technology called dual layer connectivity or simply dual connectivity.
[0010] As shown in figure 1, dual connectivity implies that the device has simultaneous connections to both macro and low power layers. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a heterogeneous network in which a mobile terminal 101 uses multiple flows, for example, an anchor flow from the base station (or anchor eNB) 401A and an auxiliary flow from a peak station. base (or an auxiliary eNB) 40IB. Note that the terminology can vary - the anchor base station and auxiliary base station in a configuration like the one shown in Figure 1 can sometimes be called master and slave base stations or according to other names. It should also be noted that while the terms anchor / auxiliary and master / slave suggest a hierarchical relationship between the base stations involved in a dual connectivity scenario, many of the principles and techniques associated with dual connectivity can be applied to deployment scenarios where they are not. there is no such hierarchical relationship, for example, between similar base stations. Therefore, while the terms anchor base station and auxiliary base station are used here, it should be understood that the techniques and apparatus described here are not limited to modalities that use terminology, nor are they necessarily limited to modalities having a hierarchical relationship suggested by
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Figure 1.
[0011] Dual connectivity can imply, in several modalities and / or scenarios:
[0012] Control and separation of data where, for example, the control signal for mobility is provided by the macro layer while high speed data connectivity is provided by the low power layer.
[0013] A separation between bottom link and top link, where bottom link and top link connectivity is provided by different layers.
[0014] Diversity for control signaling, where Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling can be provided by multiple connections, in addition to increasing mobility performance.
[0015] Macro help including dual connectivity can provide several benefits:
[0016] Increased support for mobility - maintaining the mobility anchor point in the macro-layer, as described above, it is possible to maintain seamless mobility between macro and low power layers, as well as between low power nodes.
[0017] Low cost transmissions from the low power layer - transmitting only information required for individual user experience, it is possible to avoid cost coming from supporting mobility inactive within the local area layer, for example.
[0018] Efficient energy load balancing - by disabling low power nodes when there is no data transmission in progress, it is possible to reduce the energy consumption of the low power layer.
[0019] Connection optimization - selecting the termination point for upper connection and lower connection separately, the node selection can
6/39 be optimized for each connection.
[0020] One of the problems in using dual connectivity is how to map radio data carriers (DRBs) over the anchor flow and auxiliary flow, respectively. One option for dividing the DRBs between two base stations, as shown in Figure 1, is to maintain the control plan (RRC) in the anchor eNB and distribute the PDCP entities so that some of them are in the anchor eNB and some of them in the auxiliary eNB. As discussed in further detail below, this approach can yield some important system efficiency benefits. However, this approach creates problems related to the operation of security keys that are used for confidentiality and integrity protection of data transmitted to and from the mobile terminal.
SUMMARY [0021] In LTE systems, the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer configures Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) entities with encrypted keys and configuration data, such as data indicating which security algorithms should be used. applied with respect to the corresponding radio bearer. In a dual connectivity scenario, the RRC layer can be operated exclusively by the anchor node, while the PDCP entities can be managed on each of the anchor and auxiliary base station nodes. Since the anchor base station and auxiliary base station can be implemented on physically separate nodes, the assumption that RRC can configure PDCP entities via internal application program interfaces (APIs) is no longer supported.
[0022] The example modalities described here are aimed at the secure generation of a set of encryption keys to be used for communication between a wireless terminal in dual connectivity and an auxiliary eNB. In some embodiments, a basic key for the auxiliary eNB is generated from the anchor eNB security key. The basic key can then
7/39 be used to generate keys for secure communication between the wireless terminal and the auxiliary eNB.
[0023] Modalities of the techniques described include, for example, a method, suitable for implementation on a network node, for generating security key for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an anchor base station and between the terminal without wire and an auxiliary base station, where the wireless terminal is or is about to be dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. The example method includes generating an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on an anchor base station key. The generated auxiliary security key is then sent to the auxiliary base station, for use by the auxiliary base station to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal. wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. The anchor base station key, or a key derived from the anchor base station key, is used to encode data sent to the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the base station anchor and auxiliary base station.
[0024] Also described here is another method for generating an auxiliary security key for an auxiliary base station. Like the method summarized above, this method is also suitable for implementation on a network node, for generating security key for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an anchor base station and between the wireless terminal and a wireless station. auxiliary base, where the wireless terminal is or is about to be connected to the anchor base station and auxiliary base station. In this method, however, the method can be carried
8/39 on a network node other than the anchor base station, using a primary key that may be unknown to the anchor base station.
[0025] According to this second example method, a primary security key is shared between the network node and the wireless terminal. This key may be unknown to the anchor base station, in some ways. The method continues with generating an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on the primary security key. The generated auxiliary security key is then sent to the auxiliary base station, for use by the auxiliary base station to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal. wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. In some embodiments, the generated auxiliary security key is sent directly to the auxiliary base station such that the anchor base station is not aware of the key, while in other modalities, the generated auxiliary security key is sent to the auxiliary base station. indirectly, through the anchor base station.
[0026] Other modalities of the technology described here include network node apparatus and mobile terminal apparatus, each configured to perform one of the example methods summarized above or variants thereof. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS [0027] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of an implementation of heterogeneous dual connectivity with simultaneous anchor and auxiliary flows for a mobile terminal.
[0028] Figure 2 illustrates components of the EUTRAN system architecture.
[0029] Figure 3 illustrates details of the base station protocol architecture in a dual connectivity scenario.
9/39 [0030] Figure 4 illustrates a key derivation hierarchy based on an anchor base station key.
[0031] Figure 5 illustrates a key derivation hierarchy based on an MME key.
[0032] Figure 6 is a process flow chart illustrating an example method as implemented by an example network node.
[0033] Figure 7 is a process flow chart illustrating an example method as implemented by a wireless terminal.
[0034] Figure 8 and figure 9 each illustrate a process flow chart corresponding to the example modalities of the techniques described now.
[0035] Figure 10 is a block diagram illustrating an example anchor base station apparatus, according to the techniques described now.
[0036] Figure 11 is a block diagram illustrating another example network node apparatus, according to the techniques described now.
[0037] Figure 12 illustrates components of an example wireless terminal configured according to some of the modalities described now.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION [0038] Inventive concepts will now be described more fully below with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which examples of inventive concept modalities are shown. These inventive concepts can, for example, be realized in many different ways and should not be interpreted as limited to the modalities published here. Instead, these modalities are provided in such a way that this exhibition will be meticulous and complete, and will completely extend the range of inventive concepts present to those qualified in the technique. It should also be noted that these modalities
10/39 are not mutually exclusive. Components of one modality may be assumed to be tacitly present or used in another modality. [0039] For purposes of illustration and explanation only, these and other types of inventive concepts present are described here in the context of operating on a Radio Access Network (RAN) that communicates through radio communication channels with mobile terminals ( also called wireless terminals or UEs). As used here, a mobile terminal, wireless terminal, or UE may include any device that receives data from a communication network, and may include, but is not limited to, a mobile phone (cell phone), laptop / laptop, pocket computer, hand held computer, desktop computer, a machine to machine type (M2M) or MTC device, a sensor with a wireless communication interface, etc.
