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    • 专利摘要:
    METHOD AND APPLIANCE FOR MARKING MANUFACTURED ITEMS USING PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS. The present invention relates to a method of marking a manufactured item, the latter comprising: creating a unique product identifier for a manufactured item; creating one or more encryption keys; generating a secret key using the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys; generating a system noise value by performing a hash function on the secret key and unique product identifier; generating a physical key from a measured physical property of the manufactured item; generating a physical noise value by performing a hash function on the physical key and unique product identifier; generating a secure identifier derived from or incorporating the system noise value and the physical noise value; and placing a mark on the manufactured item, comprising the secure identifier mark or an identifier derived from the secure identifier. Also described are methods of authenticating items conforming to the described method.
    公开号:BR112015013770B1
    申请号:R112015013770-9
    申请日:2013-12-16
    公开日:2022-02-01
    发明作者:Patrick Chanez；Erwan Fradet
    申请人:Philip Morris Products S.A.；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [001] The present invention relates to methods and apparatus for marking manufactured items. In particular, the present invention relates to the marking of packaged goods.
    [002] Counterfeit and smuggled goods pose a global problem for customers, manufacturers and government authorities. Counterfeit goods, which are unauthorized productions of goods, usually of inferior quality, are illegally sold all over the world. These goods are harmful to the customer because they may be of inferior quality, which can be dangerous (this is particularly important for products such as pharmaceuticals or other consumer goods). Counterfeit goods are harmful to manufacturers as they may suffer loss of reputation, increased competition from illegal manufacturers who manufacture their products, and infringement of other legal rights. Smuggled goods, which are goods produced for the purpose of evading taxes or government regulations, are also a considerable problem for manufacturers and government officials. These goods are illegally diverted, traded or imported, which results in significant revenue losses for government authorities due to improper collection of duties or taxes.
    [003] It is advantageous to be able to authenticate manufactured items using unique tags on items without the need to store each unique tag in the location where the items are to be authenticated. It is also desirable to be able to detect counterfeit goods, or items for which the unique marking of an authentic product has been copied, without the need to store an authentication record of each unique marking.
    [004] In one aspect of the disclosure, a method of demarcating a manufactured item is provided, comprising:
    [005] the creation of a unique product identifier for a manufactured item;
    [006] the creation of one or more encryption keys;
    [007] the generation of a secret key from the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys;
    [008] the generation of a physical key from a measured physical property of a manufactured product;
    [009] the generation of a secure identifier derived from or incorporating the secret key and the physical key; and
    [0010] the placement of a mark on the manufactured item, the mark comprising the secure identifier or an identifier derived from the secure identifier.
    [0011] The secure identifier may incorporate the unique product identifier.
    [0012] Preferably, the method additionally includes the step of generating a system noise value using the secret key and the unique product identifier, wherein the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the system noise value. Preferably, the step of generating a noise system value comprises hashing the secret key and unique product identifier.
    [0013] Preferably, the method additionally includes generating a physical noise value using the physical key and unique product identifier, where the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the system noise value. Preferably, the step of generating the physical noise value comprises performing a hash function on the physical key and the unique product identifier.
    [0014] As used herein, "unique product identifier" means an identifier that uniquely identifies a manufactured item. Each manufactured item is given a different unique product identifier. The unique product identifier is typically a numeric or alphanumeric string or value.
    [0015] As used herein, "encryption" means the process of transforming information through the use of an algorithm to make that information unreadable to anyone except those who have special knowledge in the form of an encryption key. Decryption is the reverse process. An "encryption key" is a piece of information used in conjunction with an encryption algorithm to encrypt or decrypt information. An encryption key is typically a numeric or alphanumeric string or value.
    [0016] As used in this document, the term "secret key" is used to describe a key used in a keyed hash that is generated using a unique product identifier and one or more additional keys or pieces of information. At the time of its generation, the secret key is not known to anyone other than the individual who created the secret key. The term "secret key" in this context is not limited to meaning a private key in the context of an asymmetric encryption scheme.
    [0017] As used in this document, a "hash function" is a function that maps incoming information to a fixed-length output (usually smaller than the incoming information) called a hash value. A hash function typically replaces or transposes, or replaces and transposes, information in order to create the hash value or noise value. Preferably, the hash function is a cryptographic hash function. The cryptographic hash function produces a digital or checksum of the incoming information. Two pieces of information can be considered identical if, using the same cryptographic hash function, they produce the same hash value. Advantageously, the hash function is a one-way hash function, which means that it is computationally impossible to derive the input information from the hash value. These properties can be used in an authentication process, as will be described. A hash function can be keyed by combining a secret key with an incoming message to create a hash value or keyed noise.
    [0018] As used in this document, the term "noise value" means a hash value, or keyed hash value, or a value or string derived directly from a hash value and a secret key.