[0040] The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is a third generation mobile communication system, which evolved from the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), and is intended to provide improved mobile communication services based on Multiple Access technology by Broadband Code Division, (WCDMA). UTRAN, short for UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network, is a collective term for B-Nodes and Radio Network Controllers that make up the UMTS radio access network. Thus, UTRAN is essentially a radio access network using broadband code division multiple access (WCDMA) for UEs.
[0041] The Third Generation Society Project (3GPP) undertook to further evolve the radio access network technologies based on UTRAN and GSM. In this regard, specifications for the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) are in progress within 3GPP. The Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) includes Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Evolution of
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System Architecture (SAE).
[0042] Note that although LTE terminology is generally used in this exhibition to exemplify modalities of inventive concepts, this should not be seen as limiting the scope of inventive concepts to only these systems. Other wireless systems, including variations and successors of 3GPP LTE and WCDMA systems, WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), UMB (Ultra Mobile Broadband), HSDPA (High Speed Bottom Packet Access), GSM ( Global System for Mobile Communications), etc., can also benefit from exploring modalities of present inventive concepts described here.
[0043] Also note that terminology such as base station (also called NodeB, eNodeB, or Evolved Node B) and wireless terminal or mobile terminal (also called User Equipment or UE node) should be considered non-limiting and not it implies a certain hierarchical relationship between the two. In general, a base station (for example, a NodeB or eNodeB) and a wireless terminal (for example, a UE) can be considered as examples of respective different communication devices that communicate with each other via a radio channel wireless.
[0044] While modalities discussed here may focus on example modalities in which described solutions are applied in heterogeneous networks that include a mixture of relatively high power base stations (for example, macro base stations, which can also be called broadband base stations or wide area network nodes) and relatively lower power nodes (for example, peak base stations, which can also be called local area base stations or local area network nodes), described techniques can be applied in any satisfactory type of network, including homogeneous and heterogeneous configurations. Thus, the base stations involved in the described configurations may be similar or identical to each other, or may differ in
12/39 terms of transmission power, number of transmitter antennas, processing power, receiver and transmitter characteristics, and / or any other functional or physical capacity.
[0045] The Enhanced UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (EUTRAN) includes base stations called enhanced NodeBs (eNBs or eNodeBs), providing the E-UTRAN user plan and control plan protocol terminations for the UE. The eNBs are interconnected with each other using the X2 interface. ENBs are also connected using the Sl interface to the EPC (Evolved Packet Core), more specifically to the MME (Mobility Management Entity) through the S1 MME interface and to the Service Portal (S-GW) through the Sl interface -U. The Sl interface supports many-to-many relationships between MMEs / S-GWs and eNBs. A simplified view of the E-UTRAN architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.
[0046] eNB 210 hosts features such as Radio Resource Management (RRM), radio bearer control, admission control, header compression of user plan data for service portal, and / or data routing of user plan for the service portal. MME 220 is the control node that processes signaling between the UE and the CN (core network). Significant functions of the MME 220 are related to connection management and bearer management, which are operated by Stratum Without Access (NAS) protocols. The S-GW 230 is the anchor point for UE mobility, and also includes other features such as temporary storage of DL (bottom link) data while the UE is being located, routing and packet shipping to the right eNB, and / or collection of information for collection and legal interception. The PDN Portal (P-GW, not shown in Figure 2) is the node responsible for allocating the EU IP address, as well as executing Quality of Service (QoS) (as further discussed below). The reader is referred to 3GPP TS 36.300 and references therein for details
Additional 13/39 of functionality of the different nodes.
[0047] When describing various modalities of the techniques now described, the term non-limiting radio network node can be used to refer to any type of network node serving UE and / or connected to another network node or network element or any radio node where the UE receives a signal. Examples of radio network nodes are Nodes B, base stations (BS), multi-standard radio radio nodes (MSR) such as MSR BSs, eNodeBs, network controllers, radio network controllers (RNCs) , base station controllers, relays, donor node controller relays, base transceiver stations (BTS), access points (AP), wireless routers, transmission points, transmission nodes, remote radio units (RRUs) ), remote radio heads (RRHs), nodes in a distributed antenna system (DAS), etc.
[0048] In some cases, a more general term network node is used; this term can correspond to any type of radio network node or any network node that communicates with at least one radio network node. Examples of network nodes are any radio network nodes stated above, core network nodes (for example, MSC, MME, etc.), O&M, OSS, SON, positioning nodes (for example, E-SMLC), MDT, etc.
[0049] When describing some modalities, the term user equipment (UE) is used, and refers to any type of wireless device communicating with a radio network node in a cellular or mobile communication system. Examples of UEs are targeted devices, device-to-device UEs, machine-type UEs or UEs capable of machine-to-machine communication, PDAs, wireless-enabled desktop computers, mobile terminals, smart phones, equipped embedded laptop (LEE ), laptop-mounted equipment (LME), USB dongles, customer facility equipment (CPE), etc. The term mobile terminal as used here should be understood as
14/39 being generally interchangeable with the term EU as used here and in the various specifications promulgated by 3GPP, but it should not be understood as being limited to devices complying with 3GPP standards.
[0050] The example modalities presented here are specifically directed to key generation when the LTE Uu protocol stack is divided between a macro cell and an auxiliary eNB cell. The techniques and device are generally more applicable to key generation in other dual connectivity scenarios.
[0051] As noted above, an option to divide radio data carriers (DRBs) between two base stations in a dual connectivity scenario is to maintain the control plan, which is administered by the Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol ), in the anchor eNB, while distributing the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) entities, which are associated with individual radio bearers, so that one or more are terminated in the anchor eNB and one or more in the eNB help.
[0052] The RRC layer configures all PDCP entities with which it is associated. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows an example of a protocol architecture for multiple connectivity.
[0053] More particularly, RRC configures PDCP entities with encrypted keys and configuration data, such as data indicating which security algorithms should be applied with respect to the corresponding radio bearer. For connections associated with a given mobile terminal, RRC configures all PDCP entities for user plane traffic (DRB) with one and the same encryption key, KUP-enc, and all PDCP entities for control plane traffic (SRB) with one and the same encryption key, KRRC-enc, and one and the same integrity protection key, KRRC-int. For DRBs used to protect data between a donor eNB and a relay node, RRC also configures the
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DRBs with an integrity protection key, KUP-int.
[0054] Since anchor eNB and auxiliary eNB can be implemented on separate physical nodes, the assumption that RRC can configure PDCP entities through internal application program interfaces (APIs) is no longer supported. That is, the current situation where security configuration data can be assumed to be kept securely within the physically secure environment of eNB is no longer sustainable. Instead, the RRC entity in the anchor eNB has to configure the PDCP entities in the auxiliary eNB, which is outside the secure environment of the anchor eNB.
[0055] Anchor eNB and auxiliary eNB are used here to define different roles of eNBs from a UE or wireless terminal perspective. It is recognized that this is just an example appointment and they could also be called anything else, such as anchor and reinforcer, master and slave, or simply eNB l and eNB_2.
[0056] The LTE security design generally provides compartmentalization of security functions. This compartmentalization is intended to ensure that if an attacker breaches the security of a role, only that role is compromised. For example, there is a key used to encrypt the RRC protocol and another key used to protect the integrity of the RRC protocol. If an attacker breaks the encryption key, he can decrypt and read all RRC messages. However, since the integrity key is different from the encryption key, the attacker cannot modify or inject RRC messages.
[0057] Another aspect of the compartmentalization approach used in LTE is that each eNB uses a separate set of keys. The reason for this is that this approach ensures that an attacker breaking into an eNB does not gain any information about data transmitted between a wireless terminal and another physically different eNB. In a dual connectivity scenario, then,
16/39 maintaining ownership by invading a physical RAN node, that is, an eNB, does not help to attack another RAN node, the auxiliary eNB should use its own set of keys, separate from the set of keys used in the anchor eNB.
[0058] A dual connectivity architecture can open up three new paths for potential security attacks, depending on the techniques adopted to operate the security switches and parameters. First, transporting the security configuration and encrypted keys from the anchor eNB to the auxiliary eNB provides a point at which an attacker can spy or modify the configuration keys and data. Second, an attacker can physically break into an auxiliary eNB, and spy on or modify the keys and configuration data there. In addition, an attacker who physically invades an auxiliary eNB can read, modify or inject user plan data into any wireless terminal connected to the auxiliary eNB. Third, the attacker can access and modify user plan data when the auxiliary eNB sends and receives it. This is indifferent whether the user plan data flows between the auxiliary eNB and the anchor eNB, between the auxiliary eNB and the S-GW, or if data is leaked to the Internet locally in the auxiliary eNB.
[0059] The example modalities described here are aimed at the secure generation of a set of encryption keys to be used for communication between a wireless terminal in dual connectivity and an auxiliary eNB. In some embodiments, a basic key for the auxiliary eNB is generated from the anchor eNB security key. The basic key can then be used to generate keys for secure communication between the wireless terminal and the auxiliary eNB.
Establishing a key for auxiliary eNB [0060] In LTE, the set of keys in an eNB includes K _ê nb, and Kup-enc, KRRc-enc 6 Urrc-magnet · Depending on which functions the auxiliary eNB provides, the set of keys needed by the auxiliary eNB will differ. Since the
17/39 auxiliary eNB finish at least the user plan coding, it is useful to establish an encryption key that the auxiliary eNB shares with the wireless terminal. If the auxiliary eNB will provide services for relay nodes, there is also a need for an integrity key to protect the DRBs that carry traffic from the relay node control plan. It is therefore useful to establish a basic key for the auxiliary eNB, similar to K _ê nb, from which other keys can be derived. From now on the discussion will be about establishing a basic key, called K _aux iii _{ar ê} nb, but the same reasoning can obviously be applied to the case where, just for example, an encryption key is established.
[0061] Figure 4 shows how K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb can be generated based on the K _and NB of the anchor eNB. The figure shows a possible key hierarchy for the auxiliary eNB. In this example, the auxiliary eNB and the wireless terminal share the keys Knuxíii ^ eNB, Kauxíiíar eNB-enc and K _ail xj] j _ar _ _c [ B-jnt, all of which are derived directly or indirectly from K _ê nb for the anchor eNB.
[0062] The arrows in Figure 4 indicate applications of Key Derivation Functions (KDF). A KDF can, for all practical purposes, be considered a unidirectional function. As is well known to those familiar with coded techniques, unidirectional functions are easy to compute in the forward direction (the direction of the arrow), but computationally impossible to reverse. The implication of this is that access to a lower key in the key hierarchy does not provide useful information about a higher key in the hierarchy. An example of a KDF is the function of HMAC-SHA256, which is the KDF used in LTE and many other 3GPP systems.
[0063] A concrete example is in Figure 4. If the key K _ailX jij _ar _ _ê nb is generated in the anchor eNB and sent to the auxiliary eNB, then the auxiliary eNB has access to the K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb and the keys coding and integrity that she
18/39 drift. However, you will not have access to K _and NB [0064] Because it is assumed that KDFs are known, the anchor eNB node, on the other hand, will have access to all keys used by the auxiliary eNB. This breaks the principle of compartmentalization if interpreted in its strictest sense. However, the security level in this scenario is similar to that obtained with an X2 ticket transfer, which is an LTE ticket transfer, which is operated without the involvement of the Mobility Administration Entity (MME). At an X2 pass-through, the source eNB calculates a new key based on the K _ê nb currently used and provides the new key to the targeted eNB. Another example of a similar situation appears in the context of relay nodes. In the case of relay nodes, the Donor eNB acts as an S1 proxy for the relay node. As a result, the Donor eNB has access to all keys used by the relay node. Because the security situation is similar for many networks that already appear in LTE, using K _ê nb as the basic key material for K _aux jiiar_eNB can be considered acceptable from a security point of view.
[0065] The key hierarchy shown in Figure 4 can be used advantageously in a dual connectivity scenario in which the anchor eNB controls the PDCP entities in the auxiliary eNB, that is, the anchor eNB can establish new PDCP entities, delete them and restart PDCP entities previously deleted. The anchor eNB and the mobile terminal (for example, UE from LTE) will each derive K _ailX jij _ar _ _eNB from K _ê nb like this: K _aU xiiiar_eNB = KDF (KeNB, others_params).