    [0019] The measured physical property of the manufactured item may be any physical property measured, and may be based on mass, weight, shape, surface texture or pattern, color, chemical composition, or response to a stimulus, such as response to electrical, magnetic, or magnetic stimuli. or opticians. The physical property measured preferably chosen and measured to a resolution that is likely to be unique for each manufactured item, or at least is more likely to be different than the same for either of the two manufactured items. The measured physical property preferably provides a physical signature for the manufactured item. In a preferred embodiment, the measured physical property is an image of a portion of the package of the manufactured item.
    [0020] The secure identifier can be any type of identifier; however, preferably it is a numeric or alphanumeric string or value. The mark may also be a sequence of characters or numbers, or it may be a graphical representation such as a one- or two-dimensional bar code.
    [0021] In one embodiment, the step of generating the secure identifier comprises generating a first identifier by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the system noise value and generating the secure identifier by encrypting the first identifier together with the physical noise value.
    [0022] In this embodiment, the method may additionally comprise the authentication of an item manufactured in a verification center, the authentication step comprising: identifying the brand on the product; decryption of the tag to extract the first identifier and the physical noise value; decrypting the first identifier to yield the unique product identifier and system noise value; generating a new physical key from a measured physical property of a manufactured item; generating a new copy of a physical noise value by performing a hash function on the new physical key and originating unique product identifier; comparing the new copy of the physical noise value to the originating physical noise value; and providing an indication that the originating physical noise value is identical or correlated with the new copy of the physical noise value.
    [0023] The step of comparing may comprise originating a correlation table and the step of providing an indication comprises providing an indication as to whether the correlation table is greater than the threshold value.
    [0024] In the present embodiment, the authentication step may further comprise: generating a new copy of the secret key from the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys; generating a new copy of the system noise value by performing a hash function on the new copy of the secret key and unique product identifier; comparing the new copy of the system noise value to the originating system noise value; and providing an indication that the new copy of the system noise value and the originating system noise value are identical.
    [0025] In another embodiment, the step of generating a secure identifier comprises generating a first secure identifier by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the system noise value; generating a second secure identifier by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the physical noise value; and placing a tag comprising the first and second secure identifiers or an identifier or identifiers originating from the first and second secure identifiers.
    [0026] In this embodiment, the method may additionally comprise the authentication of an item manufactured in a verification center, the authentication step comprising: identifying the brand on the product; decryption of the tag to extract the first identifier, the system noise value and the physical noise value; generating a new copy of the secret key from the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys; generating a new copy of the system noise value by performing a hash function on the new copy of the secret key and unique product identifier; comparing the new copy of the system noise value to the originated system noise value; generating a new physical key from a measured physical property of the manufactured item; generating a new copy of the physical noise value and unique product identifier originated; comparing the new copy of the physical noise value to the originating physical noise value; and providing an indication as to whether the system noise value is identical to the originating system noise value and whether the new copy of the physical noise value is identical or correlated with the originating physical noise value.
    [0027] In either embodiment, the step of generating the first secure identifier may comprise encrypting the unique product identifier and the system noise value using a code-generating key, in which the generation step of the second secure identifier comprises combining the first secure identifier and the physical noise value together with a code generator identifier, and wherein the code generating key may be sourced from or obtained from a lookup table at a data center. verification using the code generator identifier.
    [0028] In either embodiment, the method may also comprise the step of storing one or more encryption keys in a verification center. The one or more encryption keys may comprise a static key and a dynamic key, wherein a new dynamic key is created for each batch of manufactured items whereas the same static key is used for plural batches of manufactured items.
    [0029] The unique product identifier may include information that identifies an item batch to which the item belongs.
    [0030] The invention provides the ability to authenticate both based on manufacturer information, ie the various encryption keys, and based on the physical property of the item. This provides two layers of authentication, and allows detection of identifier cloning on genuine items, but does not require large-scale storage of authentication codes.
    [0031] In another aspect of the invention, there is provided an apparatus for marking a manufactured item, comprising:
    [0032] a key generator, configured to generate decryption keys;
    [0033] a code generator configured to generate a unique product identifier for each item manufactured;
    [0034] a physical key generator configured to generate physical keys from a measured physical property of each manufactured item;
    [0035] the processing means configured for:
    [0036] generation of a secret key for each item manufactured using the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys;
    [0037] the generation of a secure identifier derived from or incorporating the secret key and the physical key; and
    [0038] A marker to mark each manufactured item with the secure identifier or an identifier derived from the secure identifier.
    [0039] Preferably, the processor is configured to generate a system noise value for each item manufactured using the secret key and a unique product identifier, where the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the system noise value. Preferably, the processor is configured to generate the system noise value for each item manufactured by performing a hash function on the secret key and unique product identifier.
    [0040] Preferably, the processor is configured to generate a physical noise value for each item manufactured using the physical key and unique product identifier, where the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the physical noise value. Preferably, the processor is configured to generate the physical noise value for each item manufactured by performing a hash function on the physical key and unique product identifier.
    [0041] In one embodiment, the processing means are configured to: generate a first identifier for each manufactured item by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the secret key or system noise value; and generate the secure identifier for each manufactured item by encrypting the first identifier along with the physical noise value.