[0066] To avoid the possibility of well-known attacks that exploit the repeated transmission of encrypted data that carries known underlying data, it should be ensured that K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb is updated each time a PDCP entity reuses the same values of COUNT. Thus, the derivation of K _aux jiiar _ê nb should preferably include
19/39 appropriate update parameters. One way to achieve update is to use the PDCP COUNT sequence numbers that are associated with some predetermined RRC message, such as the most recent RRC Security Mode Command or Pass-through Transfer Command, or one of the Reset Request messages RRC or Complete that were used to establish PDCP entities in the auxiliary eNB. Sequence numbers associated with other RRC messages can be used instead, of course. Other options for incorporating update into the K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb generation include sending a new nonce from the wireless terminal to the anchor eNB or auxiliary eNB, from the anchor eNB or auxiliary eNB to the wireless terminal (or both directions) in some predetermined RRC messages or other protocol messages. A “nonce” is a generated (pseudo) number-randomly that, with a sufficiently high probability, will be unique with respect to K _and NB [0067] Whatever the update parameters, they are then included in the derivation of K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb or in the derivation of keys derived from K _aux üiar_ _c nb- It is also possible to reuse existing information elements in RRC messages or information that is transmitted from the anchor eNB or auxiliary eNB in system information blocks. Any information can be used as long as it provides a single entry (statistically) with a sufficiently high probability.
[0068] Another possible project is that the anchor eNB derives the K _aux iiiar_eNB from K _ê nb without any update parameter. In accordance with this alternative approach, if the auxiliary eNB or anchor eNB detects that a PDCP COUNT of in the auxiliary eNB is about to wind, the anchor eNB initiates a key update of K _ê nb by an intracellular pass-through transfer. One result of the intracellular pass-through transfer is that the wireless terminal and anchor eNB not only renew K _c nb, but also K _aux iiiar_eNBa _ _and NB could be recalculated in the same way as it was
Derived 20/39 the first time. This approach may require the auxiliary eNB to have to inform the anchor eNB about PDCP COUNTs that are about to be reused.
[0069] Transporting the K _aux iii _{ar ê} nb from the anchor eNB to the auxiliary eNB can be done through the control channel between the two. The control channel must be protected in confidence and integrity as already stated.
[0070] Parameters different from those mentioned explicitly can also be entered to KDF, in various modalities of the techniques described above. The parameters can be set in any of several different orders. In addition, any one or more of the parameters for KDF can be transformed before being entered into KDF. For example, a set of parameters Pl, P2, ..., Pn, for some non-negative integer n, could be transformed first by being run by a transformation function f and the result of this, that is, f (Pl, P2, .. ., Pn), being submitted to KDF.
[0071] In an example of the key derivation, the PI parameter is transformed first before being entered into the KDF to calculate a key called the exit key: exit_key = KDF (f (Pl), P2), where f is some function arbitrary or chain of functions and Pl and P2 are input parameters. Parameter P2, for example, could be 0, 1 or more other parameters, for example, used to join the key to a certain context. Parameters can be entered as separate parameters or they can be concatenated together and then entered in a single entry to KDF. Even when KDF variants such as these are used, the core of the idea remains the same.
[0072] Regardless of which key setting approach is used, existing pass-through transfer procedures are generally unaffected when transferring the mobile terminal with dual connectivity to another base station, regardless of the type of the targeted base station. The eNB of
21/39 anchor can destroy the DRBs in the auxiliary eNB and can carry out the transfer to the target base station according to existing specifications.
[0073] When transferring a wireless terminal to a targeted eNB and a targeted auxiliary eNB, the derivation of the keys K _ê nb and K _aux jiiar _ê nb can be performed individually.
Kasme-based key derivation.
[0074] Instead of using the base key of the anchor node as the base to generate K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb, a key associated with another node in the wireless network and known to the mobile terminal can be used instead. For example, using Kasme as the key material base for K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb, as shown in Figure 5, allows for a higher level of security, compared to the use of K _ê nb described above. As seen in Figure 5, K can be derived from Kasme, and the encryption and integrity keys for the auxiliary eNB derived from the resulting K _aux iii _ar eNB.
[0075] Kasme is the key established through LTE subscriber authentication, and is shared between the MME and the wireless terminal. If the K _aux iiiar_eNB is derived from Kasme and the MME provides for the eNB to assist this K _aux iiiar_eNB directly, then the anchor node does not have access to the K _ailX jij _ar _ _eNB or the encryption and integrity keys derived from it. In this case, then, the compartmentalization principle discussed above is adhered to in a more rigid sense.
[0076] Basing the K _aux üi _ar _ _eNB derivation on Kasme requires that the MME be made aware of when the auxiliary eNB needs to access the keys, and furthermore requires that there be a communication path between the two. Whether the MME is aware of when the wireless terminal is connected to the auxiliary eNB (and therefore keys are needed) and whether there is a signal path between the MME and the auxiliary eNB depends on how the auxiliary eNB is controlled. If these conditions are not met, using the
22/39
Kasme as a key base material is less useful, although still possible, because MME would have to send K _aux jiiar _ê nb to the anchor node, which in turn provides it to the auxiliary eNB. In this scenario, certainly, the anchor node has access Ú K _aux i 1 iai_ _and NB · [0077] Using Kasme as the key base material means that K _aux iiiar_eNB is derived from Kasme using a K _aux key derivation function iiiar_eNB = KDF (Kasme, [others_params]), where the optional others_params can include one or more update parameters.
[0078] As previously described, when PDCP packet counters (PDCP COUNT) are reset, the encryption and integrity keys should be renewed. If the same key is used with the same PDCP COUNTs, there will be reuse of key flow, and potentially, possible repeat attacks. Therefore, MME and wireless terminal could include an update parameter in the key derivation. For example, the same update parameter as that used when K _ê nb is derived for the anchor node (eNB). Which update parameter is used for the derivation of K _ê nb may depend on the situation. Possible update parameters include “nonces” (random numbers used once) that the MME and wireless terminal exchange. Other possibilities are packet counters such as the NAS top link or COUNT bottom link, or a newly introduced counter that is transmitted either from the wireless terminal to the MME or from the MME to the wireless terminal. A disadvantage with a newly introduced counter is that if it goes out of sync, it has to be resynchronized by some new resynchronization mechanism.
[0079] Other parameters can be included in the derivation of K _aU xiiiar_eNB also. For example, the identity of the auxiliary eNB or the cell that the auxiliary eNB uses can be used as an input. This is similar to how K ₆ nb is linked to cell identity. The purpose could also be to compartmentalize potential security holes.
23/39 [0080] Since MME has derived K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb, MME also has to transfer it to the auxiliary eNB. Transferring K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb to the auxiliary eNB can proceed in one of two ways, either directly to the auxiliary eNB, or indirectly, first transferring the K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb to the eNB and leaving the eNB then transferring it to the eNB assist when needed.
[0081] It is generally a security advantage to transfer K _aux iiiar_eNB directly from MME to the auxiliary eNB. In this way, only the MME, the auxiliary eNB and the wireless terminal know the key. If the signaling to establish the connection between the auxiliary eNB and the wireless terminal is such that the MME is involved, then this is preferable.