    [0042] In another embodiment, the processing means are configured to: generate a first secure identifier by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the secret key or system noise value and generate a second secure identifier for each manufactured item by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the physical key or physical noise value; and the tag is configured to tag each manufactured item with the first secure identifier and the second secure identifier or an identifier or identifier derived from the first and second secure identifiers.
    [0043] The manufactured item may be a container containing a tobacco product. Examples of tobacco products are cigarettes, loose leaf tobacco, and cartridges or refills for electrically heated smoking systems or other electronic cigarette systems.
    [0044] The invention allows manufactured items to be authenticated without the need to store large volumes of information. This is important for any practical system suitable for authenticating high volume items. In addition, the use of a physical key in combination with a unique product identifier (UPI) increases security and makes it more difficult to produce counterfeit or contraband goods. Adding a physical key provides a system that can detect cloning and is difficult to replicate. Even if a forger were aware of the specific tool used to generate the physical key, combining the physical key with a UPI to produce an identifier makes cloning nearly impossible. The invention also allows authentication to be performed online, i.e. in connection with a verification center via a communications network based on the system noise value, also allowing authentication to be performed offline based on the noise value. physicist. The markup required on each item is simply one or more codes and therefore adds very little expense to each item when compared to some other solutions which rely on expensive labels technically difficult to reproduce.
    [0045] Modalities of the invention will be described below, exclusively by way of example, with reference to the attached drawings in which:
    [0046] Figure 1 is a schematic view of a demarcation system according to an embodiment of the invention;
    [0047] Figure 2 illustrates how the system noise value and the physical noise value are derived;
    [0048] Figure 3 is a flowchart showing a method of demarcating an embodiment of the invention, which can be performed in the system of Figure 1;
    [0049] Figure 4 is a flowchart that presents an authentication method for the embodiment of the invention represented in Figure 3, which can be performed in the system of Figure 1;
    [0050] Figure 5 is a flowchart showing a demarcation method of another embodiment of the invention, which can be performed in the system of Figure 1; and
    [0051] Figure 6 is a flowchart that presents an authentication method for the modality of the invention represented in Figure 5, which can be performed in the system of Figure 1.
    [0052] Unique tags on manufactured items can be used to track items. For example, a consumer order may be linked to the label or tags identifying a specific shipping box or boxes containing the ordered goods. "Goods" in this context means manufactured items or other articles intended for distribution or sale to consumers. This allows the consumer, the manufacturer and any intermediaries to constantly track the location of needed goods. This can be achieved by using scanners to scan the identifiers and communicate with a verification center. Alternatively, the identifiers can be read by a human, who can then manually communicate with a verification center. Identifiers can also be used by consumers, national authorities and other parties to verify that a specific item contains genuine products. For example, a third party might use a scanner to read the identifier on a shipping crate (or the identifier could be read by a human, as discussed above). The identifier details can be sent to a verification center. The verification center can then query or otherwise process the identifier details, determine the shipping crate production details and send those details to the scanner, thereby enabling the third party to verify the shipping crate, and the products contained therein as genuine. In case the central database does not recognize the identifier, the third party may assume that the articles in question are counterfeit. Identifiers can also be used to locate items. For example, if the manufacturer needs to pick up products from a selected number of shipping crates, those shipping crates can be located using their identifiers.
    [0053] Figure 1 is a schematic view of a demarcation system according to an embodiment of the invention; In this embodiment, the system 101 comprises one or more production centers 103, 105, 107 for producing manufactured items 109. Each production center may comprise a production line or facility which may be a cigarette manufacturing or packaging line. Preferably, production is performed in batches, each batch being devoted to the production of a certain number of individual manufactured items. If there are two or more production centers, they can be physically located either at the same or a different manufacturing site. In this preferred embodiment, the system includes production centers 103, 105, 107, but the invention can actually be performed at an import point, a distribution point, a buyer, a wholesaler or any other point in the supply chain. supply.
    [0054] Each production center includes a code generator 111 to generate codes for manufactured items 109. Preferably, the code generator 111 is a fully autonomous computer or microcontroller dedicated to a particular production center. Each production center also includes a physical key generator 112 that measures or encodes a physical property of each item manufactured and converts it into a physical key 207. The code generator 111 uses the physical keys to generate codes for marking on the items.
    [0055] In this embodiment, the physical key generator is of the type described in WO2007/071788. A portion of each item's packaging is illuminated and an image of the illuminated portion is captured by a digital image sensor. The packaging part is chosen for its temporally stable chaotic microstructure. Materials like paper and cardboard have a chaotic microstructure that can be used as a "fingerprint" of the item. The microstructure image of the item part is converted into a physical key or signature, as described in WO2007/071788, in the form of an alphanumeric value or array. Such a physical key generator is available from Signoptic Technologies, Savoie Technolac, 5 allée Lac d'Aiguebelette BP340 F-73375, LE BOURGET-DU-LAC, France. However, any type of physical key generator may be used and may depend on other physical properties of the item, such as mass or shape, or may even rely on the item's chemical or biological properties.
    [0056] In this embodiment, each production center has also included marker 113 to mark codes generated on manufactured items 109. Marker 113 may comprise any suitable means of marking, for example, but not limited to, a continuous inkjet printer, a drop-on-demand inkjet printer, a holographic printer, a laser printer, or any other printer or marker that allows the printing or marking of codes generated on individual manufactured products. The printing or marking of the generated codes can be found on each item, on an external package, on labels or in any other convenient way. In one embodiment, the generated codes are printed on adhesive tags or labels to be applied to manufactured items, preferably in a non-removable manner. In one embodiment, the generated codes are printed by a laser beam onto a layer of laser sensitive material deposited on the manufactured item or the item's packaging. These methods allow code to be printed through a transparent layer of wrapper.
    [0057] The system 101 further comprises a verification center 114 which includes a key generator 115 for generating keys 209, 211 for use in marking and authenticating manufactured products and a central server 117. In this embodiment, the code generator 111 can be communicating with the verification center 114 via a secure internet connection 119 and a server 121 local to the production center, or by other means of communicating information. Alternatively, the 111 code generator can communicate with the verification center through a manufacturing portal dedicated to one or more production centers.
    [0058] Key generator 115 generates a cryptographic key, referred to in this document as a static key. Key generator 115 generates an unencrypted version of the static key and an encrypted version of the static key. The unencrypted version of the static key, designated in this document as active static key 209, is shown with a solid border in Figure 1. The encrypted version of the static key, designated in this document as inactive static key 211, is shown with a dotted border in Figure 1. The active static key 209, which is to say the unencrypted version of the static key, is generated in the key generator 115 and is therefore accessible to the central server 117. The key generator 115 sends the inactive static key 211 to code generator 111 at production center 103, 105, 107.
    [0059] Inactive static key 211 may be sent from key generator 115 to code generator 111 on non-volatile data carrier, for example a CD-ROM, DVD-Rom or removable hard disk. The information carrier is physically transferred to code generator 111 at production center 103, 105, 107. Alternatively, idle static key 211 can be sent from key generator 115 to code generator 111 via a network connection secure, for example one that involves encryption. This can occur on demand from the code generator 111. This guarantees the authenticity, confidentiality and integrity of the static key.
    [0060] Key generator 115 also generates activation code 213, which comprises the key or code for decrypting inactive static key 211 to form active static key 209. This activation code 213 is also accessible to central server 117. From preferably, the active static key 209 and activation code 213 are stored together with the identification of the production center 103, 105, 107 to which they are reassigned.
    [0061] In one embodiment, the static key comprises a number of parts. The main part can be a plurality of secret codes, for example a saline matrix. A saline matrix can be, for example, a long string of random or pseudorandom numeric digits. The number of additional parts may include a unique identifier for the static key, a serial code defining how the static key is to be combined with a dynamic key (discussed below), a digital cryptographic certificate associated with the static key's unique identifier, and a policy or license that contains the cryptographic certificate generated above.
    [0062] Preferably, the inactive static key, that is to say the encrypted version of the static key, and particularly the plurality of secret codes, is encrypted using a strong cipher. An example of a suitable cipher is the Triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) block cipher or the DES/Rijandel cipher block. Both apply the DES cipher algorithm three times to each block of information and the Triple DES / Rijandel is a minor variation of the Triple DES that was developed by IBM. In this case, the Triple DES or Triple Des/Rijandel key comprises activation code 213. Thus, in a preferred embodiment, the active static key 209 is decoded, the inactive key 211 is encrypted using the Triple DES or Triple Des key. /Rijandel, and activation code 213 comprises this Triple DES or Triple Des/Rijandel key.
    [0063] In the next step 203, the idle static key 211 received by code generator 111 is registered. This is accomplished by the code generator 111 by sending to the verification center 114 information 215 about the received static key and any other relevant machinery information (not shown). This is preferably sent via a secure internet connection 119, as shown in Figure 1, but may be sent via another appropriate route. The verification center 114 sends the activation code 213 back to the code generator 111. Activation code 213 allows the inactive static key 211 to be activated, and this is schematically represented at 217. Activation code 213 is, preferably also sent over a secure internet connection 119, as shown in Figure 1. The registration process is preferably arranged in such a way that the active static key 209 is never transferred over the internet.
    [0064] The registration procedure may take the form of a conventional mechanism for exchanging public/private key pairs. This can use an asymmetric key pair associated with the digital cryptographic certificate that is part of the static key, as discussed above. In this case, the public key of the asymmetric key pair may come in the form of a key issued by a third party, for example, a government authority. Information 215 about the received static key that is sent from code generator 111 to verification center 114 may comprise the unique identifier for the static key that forms part of the static key, as discussed above. Relevant machinery information (not displayed), which is likewise sent from code generator 111 to verification center 114, may comprise a unique identifier or certificate for code generator 111 or production center. This unique identifier may include information about the location and identity of the code generator or production center, which has been pre-authorized for production. Preferably, the static key unique identifier and the code generator or production center identifier are encrypted using the public key of the asymmetric key pair associated with the static key certificate.