[0082] The other alternative is for MME to send K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb to eNB, which simply refers K _aux üi _{ar ê} nb to the auxiliary eNB. This approach has a security disadvantage since eNB is now also aware of K _aux iiiar_eNB · The approach can be useful, however, if there is no direct signaling path between MME and auxiliary eNB and Kasme is the key material used as a basis for the derivation of K _aux üi _ar _ _eNB .
Example methods [0083] Due to the detailed examples described above, it will be appreciated that figures 6 and 7 are flowcharts describing example operations that can be carried out by a network node and wireless terminal, respectively, where the network can be a station anchor base or an MME, in various modalities. The illustrated process flowcharts include some operations that are illustrated with a solid border and some operations that are illustrated with a dashed border. Operations that are included in a solid border are operations that are included in the broadest example modalities. The operations that are included in a dashed border are example modalities that can be included, or a part of, or are additional operations that can be carried beyond the operations of the example modalities. So, these
24/39 operations shown in optional dashed sketches can be considered in the sense that they may not appear in every example in every modality of the illustrated process. It should also be appreciated that the operations in figures 6 and 7 are provided as an example only.
[0084] More particularly, figure 6 illustrates a process for generating an auxiliary security key for use by an auxiliary base station in a dual connectivity scenario. The process shown in figure 6 can be implemented on a network node, such as an anchor base station (e.g., a LTE anchor eNB) or some other network node, such as an MME. As shown in block 10, the network node first determines a need for an auxiliary security key to be generated. This can be activated by establishing a dual connectivity scenario, for example. In response to this determination, the network node generates an auxiliary security key, based at least in part on a primary security key. This is shown in block 12. As explained in detail above, this primary security key can be, in several ways, a basic anchor node key (for example, K _c nb) or another key that is known to the network node and the mobile terminal of interest, such as an MME key (for example, Kasme) · [0085] The generation of the auxiliary security key can incorporate the use of a KDF, for example, a unidirectional encryption function, as well as a or more update parameters, as shown in blocks 12 and 16. A list of update parameters that have already been used can be maintained in some modalities, as shown in block
17.
[0086] As shown in block 18, the generated auxiliary security key is then sent to the auxiliary base station. In some cases, as detailed above, the auxiliary security key is then used to generate one or more additional keys to protect data transferred to and from the terminal.
25/39 mobile, although the auxiliary security key could be used directly for such purposes in some modalities.
[0087] Figure 7 illustrates a corresponding method as it could be performed on a mobile terminal. As shown in block 30, the mobile terminal generates the auxiliary security key, based at least in part on the same primary security key used by the network node in Figure 6. Once again, this primary security key can be, in several modalities, a basic anchor node key (for example, K _c nb) or another key that is known to the network node and the mobile terminal of interest, such as an MME key (for example, Kasme) · The generation of auxiliary security key can incorporate the use of a KDF, for example, a unidirectional encryption function, as well as one or more update parameters, as shown in blocks 32 and 34. A list of update parameters that have already been used can be maintained in some modalities, as shown in block 17.
[0088] As shown in block 36, the generated auxiliary security key is then applied to the protection of data sent to and from the auxiliary base station. In some cases, as detailed above, the auxiliary security key is used to generate one or more additional keys to protect data transferred to and from the mobile terminal, although the auxiliary security key could be used directly for such purposes in some modalities.
[0089] As discussed above, the auxiliary security key can be generated from an anchor node key or from a security key corresponding to another node, such as an MME, in various modalities. Figures 8 and 9 are process flow charts corresponding to these two scenarios, respectively. These methods can be performed on an LTE network, for example, but they can also be applied to other wireless networks that employ dual connectivity.
[0090] Figure 8 thus illustrates a method, satisfactory for
26/39 implementation on a network node, to generate security key for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an anchor base station and between the wireless terminal and an auxiliary base station, where the wireless terminal is or is about to be dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. As shown in block 810, the illustrated method includes generating an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on an anchor base station key. As shown in block 820, the generated auxiliary security key is then sent to the auxiliary base station, for use by the auxiliary base station to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys for encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. As shown in block 830, the anchor base station key, or a key derived from the anchor base station key, is used to encode data sent to the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station.
[0091] In some embodiments of the method illustrated in Figure 8, the generated auxiliary security key includes a basic auxiliary security key for use in generating one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the station auxiliary base. In some of these embodiments, the anchor base station and the mobile terminal can each derive an encryption key, or an integrity key, or both, from the anchor base station key, and use the derived key or keys to protect data sent or received from the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and auxiliary base station.
27/39 [0092] In some of the modalities shown in Figure 8, generating the auxiliary safety switch includes deriving the auxiliary safety switch from the anchor base station key using a unidirectional function. The unidirectional function can be an HMAC-SHA-256 coding function, in some modalities. In some of these and in some other modalities, the generation of the auxiliary security key is also based on an update parameter.
[0093] In some embodiments, the illustrated method may include detecting in addition that a COUNT parameter of Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) on the auxiliary base station is about to roll, and, in response, initiate a key update anchor base station and recalculate the auxiliary security key.
[0094] In some modalities, a single auxiliary security key is used to generate a set of keys for use on all Data Radio Carriers. In other embodiments, multiple auxiliary security switches can be used, in which case the generation operation described above is repeated for each of a plurality of Data Radio Carriers established between the wireless terminal and the auxiliary base station, such as that the resulting auxiliary security keys differ for each Data Radio Carrier. Multiples of the various resulting keys can be sent at the same time, in some modes.
[0095] Figure 9 is a process flow chart illustrating another method for generating an auxiliary safety switch for an auxiliary base station. Like the method shown in figure 8, the process in figure 9 is satisfactory for implementation on a network node, for generating security key for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an anchor base station and between the wireless terminal and an auxiliary base station, where the wireless terminal is or is about to be dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. In this
28/39 method, however, the method can be executed on a network node other than the anchor base station, using a primary key that may be unknown to the anchor base station.
[0096] As shown in block 910, the illustrated method includes sharing a primary security key with the wireless terminal. This key may be unknown to the anchor base station, in some ways. An example is the Kasme key discussed above, which is shared between the LTE MME and the mobile terminal.
[0097] As shown in block 920, the method continues with generating an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on the primary security key. The generated auxiliary security key is then sent to the auxiliary base station, as shown in block 930, for use by the auxiliary base station to encrypt data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encrypt data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. In some embodiments, the generated auxiliary security key is sent directly to the auxiliary base station such that the anchor base station is not aware of the key, while in other modalities the generated auxiliary security key is sent to the auxiliary base station indirectly. , by the anchor base station.