    [0065] Once the verification center 114 receives the unique encrypted static key identifier and the code generator or production center identifier, the verification center 114 can decrypt using the private key of the asymmetric key pair associated with the key certificate static. The verification center can then verify that the static key unique identifier and the code generator or production center identifier are valid. Then, the verification center 114 sends back to the code generator 111 the activation code 213. As already mentioned, preferably the activation code 213 is in the form of a Triple DES or Triple DES/Rijandel cipher. The verification center encrypts the activation code (eg Triple DES or Triple DES/Rijandel cipher) with the public key of the asymmetric key pair associated with the static key certificate. This allows the activation code (eg Triple DES or Triple DES/Rijandel cipher) to be decoded by the code generator using the private key of the asymmetric key pair associated with the static key certificate. Then inactive static key 211 can be activated using decoded activation code 213 to form active static key 209.
    [0066] Once static switch 211 is activated at the end of code generator 111, the production center is able to manufacture items and produce codes for the items manufactured in code generator 111.
    [0067] Code generator 111 generates a new key, designated in this document as dynamic key 219, for each batch of manufactured items. Dynamic key 219 is preferably a random secret code, such as a random number. The code generator uses dynamic key 219 for a batch, along with active static key 209, to generate a secret key 223. Secret key 223 is used in combination with physical keys and a unique product identifier (UPI) so that each item generates 221 codes (e.g. alphanumeric codes) that must be marked on items manufactured in that batch. In the present modality, the UPI for each item comprises production details that identify the production time together with a supplementary counter value to differentiate items produced within the limits of the same period of time by the same production center.
    [0068] The code generator uses a cryptographic hash function on a combination of the UPI with the secret key and a combination of the UPI with a physical key. This creates digitized fingerprints, referred to in this document as "noise values", for the item, and these noise values are used to generate the 221 codes which are marked on the items by the 113 marker. In addition to the typically used cryptographic hash functions, a A variety of techniques are available to generate hash values or noise values, including, but not limited to: transposition, substitution, table replacement, and indexing.
    [0069] Figure 2 illustrates the method of generating the noise values performed by the code generator 111 To generate the system noise value 225, the secret key is first originated from the active static key 209, the dynamic key 219 and the UPI 221. Dynamic key 219 and active static key 209 are known only to verification center 114 and code generator 111. In step 301 the dynamic key and UPI are used to extract the secret key from the saline matrix contained in the static key, conforming to the serial code inside the static key. Secret key 223 and UPI 221 are then hashed in step 303 to produce system noise for the item. To generate the physical noise value 227, the physical key 207 is hashed with the UPI 221 in step 305. The hash function used to generate the system noise value can be the same as or different from the hash function used to generate the value. of physical noise.
    [0070] Figure 3 illustrates a method for using the system noise value and a physical noise value to generate a secure identifier for each item in accordance with a first embodiment of the invention. In step 311 the system noise value 225 and the UPI 221 are combined. In step 313 the combined system noise value and UPI are encrypted by the generator code obfuscation key (CGOK) 231 to produce a first identifier 241. The CGOK is code generator specific and is preloaded into the code generator. The first identifier 241 is then combined with the physical noise value 227 and a code generator identifier 233. The code generator identifier (CGID) 233 will allow the CGOK to be obtained during authentication. The combination of the first identifier, the physical noise value and the CGID is then encrypted using a global key 235 in step 317 to produce the secure identifier 251. The global key 235 is common to all production centers and may be part of a symmetric or asymmetric key pair known to the verification center. Secure identifier 251 is then marked on the item at step 319 by marker 113.
    [0071] Code generator 111 or production center 103, 105,107 keeps a count of codes that are marked on manufactured items. Furthermore, the code generator 111 sends the dynamic key 219 of each batch, together with information about the batch (not displayed), to the verification center 114. This can be done via a secure internet connection 119. about the lot may include various pieces of information, for example, but not limited to, brand, intended market or intended destination. Dynamic keys 219 need not be sent to the verification center 114 in real time and can be communicated to the verification center at any appropriate time, for example, monthly. Dynamic keys 219 sent to verification center 114 are stored in a database (e.g. on a central server 117) at or accessible from a verification center 114. Dynamic key 219 for each batch is preferably stored together batch information sent to verification center 114 at the same time.
    [0072] Preferably, the active static switch 209 is deleted when the code generator 111 in a specific production center 103, 105, 107 is taken out of service. This prevents a malicious user from accessing active static key 209 without proper registration. Additional means to disable the 111 code generator and prevent unauthorized use of the 111 code generator and production center may be provided.
    [0073] Figure 4 illustrates the steps performed by verification center 114 and user 601 when a user 601 wants to authenticate an individual manufactured item marked in accordance with the process of Figure 3. User 601 reads code 221 on the item and the sends it to the verification center 114. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The user 601 can send the code to the verification center 114 by any appropriate means, such as a secure or unsecured internet connection.
    [0074] The verification center receives the secure identifier in step 321. The secure identifier is decoded using the global key 235 (or the corresponding key in the key pair, in case of asymmetric keys) in step 323 to reveal the value of physical noise 227 and the first identifier 241. The CGID is also revealed. Using a lookup table, the CGOK 231 is then obtained from the CGID. The first ID is then decoded at step 325 using CGOK 231 to reveal system noise 225 and UPI 221. With this information, together with active static key 209 and dynamic key 219 and a new physical key, both the value of physical noise and the system noise value can be recreated to authenticate the item.
    [0075] To recreate the physical noise value a new physical key must be obtained by the user 601 in step 327 when registering an image of the item portion in the same way and under the same conditions that were used in the generation of the original physical key 207. The UPI and new physical key are then hashed to generate a new physical noise value in step 329. In step 331, the new physical noise value is compared to the extracted physical noise value revealed in step 323. If the new physical noise value is sufficiently similar to the extracted physical noise value, then a part of the authentication process is completed. If the new physical noise value is not sufficiently similar to the extracted physical noise value, then the item is determined to be inauthentic in step 339.
    [0076] For the item to be considered authentic, the new physical noise value may need to be identical to the extracted physical noise value. However, it is possible to allow for some differences between the new physical noise value and the extracted physical noise value by using a correlation score and requiring a threshold correlation score for the item to be considered authentic. US2005/0257064 describes a statistical method suitable for calculating a degree of correlation or similarity between two digital signatures derived from measured physical properties of a fibrous medium.
    [0077] It is just as possible for user 601 to perform steps 329 and 331 as it is for verification center 114. If user 601 is granted the UPI by the verification center, the end user can authenticate the item based on the value of physical noise. Likewise, if the new physical key is provided to the verification center 114, the verification center can authenticate the item based on the physical noise value.
    [0078] To recreate the system noise value, the secret key must be regenerated. In step 333, using the UPI and CGID, the verification center 114 is able to retrieve dynamic key 219 and static active key 209 from records held at the verification center. The secret key can then be regenerated using UPI 221, dynamic key 219 and active static key 209. In step 335 a new system noise value is recreated by hashing the UPI and secret key. In step 337, the new system noise value is compared to the extracted system noise value in step 325. If the new system noise value and the extracted system noise value are identical, then the item can be determined to be authentic in step 339.
    [0079] In one embodiment, both physical noise value and system noise value comparisons are required for the item to be considered authentic. However, it is possible to allow authentication based on only one of these checks, if desired.
    [0080] From the derived active static key 209, the production center 103, 105, 107 in which the item was manufactured can be determined, as the active static keys are preferably stored in the verification center together with details of its associated production centers. From the derived dynamic key 219, the batch information corresponding to the item can be determined, as the dynamic keys are preferably stored in the verification center together with the associated batch information. In this way, the verification center 114 can derive, from the code 221 sent to the user 601, various pieces of information 603 about the individual item as well as check the authenticity of the item. Then, all or only selected parts of the information 603, including an indication as to the authenticity or inauthenticity of the item, can be sent to the user 601. This is represented in Figure 1. The information 603 is preferably sent to the user. user 601 through the same means by which the original code was sent.
    [0081] Figure 5 illustrates a marking process in accordance with a second embodiment of the invention. In the method of Figure 5, two secure identifiers are produced, one based on the system noise value 225 and the other based on the physical noise value 227. The system noise value 225 is combined with the UPI 221 in step 341. The combination of the system noise value and the unique product identifier is then encrypted with the CGOK 231 in step 343 to produce the first ID 241 as in the first embodiment of Figure 3. The first ID 241 is then combined with the CGID in step 345 and encrypted with the global key 235 in step 347 to produce a first secure ID 271. The physical noise value 227 is then combined with the UPI in step 221 to produce a second ID 261. The second ID is encrypted with the key global 235 in step 353 to produce a second secure ID. The item may then be marked in step 355 with the first secure ID 271 and the second secure ID 281, or with a mark or marks derived from a combination of the first secure ID 271 and the second secure ID 281.
    [0082] Figure 6 illustrates the steps performed to authenticate a marked item using the process illustrated in Figure 5. In step 401, the mark or marks are read by the user and the user derives the first secure identifier 271 and the second secure identifier 281. In step 403, the global key 235 is used to derive the physical noise value 227, a first copy of UPI 221, the first ID 241, and CGID 233. If the user has the global key 235, the user can authenticate the item based on the second secure identifier offline, i.e. no need to connect to the verification center. The user generates a new physical key at step 407 and this is hashed with the UPI to generate a new physical noise value at step 409. The user can then compare the new physical noise value to the physical noise value extracted at step 403 in the step 411. As described with reference to Figure 3, the item may be deemed authentic at step 419 if the new physical noise value is equal to or sufficiently similar to the extracted physical noise value.