[0098] In some embodiments, the generated auxiliary security key includes a basic auxiliary security key for use in generating one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encrypt data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station. In some of these and some other embodiments, generating the auxiliary safety switch includes deriving the auxiliary safety switch from the anchor base station key using a unidirectional function. The unidirectional function can be
29/39 an HMAC-SHA-256 encoding function, for example. As discussed in detail above, generating the auxiliary security key can also be based on an update parameter, in some ways. Example Hardware Implementations [0099] Several of the techniques and methods described above can be implemented using electronic data processing circuit and radio circuit or other interface circuit provided on a network node, such as an anchor base station or in an MME, while others can be implemented using radio circuit and electronic data processing circuit provided in a wireless terminal.
[00100] Figure 10 illustrates an example node configuration of a 401 A anchor base station, which can perform some of the example modalities described here. The anchor base station 401A can include radio circuitry or a communication port 410A that can be configured to receive and / or transmit communication measurements, data, instructions and / or messages. The anchor base station 401A may furthermore include a 440A network interface circuit, which may be configured to receive or send network communications, for example, to and from other network nodes. It should be appreciated that the radio circuit or communication port 410A can be included as any number of transceiver, receiver, and / or transmitter units or circuit. It should also be appreciated that the 410A radio or communication circuit may be in the form of any input or output communication port known in the art. The 410A radio or communication circuit and / or 440A network interface may include RF circuit and baseband processing circuit, details of which are well known to those familiar with base station design.
[00101] The 401A anchor base station can also include a processing unit or 420A circuit that can be configured to perform operations related to the generation of auxiliary safety switches
30/39 (for example, security keys for an auxiliary eNB), as described here. The 420A processing circuit can be any satisfactory type of computing unit, for example a microprocessor, digital signal processor (DSP), field programmable port arrangement (FPGA), or application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or any another form of circuit. The anchor base station 401A may furthermore include a memory unit or circuit 430A which may be any satisfactory type of computer readable memory and may be of a volatile and / or non-volatile type. The 430A memory can be configured to store information received, transmitted, and / or any information related to the generation of security keys or update parameters, device parameters, communication priorities, and / or executable program instructions.
[00102] Typical functions of the 420A processing circuit, for example, when configured with appropriate program code stored in memory 430A, include modulation and encoding of transmitted signals and demodulation and decoding of received signals. In various embodiments of the present invention, processing circuit 420A is adapted, using satisfactory program code stored in program storage memory 430A, for example, to perform one of the techniques described above to operate security switches in a dual connectivity scenario . Certainly, it will be appreciated that not all steps in these techniques are necessarily performed on a single microprocessor or even on a single module.
[00103] It will be appreciated that the 420A processing circuit, when adapted with program code stored in program memory and 430A data, can implement the process flow of Figure 8 (or a variant thereof) using an array of functional modules, where modules are computer programs or portions of computer programs running on the 420A processor circuit. Thus, the 401A device can
31/39 be understood to include a 440A communications interface configured to communicate with the auxiliary base station, and furthermore including several functional modules implemented in 420A processing circuit. These functional modules include: a generator module for generating an auxiliary safety switch for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on an anchor base station key; a sending module to send the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station, for use by the auxiliary base station to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more security keys additional auxiliary security to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station; and an encryption module to use the anchor base station key, or a key derived from the anchor base station key, to encode data sent to the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the wireless terminal is connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station.
[00104] Figure 11 illustrates an example node configuration of a 505A mobility management node (for example, an MME, SGSN, S4-SGSN) that can perform some of the example modalities described here. The mobility management node 505A may include an interface circuit or a communication port 510A that can be configured to receive and / or transmit communication measurements, data, instructions and / or messages. It should be appreciated that the radio circuit or communication port 510A can be included as any number of units or transceiving, receiving and / or transmitting circuit. It should also be appreciated that the 510A radio or communication circuit can be in the form of any input or output communication port known in the art. The 510A interface or communication circuit may include RF circuitry and
32/39 baseband processing circuit (not shown).
[00105] The mobility management node 505A can also include a processing unit or 520A circuit that can be configured to perform operations related to the generation of auxiliary security keys (for example, security keys for an auxiliary eNB), as described on here. The 520A processing circuit can be any satisfactory type of computing unit, for example a microprocessor, digital signal processor (DSP), field programmable port arrangement (FPGA), or application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or any another form of circuit. The mobility management node 505A may furthermore include a memory unit or circuit 530A which may be any satisfactory type of computer-readable memory and may be of a volatile and / or non-volatile type. The 530A memory can be configured to store information received, transmitted, and / or any information related to the generation of security keys or update parameters, device parameters, communication priorities, and / or executable program instructions for use by circuit. 520A processing.
[00106] In various embodiments of the present invention, the 520A processing circuit is adapted, using satisfactory program code stored in program storage memory 530A, for example, to perform one of the techniques described above to operate security switches in a scenario dual connectivity. Certainly, it will be appreciated that not all steps in these techniques are necessarily performed on a single microprocessor or even on a single module.
[00107] It will be appreciated that the 520A processing circuit, as adapted with program code stored in program memory and 530A data, can implement the process flow of Figure 9 (or a
33/39 variant thereof) using an array of functional modules, where the modules are computer programs or portions of computer programs running on the 520A processor circuit. Thus, apparatus 501A can be understood to include a communications interface 540A configured to communicate with the auxiliary base station, and furthermore including several functional modules implemented in 520A processing circuit. These functional modules include: a distribution module for sharing a primary security key with the wireless terminal; a generator module for generating an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on the primary security key; and a sending module to send the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station, for use by the auxiliary base station to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more security keys. additional auxiliary security to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station. Figure 12 illustrates an example node configuration for a 505B wireless terminal that can be configured to perform some of the example methods described here. The 505B wireless terminal may include an interface circuit or a 510B communication port that can be configured to receive and / or transmit communication measurements, data, instructions and / or messages. It should be appreciated that the radio circuit or communication port 510B can be included as any number of units or transceiving, receiving and / or transmitting circuit. It should also be appreciated that the 510B radio or communication circuit may be in the form of any input or output communication port known in the art. The 510B interface or communication circuit may include RF circuit and baseband processing circuit (not shown).
34/39 [00108] The wireless terminal 505B may also include a processing unit or 520B circuit that can be configured to perform operations related to the generation of auxiliary security keys (for example, security keys for an auxiliary eNB), such as described here. The 520B processing circuit can be any satisfactory type of computing unit, for example a microprocessor, digital signal processor (DSP), field programmable port arrangement (FPGA), or application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or any another form of circuit. The wireless terminal 505B may furthermore include a memory unit or circuit 530B which may be any satisfactory type of computer readable memory and may be of a volatile and / or non-volatile type. The 530B memory can be configured to store information received, transmitted, and / or any information related to the generation of security keys or update parameters, device parameters, communication priorities, and / or executable program instructions.