    [0083] In step 405, the CGID is used by the verification center to retrieve the CGOK 231, and the CGOK is used to decrypt the first ID 241 to reveal system noise and a second copy of the UPI. In step 408, the second copy of the UPI may optionally be compared to the first copy of the UPI for checking purposes. In step 413, verification center 114 retrieves dynamic key 219 and active static key 209 using the CGID and UPI. In step 415, a new system noise value is generated by first regenerating a secret key from the UPI, dynamic key, and static key, and then hashing the secret key with the UPI. At step 417, the new system noise value is compared to the system noise value extracted at step 405. If they are identical, the item can be authenticated at step 419. As with the embodiment of Figure 3, authentication based on both both the system noise value and the physical noise value may be required for an item to be considered authentic.
    [0084] Although the invention has been described with reference to cigarette manufacturing, it should be clear that the invention is applicable to any products that require authentication, such as pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages and luxury goods.
    权利要求:
    Claims (16)
    [0001]
    1. Method for marking a manufactured item, the method being characterized by comprising: creating a unique product identifier (UPI) for a manufactured item; creating one or more encryption keys (209, 219); generating a secret key (223) from the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys; generating a system noise value (225) using the secret key and unique product identifier generating a physical key (207) from a measured physical property of a manufactured product; the generation of a physical noise value (227) using the physical key and the unique product identifier; wherein, to create the system noise value and the physical noise value, the method uses transposition, table replacement and indexing, or a cryptographic hash function on a combination of the unique product identifier and the secret key and a combination of the unique product identifier and the physical key; the generation of a identifier derivative (251, 271, 281) from or incorporating the secret key and the physical key, where the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the system noise value, and where the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the value of physical noise; and placing (319, 355) a mark on the manufactured item, the mark comprising the secure identifier or an identifier derived from the secure identifier.
    [0002]
    2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the secure identifier incorporates the unique product identifier.
    [0003]
    3. Method according to claim 2, characterized in that the step of generating the secure identifier comprises generating (311, 313) a first identifier by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the system noise value and the generating a secure identifier by encrypting (317) the first identifier along with the physical noise value.
    [0004]
    4. Method according to claim 3, characterized in that:- the step of generating the first identifier by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the physical noise value is performed by encrypting (313) by an obfuscation key of code generator (CGOK); - the first identifier is then combined with the physical noise value and a code generator identifier (233); - the combination of the first identifier, the physical noise value and the code generator identifier it is then encrypted (317) using a global key (235) to produce the secure identifier.
    [0005]
    5. Method according to claim 4, characterized in that the code generator obfuscation key is particular to a code generator (111) in which it is preloaded and in which the global key is common to all of one or more production centers.
    [0006]
    6. Method, according to claim 3, characterized in that it additionally comprises the authentication of the item manufactured in a verification center, comprising the authentication step: identification (321) of the brand on the item; decryption (323) the tag to derive the first identifier and the physical noise value; decrypting (325) the first identifier to derive the unique product identifier and the system noise value; generating (327) a new physical key from a measured physical property of a manufactured item; generating (329) a new copy of the physical noise value by performing a hash function on the new physical key and the derived unique product identifier; comparing (331) the new copy of the physical noise value to the derived physical noise value; and providing an indication (339) as to whether the derived physical noise value is identical to or correlated with the new copy of the physical noise value.
    [0007]
    Method according to claim 6, the authentication step being characterized in that it additionally comprises: generating (333) a new copy of the secret key from the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys; generation (335) of a new copy of the system noise value by performing a hash function on the new copy of the secret key and the unique product identifier.comparing (337) the new copy of the system noise value to the derived system noise value; and providing an indication (339) that the new copy of the system noise value and the derived system noise value are identical.
    [0008]
    8. Method according to claim 2, characterized in that the step of generating the secure identifier comprises generating a first secure identifier by encrypting (241) the unique product identifier together with the system noise value ;generating (261) a second secure identifier by encrypting the unique product identifier together with the physical noise value; and placing (355) a mark on the manufactured item, comprising the mark of the first and second secure identifiers, or an identifier or identifiers derived from the first and second secure identifiers.
    [0009]
    9. Method according to claim 8, characterized in that: - the system noise value is combined with the unique product identifier; - the combination of the system noise value and the unique product identifier is then encrypted (343) with a code generator obfuscation key (CGOK) to produce (241) a first identifier; the first identifier is then combined with a code generator identifier (CGID) and encrypted (347) with a key global (235) to produce a second secure identifier; - the physical noise value is combined (351) with the unique product to produce a second identifier (261); - the second identifier is encrypted with the global key (235) to produce a second secure identifier (281).
    [0010]
    10. Method, according to claim 8, characterized in that it additionally comprises the authentication of the item manufactured in a verification center, comprising the authentication step: identification (401) of the brand on the item; decryption (403, 405) brand to derive the unique product identifier, system noise value and physical noise; generating (413) a new copy of the secret key from the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys; generating (415) a new copy of the system noise value by performing a hash function on the new copy of the secret key and the unique product identifier.comparing (417) the new copy of the system noise value to the derived system noise value; generating (407) a new physical key from a measured physical property of a manufactured item; generating (409) a new copy of the physical noise value, by performing a hash function on new physical key and in the derived unique product identifier; comparing (411) the new copy of the physical noise value to the derived physical noise value; and providing (419) an indication as to whether the new copy of the system noise value is identical to the derived system noise value, and whether the new copy of the physical noise value is identical to or correlates with the physical noise value derivative.
    [0011]
    11. Method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that one or more encryption keys comprise a static key (209) and a dynamic key (219), and wherein a new dynamic key is created for each batch of manufactured items.
    [0012]
    12. Method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the unique product identifier includes information that identifies a batch of items to which the item belongs.
    [0013]
    13. Method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that a noise value is a hash value, a keyed hash value, or a value or string derived directly from a hash value and a secret key.
    [0014]
    14. Method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the measured physical property of the manufactured item is based on the surface texture of the manufactured item.
    [0015]
    15. Apparatus for marking a manufactured item, characterized in that it comprises: a key generator (115), configured to generate encryption keys; a code generator (111) configured to generate a unique product identifier for each item manufactured; a physical key generator (112) configured to generate physical keys from a measured physical property of each manufactured item; processing means (111) configured to: generate a secret key (223) for each manufactured item using the unique product identifier and one or more encryption keys; generating a system noise value (225) for each manufactured item by hashing the secret key and a unique product identifier; generating a physical noise value (227) for each item manufactured by performing a hash function on the physical key and the unique product identifier; generating a secure identifier (251, 271, 281) derived from or incorporating the secret key and the physical key, where the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the system noise value, and where the secure identifier is derived from or incorporates the physical noise value; and a marker for marking (319, 355) each item manufactured with the secure identifier or an identifier derived from the secure identifier.
    [0016]
    16. Apparatus according to claim 15, characterized in that the measured physical property of the manufactured item is based on the surface texture of the manufactured item.
    类似技术:
    公开号 | 公开日 | 专利标题
    BR112015013770B1|2022-02-01|Method and apparatus for marking manufactured items using physical characteristics
    JP6883676B2|2021-06-09|Methods and systems for marking manufactured items to detect unauthorized refills
    KR101127327B1|2012-03-29|Methods and systems for marking, tracking and authentication of products
    US6442276B1|2002-08-27|Verification of authenticity of goods by use of random numbers
    BR112013016754B1|2021-07-27|METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR MARKING MANUFACTURED ITEMS
    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    TWI622969B|2018-05-01|
    IL238678D0|2015-06-30|
    CA2892566A1|2014-06-26|
    AU2013363820B2|2018-01-04|
    PH12015501051B1|2015-07-27|
    ES2724877T3|2019-09-17|
    CA2892566C|2022-02-08|
    US10121151B2|2018-11-06|
    EA201591160A1|2015-12-30|
    PL2932494T3|2019-10-31|
    US20150317644A1|2015-11-05|
    ZA201503264B|2016-11-30|
    MX362381B|2019-01-14|
    KR20150103029A|2015-09-09|
    EP2932494A1|2015-10-21|
    HK1212083A1|2016-06-03|
    MA20150401A1|2015-11-30|
    EP2932494B1|2019-02-13|
    IN2015DN04037A|2015-10-02|
    JP2016503988A|2016-02-08|
    JP6430396B2|2018-11-28|
    PH12015501051A1|2015-07-27|
    CN104854642A|2015-08-19|
    TN2015000274A1|2016-10-03|
    UA120342C2|2019-11-25|
    CN104854642B|2017-12-05|
    KR102194421B1|2020-12-24|
    EA034481B1|2020-02-12|
    SG11201504777SA|2015-07-30|
    BR112015013770A2|2017-07-11|
    TR201907002T4|2019-06-21|
    AU2013363820A1|2015-06-11|
    WO2014095737A1|2014-06-26|
    TW201440017A|2014-10-16|
    AR094031A1|2015-07-08|
    MX2015007830A|2016-01-15|
    MA38282B1|2016-12-30|
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    法律状态:
    2018-11-21| B06F| Objections, documents and/or translations needed after an examination request according [chapter 6.6 patent gazette]|
    2020-07-21| B06U| Preliminary requirement: requests with searches performed by other patent offices: procedure suspended [chapter 6.21 patent gazette]|
    2021-11-16| B09A| Decision: intention to grant [chapter 9.1 patent gazette]|
    2022-02-01| B16A| Patent or certificate of addition of invention granted [chapter 16.1 patent gazette]|Free format text: PRAZO DE VALIDADE: 20 (VINTE) ANOS CONTADOS A PARTIR DE 16/12/2013, OBSERVADAS AS CONDICOES LEGAIS. |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    EP12197525|2012-12-17|
    EP12197525.4|2012-12-17|
    PCT/EP2013/076725|WO2014095737A1|2012-12-17|2013-12-16|Method and apparatus for marking manufactured items using physical characteristic|
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