Therefore, in various embodiments of the invention, processing circuits, such as processing circuits 520A and 520B and their corresponding memory circuits 530A and 530B, are configured to perform one or more of the techniques described in detail above. Other embodiments can include base stations and / or other network nodes including one or more such processing circuits. In some cases, these processing circuits are configured with appropriate program code, stored on one or more satisfactory memory devices, to implement one or more of the techniques described here. Certainly, it will be appreciated that not all steps in these techniques are necessarily performed on a single microprocessor or even on a single module.
[00110] It will be appreciated by the person skilled in the art that various modifications can be made to the modalities described above without departing from the
35/39 extension of the present invention. For example, although modalities of the present invention have been described with examples including a communication system compliant with the specified 3GPP LTE standards, it should be noted that the solutions presented may be equally well applicable to other networks that support dual connectivity. The specific modalities described above should be considered exemplary, therefore, instead of limiting the scope of the invention. Because it is certainly not possible to describe every conceivable combination of components or techniques, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the present invention can be implemented in ways other than those specifically published here, without departing from essential features of the invention. The present modalities are thus to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive.
[00111] In the present description of various modalities of present inventive concepts, it is to be understood that the terminology used here is for the purpose of describing particular modalities only and is not intended to be limiting of present inventive concepts. Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used here have the same meaning as generally understood by someone of ordinary skill in the technique to which the present inventive concepts belong. It will also be understood that terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should be interpreted as having a meaning that is consistent with their meaning in the context of this specification and in the relevant technique and will not be interpreted in an too formalized or idealized sense as defined herein. .
[00112] When an element is referred to as being connected, coupled, responsive, or variants thereof to another element, it may be connected, coupled, or responsive directly to the other element or intervening elements may be present. In contrast, when a
36/39 element is referred to as being directly connected, directly coupled, directly responsive, or variants thereof to another element, there is no intervening element present. Same numbers refer to the same elements everywhere. In addition, docked, connected, responsive, or variants thereof as used here can include docked, connected, or wireless responsive. As used here, singular forms one, one and o are intended to include plural forms equally, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. Well-known functions or constructs may not be described in detail for brevity and / or clarity. The term and / or includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
[00113] It will be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc., can be used here to describe various elements / operations, these elements / operations should not be limited by these terms. These terms are used only to distinguish one element / operation from another element / operation. Thus, a first element / operation in some modalities could be called a second element / operation in other modalities without starting from the teachings of present inventive concepts. The same reference numerals or reference designators denote the same or similar elements throughout the specification.
[00114] As used herein, the terms understand, comprising, comprises, include, including, includes, has, has, having, or variants thereof are open, and include one or more declared characteristics, integers, elements, steps, components or functions, but does not prevent the presence or addition of one or more other characteristics, integers, elements, steps, components, functions or groups thereof. In addition, as used here, the common abbreviation for example, which derives from the Latin phrase exempli gratia, can be used to introduce or
37/39 specify a general example or examples of a previously mentioned item, and are not intended to be limiting of that item. The common abbreviation i.e., which derives from the Latin phrase id est, can be used to specify a particular item from a more general recitation.
[00115] Example modalities are described here with reference to block diagrams and / or illustrations of flowchart of methods implemented by computer, apparatus (systems and / or devices) and / or computer program products. It is understood that a block of block diagrams and / or flowchart illustrations, and combinations of blocks in block diagrams and / or flowchart illustrations, can be implemented by computer program instructions that are executed by one or more computer circuits . These computer program instructions can be provided to a general purpose computer circuit processor circuit, special purpose computer circuit, and / or other programmable data processing circuit to produce a machine, such as instructions that run by the computer processor and / or other programmable data processing device, transform and control transistors, values stored in memory locations, and other hardware components within that circuit to implement the functions / acts specified in the block diagrams and / or block or flowchart blocks, and thereby create means (functionality) and / or structure to implement the functions / acts specified in the block diagrams and / or flowchart blocks.
[00116] These computer program instructions can also be stored in a tangible computer-readable medium that can drive a computer or other programmable data-processing device to function in a particular way, such as instructions stored in the computer-readable medium produce a manufacturing article, including instructions that implement the functions / acts
38/39 specified in the block and / or block diagrams or flowchart blocks. Therefore, modalities of inventive concepts present can be realized in hardware and / or software (including firmware, resident software, microcode, etc.) running on a processor such as a digital signal processor, which can be collectively called a circuit, a module or variants thereof.
[00117] It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions / acts noted in the blocks can occur out of the order noted in the flowcharts. For example, two blocks shown in succession can actually be executed substantially simultaneously or the blocks can sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functionality / acts involved. In addition, the functionality of a given block of flowcharts and / or block diagrams can be separated into multiple blocks and / or the functionality of two or more blocks of flowcharts and / or block diagrams can be at least partially integrated. Finally, other blocks can be added / inserted between the blocks that are illustrated, and / or blocks / operations can be omitted without starting from the extension of inventive concepts. In addition, although some of the diagrams include arrows in communication paths to show a primary direction of communication, it is to be understood that communication can occur in the opposite direction to the arrows described.
[00118] Many variations and modifications can be made to the modalities without departing substantially from the principles of the present inventive concepts. All such variations and modifications are intended to be included here within the scope of present inventive concepts. Therefore, the subject described above is to be considered illustrative, not restrictive, and the attached examples of modalities are intended to cover all such modifications, enhancements, and other modalities, which fall within the spirit and scope of inventive concepts.
39/39 present. Thus, to the maximum extent permitted by law, the extent of present inventive concepts is to be determined by the broadest permissible interpretation of the present exposure, and should not be restricted or limited by the foregoing detailed description.

权利要求:
Claims (32)
[1]
1. Method on a network node to generate security key for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an anchor base station and between the wireless terminal and an auxiliary base station, where the wireless terminal is or is about to be dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station, the method characterized by the fact that it comprises:
generating (810) an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on an anchor base station key;
send (820) the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station for use by the auxiliary base station in encrypting data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or in the generation of one or more additional auxiliary security keys for encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station; and use (830) the anchor base station key, or a key derived from the anchor base station key, to encode data sent to the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the wireless terminal is currently connected to the anchor base station and auxiliary base station.
[2]
2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the generated auxiliary security key comprises a basic auxiliary security key for use in generating one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal auxiliary base station.
[3]
3. Method according to claim 2, characterized in that using (830) the anchor base station key comprises
2/8 derive an encryption key, or an integrity key, or both, from the anchor base station key, and use the derived key or keys to protect data sent to the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the The wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station.
[4]
Method according to any of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that generating (810) the auxiliary safety switch comprises deriving the auxiliary safety switch from the anchor base station key using a unidirectional function.
[5]
5. Method according to claim 4, characterized by the fact that the unidirectional function is an HMAC-SHA256 encoding function.
[6]
6. Method according to any of claims 1 to 5, characterized by the fact that generating (810) the auxiliary security key is furthermore based on an update parameter.
[7]
Method according to any of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that it additionally comprises:
detect a COUNT parameter of Packet Data Convergence Protocol, PDCP, on the auxiliary base station is about to roll;
in response to said detection, initiate an update of the anchor base station key and recalculate the auxiliary security key.
[8]
8. Method according to any of claims 1 to 7, characterized by the fact that the network node is a Long Term Evolution eNodeB, LTE.
[9]
Method according to any of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that said generation (810) is repeated for each of a plurality of Data Radio Carriers established between the wireless terminal and the auxiliary base station, such that the security keys
3/8 resulting auxiliaries differ for each Data Radio Carrier.
[10]
10. Method on a network node to generate security key for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an anchor base station and between the wireless terminal and an auxiliary base station, where the wireless terminal is or is about to be dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station, the method characterized by the fact that it comprises:
share (910) a primary security key with the wireless terminal;
generating (920) an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on the primary security key;
send (930) the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station for use by the auxiliary base station to encrypt data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encrypt traffic data sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station.
[11]
11. Method according to claim 10, characterized in that the generated auxiliary security key comprises a basic auxiliary security key for use in generating one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station.
[12]
12. Method according to claim 10 or 11, characterized in that generating (920) the auxiliary safety switch comprises deriving the auxiliary safety switch from the anchor base station key using a unidirectional function.
[13]
13. Method according to claim 12, characterized by the fact that the unidirectional function is an HMAC-
4/8
SHA-256.
[14]
14. Method according to any of claims 10 to
13, characterized by the fact that generating (920) the auxiliary safety switch is also based on an update parameter.
[15]
15. Method according to any of claims 10 to
14, characterized by the fact that sending (930) the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station comprises sending the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station indirectly, through the anchor base station.
[16]
16. Method according to any of claims 10 to
15, wherein the network node is a mobility management node.
[17]
17. Network node (401 A) for generating a security key for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an auxiliary base station, where the wireless terminal is, or is about to be, connected to the base station anchor and the auxiliary base station, the network node (401 A) comprising interface circuit (440A) configured to communicate with the auxiliary base station and furthermore comprising processing circuit (420A, 430A), characterized by the fact that that the processing circuit (420A, 430A) is configured to:
generating an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on an anchor base station key;
send the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station, for use by the auxiliary base station to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station; and
5/8 use the anchor base station key, or a key derived from the anchor base station key, to encode data sent to the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the station anchor base and auxiliary base station.
[18]
18. Network node (401 A) according to claim 17, characterized in that the generated auxiliary security key comprises a basic auxiliary security key for use in generating one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encrypt data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station.
[19]
19. Network node (401A) according to claim 18, characterized in that the processing circuit (420A, 430A) is configured to use the anchor base station key to derive an encryption key, or key integrity, or both, of the anchor base station key, and use the derived key or keys to protect data sent to the wireless terminal by the anchor base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station.
[20]
20. Network node (401A) according to any of claims 17 to 19, characterized in that the processing circuit (420A, 430A) is configured to generate the auxiliary safety switch by deriving the auxiliary safety switch from the anchor base station using a unidirectional function.
[21]
21. Network node (401 A) according to claim 20, characterized by the fact that the unidirectional function is an HMAC-SHA-256 coding function.
[22]
22. Network node (401A) according to any of claims 17 to 21, characterized by the fact that the processing circuit (420A, 430A) is furthermore configured to generate the
6/8 auxiliary security based on an update parameter.
[23]
23. Network node (401 A) according to any of claims 17 to 22, characterized in that the processing circuit (420A, 430A) is furthermore configured for:
detect that a COUNT parameter of the Packet Data Convergence Protocol, PDCP, on the auxiliary base station is about to roll;
in response to said detection, initiate an update of the anchor base station key and recalculate the auxiliary security key.
[24]
24. Network node (401A) according to any of claims 17 to 23, characterized by the fact that the network node (401 A) is a Long Term Evolution eNodeB, LTE.
[25]
25. Network node (401 A) according to any of claims 17 to 24, characterized by the fact that the processing circuit (420A, 430A) is configured to repeat said generation for each of a plurality of Radio Carriers of Data established between the wireless terminal and the auxiliary base station, such that the resulting auxiliary security keys differ for each Data Radio Carrier.
[26]
26. Network node (505A) for security key generation for secure communications between a wireless terminal and an auxiliary base station, where the wireless terminal is, or is about to be, connected to the base station. anchor and auxiliary base station, the network node (505A) comprising interface circuit (510A) configured to communicate with the auxiliary base station and furthermore comprising processing circuit (520A, 530A), characterized by the fact that the processing circuit is configured to:
share a primary security key with the wireless terminal;
7/8 generate an auxiliary security key for the auxiliary base station, based, at least in part, on the primary security key;
send the generated auxiliary security key to the auxiliary base station (510A) for use by the auxiliary base station to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal or to generate one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode data traffic sent to the wireless terminal by the auxiliary base station while the wireless terminal is dually connected to the anchor base station and the auxiliary base station.
[27]
27. Network node (505A) according to claim 26, characterized in that the generated auxiliary security key comprises a basic auxiliary security key for use in generating one or more additional auxiliary security keys to encode outgoing data traffic wireless terminal via the auxiliary base station.
[28]
28. Network node (505A) according to claim 26 or 27, characterized in that the processing circuit (520A, 530A) is configured to generate the auxiliary safety switch by deriving the auxiliary safety switch from the transmission station key anchor base using a unidirectional function.
[29]
29. Network node (505A) according to claim 28, characterized in that the unidirectional function is an HMAC-SHA-256 encoding function.
[30]
30. Network node (505A) according to any of claims 26 to 29, characterized in that the processing circuit (520A, 530A) is further configured to generate the auxiliary safety switch based on an update parameter.
[31]
31. Network node (505A) according to any of claims 26 to 30, characterized by the fact that the processing circuit (520A, 530A) is configured to send to the switch
8/8 security help generated for the auxiliary base station indirectly, by the anchor base station.
[32]
32. Network node (505A) according to any of claims 26 to 31, characterized by the fact that the network node (505A) is a mobility management node.

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